

ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY



U- 0685

0982-L

L30-83(12-21)-L

500 SOUTH 27TH STREET, DECATUR, ILLINOIS 62525

Docket No. 50-461

December 21, 1983

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 2
Division of Licensing
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Clinton Power Station Unit 1
Control of Heavy Loads (NUREG-0612)

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

As previously discussed between Terrance Chan, NRC Auxiliary Systems Branch and M. W. Benoit, IP, on November 7, 1983, resolutions to five informally presented questions on IP's July 28, 1983 submittal to Phase I of NUREG-0612 are provided in the attachment to this letter. Items requiring further action by IP will be completed before fuel loading and available for any desired NRC audit.

If you have any questions on the enclosed information, please contact me.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. D. Geier".

J. D. Geier
Manager
Nuclear Station Engineering

MWB/lhm

Attachment

cc: G. A. Harrison, NRC Clinton Licensing Project Manager
N. E. Fioravante, NRC ASB
T. Stickley, EG&G
NRC Resident Office
Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety

8312290288 831221
PDR ADOCK 05000461
A PDR

13030
11

NRC Q1:

"Concerning the generic safe load areas: How were these areas established? Is a total failure of the floor to be permitted? If not, was an analysis performed to show what type of impact (load weight combined with drop height) the floor can take; and how will lifts be limited within these bounds?"

IP A1:

Two generic load path areas were determined for Clinton Power Station Unit I. The first, shown on drawing M01-1419, covers generic lifts made by the Fuel Building crane main or auxiliary hooks over the equipment hatch and the floor space north and west of the equipment hatch. No safe shutdown equipment is located below this load path area. A total failure of the floor is permitted.

The second generic load path area is located on the refueling floor in the Containment as shown on drawing M01-1434, to cover lifts made by the Containment Polar Crane main or auxiliary hooks. Safe shutdown equipment is located on various elevations below this load path area. A load drop analysis will be performed to determine safe load weight/drop height combinations for lifts made in this area not handled by single failure proof lifting systems.

Lifts will be limited within the bounds of these two generic safe load path areas by maintenance or operations procedures.

NRC Q2:

"The drawings provided have safe-load-paths marked on them in pen. This indicates that the paths were marked for review only. There are no assurances that properly marked drawings will accompany or be referenced by the lift procedures."

IP A2:

Maintenance procedures will reference the safe load path drawings.

NRC Q3:

"Some specific load paths are developed for Polar Crane main hook lifts, but IP has indicated that the list is probably not complete. Generic paths should be developed for all other loads. The use of a single-failure-proof (S-F-P) crane does not exempt IP from the load path requirement. (IP should be cautioned that a S-F-P crane by itself also does not constitute a S-F-P lifting system - see NUREG-0612 section 5.1.6)."

IP A3:

See IP A1.

NRC Q4:

"The load drop of the New Fuel Shipping Container is presented here. Does this drop represent an upper bound for all potential drops in this generic area?" (See 1st paragraph on this subject.)"

IP A4:

No. The load drop analysis was done for a New Fuel Shipping Container in the area marked "Safe Load Path Area for New Fuel Shipping Container" on drawing M01-1419 only. The generic area was not considered (see IP A1). This analysis was done because there are components of the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System located below the area.

NRC Q5:

The Dryer/Separator Strongback's load test does not meet the formal requirements of a 150% test. The 125% load test may be acceptable, however, more information should be provided. Basically, if the device is S-F-P, a description of the device and the meaning of the load test is needed. If the device isn't S-F-P, the device description should be accompanied by a discussion of potential load drop consequences.

IP A5:

The strongback will be upgraded to a factor of safety of ten in compliance with section 5.1.6(1a), Single Failure Proof Handling Systems, of NUREG-0612.