



Commonwealth Edison

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station
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Docket

50-254

NJK-83-447

December 1, 1983

Mr. Edson G. Case, Deputy Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Case:

Enclosed please find a listing of those changes, tests, and experiments completed during the month of November, 1983, for Quad-Cities Station Units 1 and 2, DPR-29 and DPR-30. A summary of the safety evaluation is being reported in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59.

Thirty-nine copies are provided for your use.

Very truly yours,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

N. J. Kalivianakis

N. J. Kalivianakis
Station Superintendent

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Enclosure

cc: B. Rybak

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SPECIAL TEST 1-69

On November 7, 1983, Special Test 1-69 was completed. The purpose of this test was to test the use of the Economic Generation Control System in raising and lowering Reactor power from both local program control and remote control from the Load Dispatcher's office.

Summary of Safety Evaluation

1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because operation in the automatic flow control mode has been analyzed in the FSAR. In addition, operation in EGC was analyzed in the Dresden FSAR and referenced in the Quad-Cities FSAR.
2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the conditions of this test have previously been analyzed in the Dresden FSAR and these analyses were referenced in the Quad-Cities FSAR.
3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because operation in the automatic flow control mode will be within the limits specified in the Technical Specifications for this mode of operation. Core flow will be maintained between 65 percent and 100 percent, and the proper Kf factor will be applied to the MCPR limit.

SPECIAL TEST 1-71

On November 7, 1983, Special Test 1-71 was completed. The purpose of this test was to obtain data so that the effects of Economic Generation Control operation and nightly load following on core thermal limits and PCIOMR's may be analyzed.

Summary of Safety Evaluation

1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because all load changes will be made in accordance with approved Station procedures. Thus, there are no additional safety implications from possible Recirculation equipment malfunctions and the resulting system transients due to load changes with Recirculation flow than those previously analyzed in the FSAR.
2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because all load changes required by this test are such that the Reactor core will be operated below the licensed core thermal power limit of 2511 MWt and within the bounds of all previously analyzed transients.
3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because all power changes will be performed using approved Station operating procedures and will be within Technical Specification limits.

Reactor Protection System Electrical Protection Assemblies

Description

The Electrical Protection Assemblies (EPAs) are loaded electrically between the RPS power supplies (2 MG Sets plus dirty power) and the RPS buses. On sensing an undervoltage, overvoltage or underfrequency, one or more EPAs will trip; tripping the associated RPS bus. The EPAs are in series pairs to provide redundancy.

It was postulated by the NRC that the existing relays on the RPS buses might not trip when they should during an earthquake, allowing degradation of the RPS supply.

Evaluation

The new protective relays reduce the probability of the RPS malfunctioning due to degraded power supply. Tripping of the RPS on out of specification supply is ensured by these relays.

M-4-2-81-27
24/48 VDC Meter Rewire

Description

The purpose of this modification is to give the Control Room Operators a more accurate indication of the condition of the 24/48 VDC batteries. This resulted from a recommendation from the DC Systems Task Force. The modification will result in the Control Room meter-alarm unit sensing battery voltage and the local under/overvoltage relays sensing bus voltage.

Evaluation

This modification does not alter the 24/48 VDC distribution system in any way. The modification does not add or remove any equipment, it simply rearranges existing alarm points. The new arrangement will provide Control Room Operators with more accurate indication of the condition of the 24/48 VDC batteries. Therefore, the margin of safety is improved.