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5 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
6 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

7 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

8 In the Matter of

9 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
10 OF CALIFORNIA

11 (UCLA Research Reactor)

Docket No. 50-142 OL

(Proposed Renewal of
Facility License)

12 MOTION FOR CURTAILMENT OF ACTIVITIES (II)

13 The 1984 Olympics

14 I. Introduction

15 On July 19, 1983,^{1/} the Committee to Bridge the Gap moved the
16 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to expedite evidentiary hearings on
17 the adequacy of security at the UCLA nuclear reactor, a matter largely
18 deferred for the last three years while certain threshold issues were
19 resolved. CBG requested that those security hearings be scheduled for
20 no later than February 15, 1984, so that the issue of the adequacy of
21 the reactor's security could be resolved well in advance of the 1984
22 Olympic Games, a portion of which are to be held at UCLA. Indeed, UCLA
23 is to be Olympic Village, with thousands of athletes housed within a
24 few hundred meters of the UCLA nuclear reactor.

25
26 ^{1/} renewed July 25, October 14, and December 13. Those motions have
27 not yet been ruled upon.

1 CBC pointed to published reports that the reactor was,
2 as Newsweek called it, "an obvious target for terrorists" during the
3 summer Olympics, and for that reason requested that the stalled security
4 proceeding be expedited so that there would be sufficient time to take
5 whatever protective measures the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
6 might rule necessary. It was CBC's position that the Special Nuclear
7 Materials on site should be shipped offsite prior to the Olympics and
8 remain offsite during the Olympics, the period of greatest risk.
9 It had been the position of UCLA, however, that sabotage protection,
10 whether during the Olympics or at any other time, was not required by
11 NRC regulations.^{2/} That threshold matter has now been disposed of by
12 the Board in its May 11 and October 24 Memoranda and Orders, affirming
13 that sabotage protection is indeed required by 10 CFR 73.40.

14 As arrangements for shipping Special Nuclear Materials take
15 many months, and as the irradiated fuel must be cooled down prior to
16 being shipped, a clock has been ticking ever since CBC's July motion
17 for expedited proceedings on the security issues.

18 There now appears to be little possibility of hearing by
19 February 15. However, were decision to be reached later, and the Board
20 to concur with CBC's position that the unique security situation posed
21 by the Olympics mandates that Special Nuclear Material not be at a
22 reactor only a few hundred feet away, it could be too late to take the
23 necessary action. The fuel would not have time to cool for shipping,
24

25 ^{2/} This despite the Columbia decision, the clear language of 10 CFR 73.40,
26 the Commission's annual reports to Congress indicating all research reactors
27 must have sabotage protection, the assertions of Staff's affiant Carlson
28 at the research reactor safeguards meetings that 73.40 requires all research
reactors to protect against sabotage, and numerous exchanges of correspondence
through the 1970s between UCLA and the NRC about the sabotage protection
requirements.

1 and there would not be sufficient time to make the necessary, time-
2 consuming arrangements for such shipping.^{2/}

3 Therefore, the operations of the facility must now be curtailed,
4 so that the irradiation level can decline in preparation for possible
5 off-shipment, and arrangements must now be made for shipping to be
6 completed sufficiently prior to the Olympics so that potential terrorists
7 know there is nothing worth attacking at the reactor facility, that no
8 fuel is even on site.

9 These actions-- curtailment of operation and preparations for
10 off-shipment-- can always be reversed if, after hearing the evidence,
11 the Board determines them unnecessary. But failure to take these
12 precautionary measures now would foreclose the Board's later determination
13 that they are necessary, and could thus pose a major and irreversible
14 threat to public health and safety.

15 II. Discussion

16 To Not Act Now is to Act by Default

17 The Board has before it CBG's contentions that security at
18 the facility is inadequate. A major risk is associated with the
19 upcoming Olympics, to begin in July. Even if hearings are now expedited,
20 as CBG continues to request, it is unlikely that a Board decision could
21 be issued before late May at the earliest, what with pending protective
22

23 ^{2/} Counsel for UCLA explained at the July 25, 1983, hearing (TR 2098)
24 that the "incredibly complex" arrangements necessary to package and ship
25 such materials, including getting approval for shipping containers,
26 final destinations, and so on, require that the arrangements be made well in
27 advance of the prospective shipment date. Likewise, no off-shipment from
28 the facility has occurred to date without a long cooling-down period.
Delays spent debating the precise minimum advance period necessary will
doubtless take us over the threshold to the point of no return.

1 order, discovery, and summary disposition matters to resolve before
2 hearings and filing of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
3 after hearing. Even were a Board decision possible by late May,
4 it would be too late to take the measures the Board may have determined
5 necessary. Potentially catastrophic public injury by successful sabotage
6 of the UCLA nuclear reactor during the Olympics-- which the Board may
7 in May or thereafter rule preventable by fuel offshipment-- could not in
8 fact be prevented because there was no longer sufficient time left in
9 which to arrange the necessary precautions.

10 Stated somewhat differently, if the Board does not now curtail
11 operations and commence off-shipment preparations, the Board will
12 have essentially decided-- by default and without an evidentiary base--
13 the critical issue of adequate reactor security in the face of the Olympics
14 threat. Failing to curtail now would foreclose the Board's ability
15 to rule at all on this important matter, producing irreversible injury.

