

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 0 H D B S 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T

0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 4 6 7 1 1 1 0 8 3 8 1 2 0 9 8 3 9
7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 (NP-33-83-88) On 11/10/83 it was determined that the separation criteria, as required
0 3 by the Fire Hazard Analysis Report (FHAR) is not being maintained between the #1
0 4 Mechanical Penetration Room (Fire Area D) and the #1 Emergency Core Cooling System
0 5 (ECCS) Pump Room (Fire Area A) and between the #2 Mechanical Penetration Room
0 6 (Fire Area D) and the #2 ECCS Pump Room (Fire Area A). Currently an open pipe chase
0 7 exists between each set of rooms. The fire barriers were declared nonfunctional,
0 8 placing the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.10.
7 8 9 80

0 9 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
A B 11 B 12 A 13 Z Z Z Z Z Z 14 Z 15 Z 16
9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR 8 3 21 22
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X 18 X 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 Y 23 N 24 Z 25 Z 9 9 9 9 26
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause of this occurrence is a design error in that Bechtel did not verify the
1 1 as built conditions of the plant, nor did they perform any analysis on open pipe
1 2 chases between fire areas prior to issuing the FHAR. A fire watch was established
1 3 within one hour at each of the pipe chases. An analysis is being performed by Bechtel
1 4 to analyze the above described conditions.
7 8 9 80

1 5 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32
D 28 0 0 0 29 NA A 31 Found by an Operations Engineer.
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 80
1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36
E 33 Z 34 NA NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 80

1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39
0 0 0 37 E 38 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 80

1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41
0 0 0 40 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 80

1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION 43
Z 42 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 80
8312210229 831209
PDR ADOCK 05000346
S PDR

2 0 ISSUED DESCRIPTION 45
Z 44 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 80
NRC USE ONLY
68 69 80

DVR 83-165 NAME OF PREPARER Lynn Richter

PHONE: 259-5000, Ext. 369

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-88

DATE OF EVENT: November 10, 1983

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Criteria for separation between fire areas not being met.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 5, with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On November 10, 1983, it was determined that the fire barrier between the #1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Pump Room which is located in Fire Area A, and the #1 Mechanical Penetration Room, located in Fire Area D, is non-existent, per the as built mechanical drawings. The current as built drawings show a pipe chase which runs through the #1 Mechanical Penetration Room, 585' level, to the #1 ECCS Room, 565' level. Located in this pipe chase are two Radwaste Area Ventilation ducts, one which terminates between the 585' and 603' level, and the other that passes through to the #1 ECCS Pump Room. Located within the latter duct is a fire damper, FD 1.57. The current drawings show that these two ducts should be encased by a concrete floor (the 585' level floor) as well as a wall which separates these ducts from the remainder of the pipe chase. As presently, the concrete floor and wall does not exist in this pipe chase.

With the pipe chase open, the separations criteria, as required by the Fire Hazard Analysis Report (FHAR), between fire areas A & D is not maintained.

Similar conditions were also found between the #2 Mechanical Penetration Room and the #2 ECCS Pump Room. Currently an open pipe chase exists between these two rooms. This condition is reflected in the current drawings.

Since the separation criteria between fire areas is not being met between fire areas A & D, and since open pipe chases between fire areas is not analyzed in the FHAR, these fire barriers were declared nonfunctional at 1645 hours on November 10, 1983. This placed the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.1.0.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence is a design error in that Bechtel did not verify the as built conditions of the plant, nor did they perform any analysis on open pipe chases between fire areas, prior to issuing the FHAR.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. Fire Suppression and Detection Systems are located in these fire areas and are currently operable.

An analysis is currently being performed by Bechtel to analyze the previously described conditions.

Corrective Actions: As per the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.1.0, a fire watch was established at each of the pipe chases within one hour. Pending the receipt of Bechtel's analysis, the appropriate corrective action will be taken and will be documented in a revision to this report.

Failure Data: There have been no previous similar occurrences.

LER #83-165

DMB



December 9, 1983

Log No. K 83-1668
File: RR2 (NP 33-83-88)

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator, Region III
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

LER No. 83-063
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
Date of Occurrence: November 10, 1983

Enclosed are three copies of Licensee Event Report 83-063 which are being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30 day written notification of the subject occurrence.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads 'Terry D. Murray'.

Terry D. Murray
Station Superintendent
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

TDM/ljk

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Richard DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Encl: 30 copies

Mr. Norman Haller, Director
Office of Management and Program Analysis
Encl: 3 copies

Mr. Walt Rogers
NRC Resident Inspector
Encl: 1 copy

DEC 14 1983

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