

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

PHONE: (609) 339-4309



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

December 13, 1983

Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Dr. Murley:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-058/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-058/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. M. Zupko, Jr.".

J. M. Zupko, Jr.
General Manager -
Salem Operations

JR:k11342

CC: Distribution

Report Number: 83-058/03L

Report Date: 12-13-83

Occurrence Date: 11-18-83

Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Co.
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Containment Systems - 100' El. Containment Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 83-209

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100 % - Unit Load 1143 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 2100 hours, November 18, 1983, during normal power operation, while performing routine air lock testing surveillance, the 100' Elevation Air Lock exterior door exhibited a leakage rate greater than the maximum allowed by SP(O)4.6.1.3a. The air lock was declared inoperable and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.6.1.3 was entered. The interior door remained operable throughout the occurrence and was administratively tagged closed until repairs could be effected on the exterior door.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Upon investigation, it was discovered that the door latch assembly, which is adjusted through the use of slotted bolt holes, was slightly loose and out of adjustment. This prevented the door from exerting the proper pressure against the seals. Although problems with seal leakage have been previously documented and corrective actions are being addressed (see LER 83-050/03L), this problem was unrelated to previous events.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on containment integrity and containment leak rate. Surveillance testing of air lock seals provide assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests.

Action Statement 3.6.1.3 requires:

With an air lock inoperable, restore the air lock to operable status within 24 hours or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

Each door contains two seals. The test pressure is applied between the seals to ensure that there is not excessive leakage due to seal damage. Under actual emergency conditions with a pressure inside of the containment plus a failure of the interior door, the pressure against the exterior door tends to seat the knife edges into the seals. Although the air lock door failed to meet the existing testing requirements, the seal was not damaged and the door would likely have provided a barrier during accident conditions. One door was maintained in an operable status throughout the occurrence, and the inoperable air lock was returned to an operable status within the time specified by the action requirement. No undue risk to the health or safety of the public was therefore involved in this occurrence. This event constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation and is therefore reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:


The latch mechanism was aligned to the proper position and the bolts were tightened; the air lock was retested with both doors exhibiting satisfactory leakage rates. The air lock was declared operable and Action Statement 3.6.1.3 was terminated at 2230 hours, November 18, 1983. No other corrective action was deemed necessary.

FAILURE DATA:

Chicago Bridge and Iron Co.
Personnel Air Lock
Latch Mechanism

Prepared By J. Rupp

SORC Meeting No. 83-148



General Manager -
Salem Operations