16 To not take precautionary, reversible measures now to preserve
17 the Board's ability to rule on the matter before it would be, in effect,
18 to reward delay. The Board has twice overruled UCLA's arguments that
19 sabotage protection is not required, and may, if CBG prevails on the
20 facts as well as the law, determine that the specific measures suggested
21 by CBG regarding the Olympics are necessary. Without the proposed
22 precautionary actions taken now, however, such a ruling might be simply
23 too late to prevent a truly catastrophic event.

24 Irreversible Injury: Tremendous Potential for Public Harm

25 The Board already has before it sworn testimony and declarations
26 indicating that sabotage at the UCLA reactor could have devastating results
27 in terms of public exposures to radiation. A release of just 25% of the
28 radiiodines could result in doses in excess of a million Rem to the

1 thyroid near the facility and doses in excess of legal limits out 75
2 kilometers (see sworn testimony by Dr. Roland Finston of Stanford,
3 Dr. Lowell Wayne of Southern California Federation of Scientists, et al).^{4/}
4 Sabotage could release far in excess of 25% of the UCLA reactor's radio-
5 iodines (see, e.g., Kaku declaration, P 83, indicating 80% release from
6 explosion and incendiary-induced fire).

7 Judge Luebke at an early prehearing conference (TR 125)
8 inquired as to whether there weren't irradiation ports through which
9 harmful materials could be inserted into the core, the consequences of
10 which might be considerably more severe than those of the accident
11 conceived by Staff and Applicant to be the maximum accident credible.
12 Without going into detail here, it is obvious that tremendous damage
13 could be intentionally done to the reactor in question-- with explosives,
14 incendiary devices, simple arson, or through other means. If one recalls
15 the extensive physical damage done to the U.S. Embassy and Marine
16 Headquarters recently just by car bombs, and considers in addition to
17 the consequences of equivalent physical destruction the release of
18 hundreds of thousands of curies of radioactive fission products in a
19 huge U.S. city while the whole world's attention is captured because of
20 the Olympics, the magnitude of the threat becomes apparent.

21 As indicated in CBG's Panel IV testimony during the recent
22 inherent safety hearings, the radiological consequences from even less
23 severe, non-intentional destructive incidents could be enormous.
24 The injury that could result to the public from calculated, intentional
25 destruction, given the dense population nearby, swollen even greater by
26 the Olympics, must give pause to those responsible for atomic safety.

27 Counsel for UCLA, at the February 23, 1983, prehearing
28

^{4/} There are millions of people within 75 kilometers of the reactor site.

1 conference (TR 905), said about the UCLA reactor, "We certainly never
2 said it is inherently safe from sabotage. That is an absurd proposition."
3 Yet, despite admitting that the reactor isn't inherently protected by
4 nature of its design from radiological sabotage, it has been UCLA's
5 position throughout this proceeding that it was not required to have
6 a physical security plan to prevent sabotage, a position the Board has
7 ruled contrary to NRC regulations. A tragedy of major proportions could
8 result if compliance measures-- meeting Board approval-- are not in place
9 prior to the Olympics.

10 The Threat is Real

11
12 There are daily press reports about the potential for tragedy
13 at the upcoming Olympics, which represent a tremendous attraction to
14 potential terrorists.

15 Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl F. Gates, interviewed December 18,
16 1983, on "Face the Nation," (reported in the Los Angeles Times of December
17 19), said the 1984 Olympics would provide a "great stage for those who
18 want to get across a message" through acts of violence.

19 Newsweek (June 27, 1983) reports about the dangers associated
20 with the Olympics due to various groups "who might be eager to settle
21 political grudge matches before an international TV audience estimated
22 at 2.5 billion."

23 The UCLA reactor has been prominently identified as a likely
24 target. Newsweek again:

25 "One obvious target for terrorists is the small nuclear
26 reactor at UCLA. LAOOC security director Edgar Best
27 insists that the 100-kilowatt training device poses no
28 real danger but UCLA Prof. Walter Wegst disagrees, saying
that an explosion could cause fallout that would reach
the 5,200-athlete Olympic Village located on campus."

(emphasis added)

1 Playboy, in a May 1983 article entitled "A Terrorist's Guide
2 to the 1984 Olympics" describes a tour by a security expert of the areas
3 near the Olympic Villages (the student housing areas at UCLA and USC):

4 "Maps of the campuses are readily available. When Miller
5 and I visited UCLA, it was difficult for us to figure out
6 how anyone could control traffic and access to those busy
7 areas. 'There are service tunnels all over the place,'
8 said Miller, 'They'll have to watch those. Christ, here's
9 Boelter Hall. You know what's in there?'

10 'No,' I said.

11 'A fucking nuclear reactor. It's right in the middle of LA.
12 One terrorist cell-- four men-- goes in there, sets time charges
13 in satchel bombs and booby-traps the works and....'

14 'Holy shit,' I said.

15 'That's a lot of publicity, a little meltdown and fallout,'
16 he said."

17
18 The issue, thus, has become very widely known, due to these and other
19 articles, and the reactor is widely reported to be a primary target
20 during the upcoming Olympics. UCLA, instead of assuring the public
21 that adequate security precautions will be taken, continues to assert
22 that none are required. The matter is public-- both the attractive
23 nature of the target and the assertions by its supposed protectors that
24 the reactor is essentially unprotected. One must presume that this
25 state of affairs has not escaped the attention of those who might be
26 interested in creating mischief at the Olympics.

1 The threat is not fanciful. The public identification of
2 the UCLA nuclear reactor as a prime target for sabotage must be considered
3 in the context of the terrorist attack on the Israeli athletes at the
4 Munich Olympics and also the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi research reactor,
5 with pledges by Arab supporters throughout the world to retaliate in kind.
6 In the current rash of political bombings, a nuclear reactor a few hundred
7 meters away from Olympic Village and many of the televised games is a
8 tempting target for a wide array of violence-prone individuals or groups.
9 Newsweek quotes LAFD Cmdr. Rathburn as saying, "Every conflict that
10 exists anywhere in the world is represented on both sides somewhere
11 in southern California." Any group, large or small, with a propensity
12 to violence and a cause that it wishes to publicize may be drawn to
13 some terrorist act at the Olympics. The reactor must be considered a
14 likely target of such people.

15
16 The Reactor Facility-- and Thus the Public-- Essentially Unprotected

17
18 Applicant has repeatedly conceded in this proceeding that
19 its security plan is not designed to prevent sabotage, and is merely
20 designed to detect attempts at unauthorized removal of the weapons-
21 grade nuclear materials on site. The unprotected nature of the site
22 is thus a matter of public record.

23 Although it is CEG's position that more than just detection
24 of theft attempts is required, even by 10 CFR 73.67, and that UCLA couldn't
25 even adequately detect such an attempt, the issue of detection is essentially
26 meaningless when it comes to sabotage. Even assuming an alarm system
27 which works, the sound of an explosion at the reactor would reach the
28 campus police station at virtually the same instant as the alarm-- which
would be, obviously, far too late. The whole town would know the same

1 moment the police do that an explosion has taken place. Furthermore,
2 a political hostage situation during which terrorists take over the
3 reactor and threaten to blow it up and kill the hostages if their demands
4 are not met (release of political prisoners, a million dollars, free
5 air time to broadcast a manifesto, or whatever) is predicated on being
6 detected-- the whole purpose of the act is for it to be known as widely
7 as possible. Lack of preventive measures is thus an invitation to tragedy.

8 The specific security problems at the facility-- and they are
9 many and varied-- for obvious reasons should not be explicitly detailed
10 in a public pleading such as this. CBG stands ready to delineate the
11 security weaknesses one by one in the appropriate setting (the long-
12 awaited evidentiary hearings), including documentary evidence as well
13 as testimony by experts and professionals in various aspects of security
14 and nuclear safeguards. ^{5/}

15
16 Curtailment and Off-Shipment the Only Effective Protection

17 The facility-- by UCLA's own admission-- is essentially
18 unprotected against radiological sabotage and has a mere theft detection
19 program of questionable effectiveness. On the first matter the Board
20 has ruled that lack of sabotage protection plan is in violation of
21 10 CFR 73.40(a). In a related motion for curtailment (December 14, 1983)
22 on that matter, CBG argues that the facility must be shut down and
23 the fuel shipped offsite because the regulations prohibit possession
24 or utilization of Special Nuclear Materials without an approved plan
25 for sabotage protection.

26 Because the facility is essentially unprotected, curtailment
27 and off-shipment are necessary on the independent grounds of the

28 ^{5/} Access to certain areas and documents remains to be provided to
complete the reviews.

1 Olympics. No other precaution can reduce the probability of a
2 terrorist act to an acceptably low level, particularly given site
3 characteristics that should not be detailed here and the potential
4 consequences of such an act if successful, already of record.^{6/}

5 Given the particular site characteristics, which make
6 normal protective measures very difficult, the only truly effective
7 measure to prevent the reactor being a target during the Olympics
8 would be to remove its attractiveness as a target.

10 III. Conclusion

11 It is CBG's position that the reactor must be shut down
12 and the fuel off-site during the Olympics. Had consideration of
13 CBG's contention not been so long delayed by summary disposition
14 and related delays, the factual resolution could have occurred in
15 time to institute whatever protective measures the record would
16 indicate to the Board.

17 But with all these delays, the only way for the Board to
18 preserve its ability to rule on this pressing matter and to avoid
19 the possibility of serious, irreparable injury to the public is to
20 curtail operations now and to order that arrangements be initiated
21 now for off-shipment prior to the summer Olympics.

22 CBG requests that a May shipping date be set, to provide
23 some room for unforeseen delays that might extend into June; and
24 that curtailment be instituted now.

25 A May shipping date, now arranged, can always be later
26 cancelled if, after hearing the evidence, the Board finds it unnecessary.


27
28 ^{6/} Shutdown shortly before or during the Olympics with fuel remaining onsite, for reasons best detailed in a less public setting, would not resolve the problem.

1 Likewise, curtailed operations can always be reinstated. But if
2 reversible, preparatory measures are not now taken as a precaution,
3 the Board will have lost the ability to order these protective measures
4 later, should it find that the public safety requires them.

5 CBG continues to await the opportunity to present its
6 evidence-- both documentary and expert opinion-- on the essentially
7 unprotected nature of the UCLA facility and on the necessity of
8 off-shipment of fuel. CBG continues to ask that those evidentiary
9 hearings be expeditiously scheduled. However, unless the Board
10 takes precautionary action now to preserve its ability to rule,
11 any such hearing may be too late to prevent what could be a preventable
12 catastrophe.

13
14
15 executed this twenty-seventh
16 day of December, 1983
17 at Ben Lomond, CA

Respectfully submitted,


Daniel Hirsch
President
Committee to Bridge the Gap

NATIONAL AFFAIRS



**The Official
1984 Olympic Program
puts you ringside, poolside
and trackside.**



Lester Sloan—NEWSWEEK

Games people play: The application for Olympic tickets had Californians waiting on line

Who Will Police the Olympics?

It seems that nothing can dim America's Olympic ardor. Despite reports that the 1984 Los Angeles Games might degenerate into a marathon traffic jam—or be obliterated by smog—more than a million Americans streamed into Sears stores and selected banks last week to pick up ticket brochures. The elaborate order forms they are now completing read like an act of faith in the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC). Prices for as-yet-undefined seats at the more popular events such as the gymnastics and swimming finals range from \$40 to \$95, and a pass to all 26 boxing sessions costs \$2,200—providing you are lucky enough to be selected at random by the computer that decides who gets into which sellouts. GET A LOAN, GOTO GAMES, the Los Angeles Times snidely suggested. But the sad truth is that officials will need all of the \$90 million to \$140 million they expect to generate from ticket revenues to ensure that the Olympics are not disrupted by terrorists. In a real sense, the main event at next summer's Games will be a two-week-long exercise in synchronized policing.

Or at least the hope is that the 60-odd federal, state and local agencies charged with handling Olympic security will become synchronized by the time the flame is kindled in the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum on July 28, 1984. Rather than face the delicate question of just who is in charge right now, the various authorities have opted for a byzantine method of coexistence in which an Olympics Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee oversees a Security Planning Committee that incorporates an Integrated Planning Group consisting of 16 subcommittees. The endless meetings deriving from this makeshift bureaucracy have made it possible for everyone from FBI operatives to the chief of campus police at the University of Southern California to voice an opinion, and as yet very little

plumage has been ruffled. On the other hand, it's still unclear who would spring into action if, say, a group of Third World "athletes" suddenly made a suicide run on the presidential box. And no one has seemed particularly eager to choose from among the FBI's SWAT team, the marksmen of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the U.S. Army's crack antiterrorist squad, Delta Team—the three most likely candidates for the job.

Threats: The one thing everyone does seem to agree on is that whichever emerges as the ultimate authority will need all the help it can get. "Every conflict that exists anywhere in the world is represented on both sides somewhere in southern California," says LAPD Cmdr. William Rathburn. In that volatile climate, anti-American violence perpetrated by a group such as the Puerto Rican FALN is just one of many possible threats. Of equal concern to authorities are extremists linked to the Arab world, the Irish Republican Army, Armenia, China and the Philippines who might be eager to settle political grudge matches before an international TV audience estimated at 2.5 billion. One obvious target for terrorists is the small nuclear reactor at UCLA. LAOOC security director Edgar Best insists that the 100-kilowatt training device poses no real danger but UCLA Prof. Walter Wegst disagrees, saying that an explosion could cause fallout that would reach the 5,200-athlete Olympic Village located on campus.

The challenge inherent in policing an Olympics that will be spread over 23 "venues" as far as 200 miles apart only serves to make the job more

attractive to the competing agencies. Unwilling to cede even the international aspect of security without a struggle, Rathburn and LAPD Chief Daryl Gates visited Asia, the Middle East and Europe in the past year to gather information on terrorists in the hope that they can avoid being bullied into a minor role by the FBI and CIA. "Counterterrorism is not their exclusive turf," insists an LAPD official.

The White House, concerned enough to request \$69.1 million in federal funds for Olympic security, is clearly not amused by the prospective turf battles. Six weeks ago the Reagan administration retained the Austin, Texas, consulting firm headed by retired Army Col. Charles Beckwith, ground commander of the ill-fated 1980

Iranian-hostage-rescue mission, to produce an evaluation of antiterrorist planning thus far. NEWSWEEK has learned that in an interim report Beckwith cited the lack of cooperation among the law-enforcement agencies as a chief problem—and called for the appointment of a czar to coordinate the federal role in Olympic security. Armed with Beckwith's findings, White House aide Michael Deaver flew to Los Angeles two weeks ago for an interorganizational meeting—and plans to visit Fort Bragg, N.C., to see the Delta Team in training.


Meanwhile, the White House has named Kenneth Hill, a veteran State Department security officer, to serve as liaison between the LAOOC and the Reagan administration. But for all the apparent confusion, no one in Washington or Los Angeles seems ready to panic. "Security will be there and will be very sufficient," says Rathburn. "There is a very high possibility of something happening, but my gut feeling at this time is that we will not have a major terrorist incident."

Judging by the way they are queuing up for ticket order forms, Americans seem to share that optimistic view. And despite the long waits and shocking prices, the atmosphere at most outlets was anything but grim. "It's the hottest ticket in town," beamed Californian Craig Furniss after picking up his brochure. At a bank in Los Angeles, one customer got around the one-order-blank-per-household rule by repeatedly going outside to slip into different disguises. Given such old-fashioned American ingenuity, the LAOOC may yet produce an event worthy of America's Olympian expectations.

Beckwith: Concerned



CHARLES LEERHSEN with MARTIN KASINDORF and JANET HUCK in Los Angeles



A TERRORISTS' GUIDE TO THE 1984 OLYMPICS

article **By JAMES P. WOHL**

While the 1984 Olympic Games are being touted as Disneyland with sweat by the public-relations staff at the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, it is a safe bet that plans to shatter that showcase of democracy have already been set in motion. The world has come to expect the death of innocents in the pursuit of the principal terrorist goal: publicity. Given the complexities of guarding the 1984 summer games, those plans have an awesome chance of success.

Security for the games is the responsibility of an umbrella group called the Olympic Law Enforcement Coordinating Council. The organizing committee is represented on the council by Edgar Best, a talented, tough ex-special agent in charge of the Los Angeles office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who has been meeting for nearly two years with local, state and Federal law-enforcement agencies, as well as with political figures—including the President of the United States. But the logistics are tremendously complex. At the Montreal games, only five agencies needed coordination; in Moscow, only two. For the 1984 Olympics, Best and other top personnel are attempting the task of coordinating 60 law-enforcement agencies. Sources within the Los Angeles Police Department indicate that the task is overwhelming.

The Law Enforcement Coordinating Council has set up 27 subcommittees in charge of intelligence, transportation, SWAT, air support, communications, traffic, crowd control and the like. Although Best downplays the dangers of internal dissension, it is a fact that rivalries, jealousies and the idiosyn-

crasies of individual law-enforcement bureaucracies have crippled police work many times in the past. Those problems could be especially troublesome at the Olympics, where neither Best's council nor the L.A.P.D. has the legal means to force meetings and cooperation with autonomous local agencies—much less with the FBI, the CIA or the Secret Service. "Autonomy is a major problem," a source in the L.A.P.D. told me. "If we can't force cooperation, how are we going to guard Marcos or Castro or Mitterrand or Reagan?"

Cooperation aside, Best doesn't share the feeling—expressed by some front-line cops—that foreign battles will be fought in Los Angeles by terrorists seeking publicity. It is his opinion that the Munich massacre of Israeli athletes caused a backlash that would discredit similar terrorist action now.

"Black September no longer exists because of that," he said.

Over at the L.A.P.D., the spokesman—and the chief of Olympics security for the police department—is Commander Bill Rathburn, whose background in antiterrorist work is nil. He isn't sure what qualified him for the job of Olympics planning. He is sure, however, that no one can guarantee a safe Olympics. He, too, attempts to downplay the coordination problems.

"I was originally uncomfortable with the lack of legislative direction to coordinate security," he said. "Many people in responsible positions were and still are. But I feel now that the recognition of local autonomy is the cornerstone of our effort."

The good news is that there is a reputable (continued on page 182)

if terrorists have plans to make los angeles another munich, the only way to outmaneuver them is to see the games through their eyes

presence that caused the anxiety. What electrified the place was the uncertainty. Would it be the man entering the elevator carrying flowers? Would it be the unoccupied taxicab parked by the side of the building? It might be a gun, a rocket, a poisoned apple or the Armenian double-bomb trick, in which the first bomb goes off, a crowd gathers to see what has happened, and then the second bomb goes off. Terrorism: Guess. Guess again.

Just one month earlier, Gemayel's brother, Bashir—himself the newly elected president of Lebanon—had been killed when a 400-pound bomb destroyed the Christian Phalangist headquarters in east Beirut. When Amin Gemayel left the Madison Hotel after a two-day visit, one could see the relief in the faces of the doormen, the concierge and the assistant managers: The place had not been blown up. No one had even phoned in a bomb threat. Gemayel was now someone else's problem.

We hear about terrorism almost daily, yet few of us have a precise notion of what it is. Fewer yet could say what sort of people we would find behind the ski masks. The experts aren't really sure of what most terrorists want. They haven't even been able to agree on a definition of terrorism. But however we choose to define it, terrorism has become a fact of life. Between 1970 and 1980, according to a 1981 conference at Los Alamos National Laboratories, nearly three terrorist operations per day were reported world-wide. The total number of people killed by terrorism in that ten-year period has been estimated at around 10,000. The cost in property destroyed was about \$200,000 per day. At least \$150,000,000 in reported kidnaping ransom was collected by terrorists between January 1, 1971, and late 1982. The security necessitated by terrorism costs billions. But terrorism is not only a major economic influence in the world today, it's a psychological and a political one as well.

It has permanently altered Western Europe, Japan, South America, Central America, the Middle East, Africa—most of the world, in other words. And now, some experts say, the U.S. may be the next big target.

There are people paid to worry about just that possibility, and in the International Club of Washington, where some of them gather to eat lunch, the tension is sometimes as thick as the cigarette smoke. Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies (C.S.I.S.) is located in the same building. C.S.I.S. is a private think tank, and a lot of the thinking that goes on there these days concerns terrorism.

I sat in the club one day last summer listening to two of the world's top experts on terrorism, Yacov Heichal, former head

TERRORISTS' GUIDE

(continued from page 90)

"The U.S. is a paradise for the terrorist. Everyone wants to help here and usually does."

antiterrorist expert working for the L.A.P.D. He is Commander George Morrison, and my source indicated that he is called in to advise law-enforcement agencies all over the country. Rathburn wouldn't let me talk with him, however. It seems that Morrison has drawn departmental rebukes for his outspoken dealings with the press—for telling it like it is, in other words.

As for the FBI, it has generally maintained a low-profile, no-comment posture on its Olympics planning. Director William Webster has indicated, however, that the bureau expects to take a leading role in the event of a terrorist raid. Its response force will include its own SWAT team, as well as the Delta "Blue Light" Team, the United States' answer to the British anti-terrorist Special Air Service and the West German G.S.G.9.

Sources in the L.A.P.D. bridled at the suggestion that the plans that have been developed locally over the past two years will be pre-empted by the bureau. Meanwhile, the FBI's press-relations agent told me, "You're on the right track trying to pin down just who has the responsibility." Then he added, "Lotsa luck."

But even with Morrison's expertise, even with the FBI and the Blue Light Team, this looks like a bad time to be holding an Olympics in the U.S., much less in Los Angeles, where far-flung facilities

make security especially tough. I wanted to find out how the other side might be viewing things, so I got together with someone who knows the terrorist mind and method firsthand.

"You look like shit," I told John Miller when I picked him up at Los Angeles International Airport. Miller is a brawling professional soldier who trained with the Special Air Service in Great Britain. He was undercover in Belfast against the Irish Republican Army. He kidnaped the Great Train Robbery fugitive, Ronnie Biggs, from Brazil. The international press keeps an eye on this archetypal rogue, who's always in transit and trouble. He had just gotten back from a foray into Angola. A discolored right cheek added authenticity.

"I got hit with a rifle butt," he said. "We were reconnoitering—looking for an opportunity to take some British and American mercenaries out of prison down there. Three big guys jumped up. We put them down and left the guns. Stupid. My mate got shot under here." He poked his thumb at my back. "Had to leave 'im with some friends. He was coughing up blood. Nicked the lung, I think."

We started to fill each other in on Olympics logistics. In 1932, Los Angeles was the first Olympics city to build housing facilities specifically for the games. In modern times, it will be the first *not* to build new facilities. The University of California at

Los Angeles and the University of Southern California will house the majority of the athletes. Never have the games been scheduled at such geographic distances as the 1984 venues, the Olympics word for the playing sites. The 23 venues are spread out beyond the boundaries of the County of Los Angeles, which itself covers an area of more than 4000 square miles. Never has so much space been allocated for media representatives: The entire Los Angeles Convention Center—334,000 square feet of floor area—has been leased. And never has the President of the United States officiated at the opening ceremonies.

"To compound the problems, you're also dealing with a nation of nice guys," Miller said as we sat down to dinner at a restaurant on Sunset Strip. "The U.S. is a paradise for the terrorist. Everyone wants to help here and usually does. Especially to help people with a foreign accent. You can't even look over a fence in Russia. Also, the U.S. is an open target because it's the only country in the world where every piece of necessary military equipment is sold right in the open or nearly so. Give me a few hours and I'll get you an antitank cannon with live shells for your front yard."

"They'll send in a four-man cell to reconnoiter," he continued. "They'll dig away and gather information."

"How hard is it to get that kind of information?" I asked.

"How hard? Tomorrow, I'll show you."


The next day, we went to the Olympic Organizing Committee headquarters at the UCLA campus. I told someone in the press wing that I was writing something. Ten minutes later, I had maps, schedules and information about the venues, as well as detailed geographic and demographic information about the city of Los Angeles. I didn't show any I.D. until later, when I interviewed Best. He was the only careful person I spoke with—the only one who seemed to recognize that effective security starts long before the games themselves. On the way out, Miller lifted an official organizing-committee security badge. He just took the badge from a visitor's clothes. "A ticket," he said.

"And if you could do it——" I started to say.

"That's right. So could they. That's America. This badge would get any terrorist admittance to the inside, at least during the planning stages. I don't think there's another country that's so bloody easy."

"No one can guarantee public safety at the 1984 games," he said. "There is no way Russia, even a post-Brezhnev Russia, is going to want to see it blood-free. Whatever the Soviets' involvement in international terrorism, they'd like to demonstrate that which you ignore on an international scale: that the freedom Americans have is fraught with danger and crime and murder. You may be rich and free, but you have no discipline or order—prized values in the rest of the





world. The Soviets would also like to teach the U.S. a lesson for Jimmy Carter's decision to trash the summer games in 1980. It's the only answer to Moscow's broken window on communism. What can L.A. do to protect itself? It can't adequately protect its ordinary citizens from domestic predators."

The city has black and Latin gangs that can't be controlled, plus the cops are going to have their hands full with more ordinary home-grown cons and creeps. Every pimp, whore, grifter, drifter, pickpocket, con man, crackpot, flimflam man, swindler, diddler and panhandler within 500 miles will be in L.A., moving in for the kill.

And then you get to the visitors. Anti-nuke, antiwar, anti-abortion activists; neo-Nazis; Ku Klux Klanners; the Jewish Defense League; fellow-traveler U.S. citizens from 30 countries; Solidarity activists; the Weather Underground; Black Liberation Army; and uncounted splinter organizations—they'll all be moving in for a shot at the gold headlines.

"What about the backlash after Munich?" I asked Miller. "Black September is gone from the scene, and the P.L.O.

has, after all, moved into the political arena. Edgar Best thinks that it'll be calm here, like Moscow, Montreal and Lake Placid."

"Maybe," he said. "But these people are terrorists. That's their business. That's how they live. They all work together. Just because the provisional wing of the I.R.A. gets some parliamentary representation doesn't mean that it won't be out killing horses and kids and heroes, like Mountbatten. Terrorists' egos are tied to destruction, and their employment depends on death.

"You retire them like this." He pointed a finger at my temple. "You take them and kill them as quick as you can. They don't sit around rocking at some old folks' home; they have to tucking *die*. It's like getting fired."

We visited the two principal Olympic Villages—the student housing areas at the huge USC and UCLA campuses. While the facilities weren't built for security, Commander Rathburn said that they would be secured and the athletes would be completely isolated. When I mentioned Munich, he had no comment. He knew

what I was writing about. "I'd like to keep a lid on this whole thing," he said. "You're playing with dynamite."

Maps of the campuses are readily available. When Miller and I visited UCLA, it was difficult for us to figure out how anyone could control traffic and access to those busy areas. "There are service tunnels all over the place," said Miller. "They'll have to watch those. Christ, here's Boelter Hall. You know what's in there?"

"No," I said.

"A fucking nuclear reactor. It's right in the middle of L.A. One terrorist cell—four men—goes in there, sets time charges in satchel bombs and booby-traps the works and . . ."

"Holy shit," I said.

"That's a lot of publicity, a little meltdown and fallout," he said. "The athletes are going to have exposure going to and coming from those widespread venues. No Olympics participants have ever had to be trucked so far. It's a nightmare to control, and there will be many targets of opportunity."

The weight-lifting events will be held at

Loyola Marymount University. We walked through the gymnasium. "The Israelis will be a number-one target," Miller said. "Weight lifting is one of their sports. It could happen here. A cell could take over or rent one of the little private houses on the road in here and use a couple of hand-launched wire-guided missiles. The bus comes by and—zap!—easy escape. L.A. has a lot of roads."

"What about diversionary tactics?" I asked.

"They're not going to waste bodies with grandstanding," he said. "They'll pick one prime target and a secondary one. Sure,

they could drop a bunch of incendiary devices in the hills and forests. They could burn Southern California and distract an entire raft of police and firemen, but that's not likely. No, it would be risking bodies to take bodies."

The Los Angeles Convention Center will hold news representatives from all over the world. Again, we had no trouble gaining access through a back door. Part of the eight-acre facility was being used for an exotic-plant-growers convention. "This could be a real problem," said Miller. He showed me where city garbage trucks drive right up on the main floor. "Load

one of those trucks with explosives and that's a lot of news. That's I.R.A.-style stuff. And, probably, this facility is not going to get much protection. The security people are going to have to watch everything."

At the Forum, the basketball venue, we ascertained that security would be provided mostly by the guards used for normal activities. "Those guys are OK for rowdies and drunks," Miller said. "A lot of them are off-duty cops, and they can bust teeth. But against trained terrorists, you need pros. That's a problem."

We visited most of the other venues. Even to an untrained eye, the opportunities for a creative scenario for death loomed clear, from sniping at the yachting events in Long Beach Harbor to automatic fire on massed cyclists on the road at Cal State University in Dominguez Hills to a grenade assault at the equestrian events at Santa Anita Park.

"This is a town of theatrics," Miller said. "Terrorism is high theater with publicity as the prize. Whatever terrorists do, it has to be huge and terrible."

When we visited the Coliseum, the site of the opening ceremonies and the track-and-field events, Miller immediately noticed the number of entrances. "There are 90 ways in here. It'll take an army to vet the spectators. At the opening ceremonies, they'll have heads of state, the business-and-industry sponsors..."

"It's an election year; a lot of candidates will be here," I said.

"And President Reagan," he said. "They might try a Sadat-type suicide run, say from the marching athletes..."

We walked into the huge empty arena. No one stopped us. "This would be the prime target," Miller said. "The President will probably land out there on the field by helicopter. Security will have to do a real job here."

We climbed all over, looking for vantage points. It was eerie contemplating destruction. "Maybe they'll just rent a military-type Cobra helicopter and outfit it with fire control," said Miller. "You can rent anything in Hollywood; they use them in films. Then it comes in over the far side there with rockets. *Wham!*"

"Yecch," I said. "They'd have to be crazy. What an end."

"Not quite," he said. "The terrorists are doing business. Security has to bankrupt them. Unless interagency rivalry disappears, unless intelligence is quick and coordination is ironclad, this could be the last Olympics."


The reconnaissance tour was over and I was driving him to the airport. His cheek was almost healed and he was leaving to find more trouble. He was always in the thick of it.

"So, where are you going to be on July 28, 1984?" I said.

"Right here in L.A.," Miller said. "Where else?"



DRAMBUKE OVER ICE WITH PARK PLACE



Olympics Terror Colors U.C.L.A. Reactor Fight

By JUDITH CUMMINGS

Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, July 29 — On any school day 50,000 people are studying or working at the sunny, palm-dotted campus of the University of California at Los Angeles. Hundreds of thousands more live near the campus in neighborhoods of upper middle-class apartments and homes.

For more than two decades these people have worked or lived near a nuclear research reactor operated by U.C.L.A. That reactor is now the focus of an anti-nuclear protest that has suddenly become more intense and more successful than in the past.

The nuclear opponents, led by an environmentalist group called the Committee to Bridge the Gap, want the reactor shut down. They say it is a possible safety hazard in a densely populated urban area and, in a sensitive new element of concern, they add that it is presumably a tempting target for potential terrorist sabotage during next summer's Olympic Games.

U.C.L.A. is to be the site of one of the Olympic Villages where athletes competing in the Games will stay. The village will be about a mile from the campus building that houses the reactor. In the aftermath of the 1972 Olympics in Munich, where 11 Israeli athletes were killed in a terrorist attack, security planning is of major concern here.

Relicensing Is Opposed

The environmentalist group is opposing U.C.L.A.'s application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for a renewed 20-year license to operate the reactor. A panel of the regulatory commission, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, started public hearings on the application last week. The hearings are expected to continue through October. The board's decision can be appealed, posing the possibility of a long wait before the question is resolved.

There are 70 research reactors throughout the country operating in capacities similar to the one here, but U.C.L.A.'s Argonaut-type reactor, initially licensed in 1960, is one of the older. Jim Hanchett, a spokesman for

the nuclear commission, said the agency had no knowledge of any safety-related incidents at any of them.

Nevertheless, the opponents scored an important victory last February when the licensing board stated: "U.C.L.A. and staff maintain that U.C.L.A.'s Argonaut University Training Reactor is an inherently safe machine. We find that this conclusion is subject to dispute."

Officials at the university maintain the reactor's design makes it "a physical impossibility" for a serious accident or dangerous radiation release to occur under normal operating conditions.

'Power of 100 Hair Dryers'


Tom Tugend, a spokesman for the university, said the research reactor operated at a maximum power level of only 100 kilowatts. "We compare it to the equivalent power consumed by 100 home hair dryers," he said. Nuclear power reactors generate 30,000 times the power, he said.

Opponents reject such reasoning. "U.C.L.A. says it's tiny compared to power reactors, but we say it's at least as dangerous because it lacks the safety features of a power reactor," said Steven Aftergood, an engineer who is an official of the Committee to Bridge the Gap. The organization was founded in 1970, and many of its members are former U.C.L.A. students who have continued their campus activism.

The licensing board, in an unusual statement in its March 1983 order calling for the hearings, noted the high population density, the lack of a buffer zone between the reactor and the population, and the lack of a containment structure. Under such conditions, the panel said, "the board expects U.C.L.A. to show that the reactor is not only safe, but safe by a wide margin."

University officials concede they cannot rule out a radiation hazard under catastrophic conditions, such as an act of terrorist sabotage.

"I don't know the answer," Mr. Tugend said. "If somebody drops a bomb on the building or explodes a thousand



Associated Press

Nuclear research reactor at the University of California at Los Angeles. Foes of nuclear power challenge its safety.

pounds of dynamite, this is what they're debating at the hearing."

Safety Precautions Described

He acknowledged that the reactor included no buffer or containment building, but he said it was encased in more than seven feet of concrete in three separate walls, which created more than adequate protection.

The reactor produces a radioactive gas, argon 41, that university officials say becomes harmless after 14 hours. Nuclear opponents contend some of the radiation would reach the population before the radioactive particles decayed.

The opponents have lined up expert testimony to contend that even under normal, noncatastrophic conditions the

reactor poses unacceptable hazards, among them a threat that an unanticipated surge of power could balloon exponentially before safety mechanisms could intervene to shut down the reactor.

Standoff at Columbia University

A similar standoff pitting the research needs of a major university against those of a dense urban population was seen at Columbia University, where protests in the days after the 1978 nuclear accident at Pennsylvania's Three Mile Island power plant prevented the activation of a reactor on the Morningside Heights campus. As a result, Columbia's Triga Mark II reactor, which was completed in 1968 and licensed in 1977, has never been fueled.

A Columbia spokesman, Judith Lindsey, said the university had no plans to change the reactor's dormant status.

The dispute at U.C.L.A. is the first contested relicensing of any reactor power or research. Earlier protests have been over initial licensing applications. Local antinuclear forces say the fact that the fight over the U.C.L.A. reactor has advanced this far is evidence of increased skepticism over the safety of nuclear energy operations and a sign of growing vigor in the anti-nuclear movement.

Even the Nuclear Regulatory Commission might not argue with such a conclusion. "We relicensed the research reactor at Berkeley a few years ago without a peep," Mr. Hanchett said. "Berkeley, of all places."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

In the Matter of

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA

(UCLA Research Reactor)

Docket No. 50-142

(Proposed Renewal of
Facility License)

DECLARATION OF SERVICE

I hereby declare that copies of the attached: MOTION FOR CURTAILMENT
OF ACTIVITIES (II): The 1984 Olympics

in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by
deposit in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, addressed
as indicated, on this date: December 27, 1983.

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Chief, Docketing and Service Section
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
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