

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 ①

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ N C B E P 2 ② 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 ③ 4 1 1 1 1 ④ ⑤  
 7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CONT

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ REPORT SOURCE L ⑥ 0 5 0 - 0 3 2 4 ⑦ 1 1 1 1 8 3 ⑧ 1 2 0 9 8 3 ⑨  
 7 8 9 DOCKET NUMBER 60 61 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ⑩

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ While performing an Engineering evaluation to support the replacement of a Unit No. 2 drywell system  
 ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ PCIV, a conservative determination was made that the drywell equipment drain (DWED) line (3"), floor  
 ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ drain (DWFD) line (3"), and service air header (SAH) line (1"), outside the drywell of each unit were  
 ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ not adequately supported to prevent potential failure inboard of their respective PCIV's during a seis-  
 ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ mic event. This event did not affect the health and safety of the public.  
 ⑦ ⑧ ⑨

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ Technical Specifications 6.9.1.8i 80

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE  
 ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ X X ⑪ B ⑫ Z ⑬ S U P P O R T ⑭ A ⑮ Z ⑯  
 7 8 9 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20  
 ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.  
 ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑰ 8 3 ⑱ 0 9 0 ⑲ 0 1 ⑳ T ㉑ 0  
 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32  
 ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ㉒ ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER  
 ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ X ⑱ X ⑲ Z ⑳ Z ㉑ 0 0 0 0 ㉒ Y ㉓ Y ㉔ A ㉕ B 4 5 0 ㉖  
 33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ㉗

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ This event is attributed to personnel oversight during original design of the supports (rod hangers)  
 ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ for the subject system lines. Unit Nos. 1 and 2 DWED and DWFD lines were reanalyzed and resupported  
 ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ in accordance with plant modifications to original design criteria, and the subject SAH lines were  
 ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ cut and capped just outboard of the PCIVs.  
 ⑦ ⑧ ⑨

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ 80

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS ㉙ METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION ㉚  
 ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ G ㉛ 0 0 0 ㉜ NA C ㉝ Engineering Evaluation  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 80

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY ㉞ LOCATION OF RELEASE ㉟  
 ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ Z ㊱ Z ㊲ NA NA  
 7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION ㊳  
 ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ 0 0 0 ㊴ Z ㊵ NA  
 7 8 9 11 12 13 80

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION ㊶  
 ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ 0 0 0 ㊷ NA  
 7 8 9 11 12 80

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION ㊸  
 ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ Z ㊹ NA  
 7 8 9 10 80

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION ㊺  
 ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ N ㊻  
 7 8 9 10 80

8312200407 831209  
 PDR ADOCK 05000324  
 S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER M. J. Pastva, Jr.

PHONE: 919-457-9521

LER ATTACHMENT - RO #2-83-90

Facility: Unit No. 2

Event Date: November 11, 1983

A conservative determination made during an Engineering evaluation to support replacing a Unit No. 2 drywell system Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV), found that the drywell equipment drain (DWED) line (3"), floor drain (DWFD) line (3"), and service air header (SAH) line (1") outside the drywell of both Unit Nos. 1 and 2 were not adequately supported to prevent a potential failure of their subject lines' respective PCIVs during a seismic event.

This design deficiency is attributed to personnel oversight during the original design of the supports for the subject lines. Following the determination that the drywell drains were inadequately supported, our architect/engineer was directed to review all non-safety related piping penetrations for similar situations. This review revealed the service air lines for both units were inadequately supported also.

As a result of this event, the subject Unit Nos. 1 & 2 drywell DWED and DWFD lines were analyzed and supported to assure containment integrity. In addition, the subject Service Air Lines for both units were cut and capped outboard of the PCIV. Thus seismic loading from the non-safety related portions of the system will have no impact on the containment penetration integrity.



Carolina Power & Light Company

DEC 16 10:57  
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant  
P. O. Box 10429  
Southport, NC 28461-0429

December 9, 1983

FILE: B09-13510C  
SERIAL: BSEP/83-3781

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II, Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street N.W.  
Atlanta, GA 30303

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-324  
LICENSE NO. DPR-62  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2-83-90

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In accordance with Section 6.9.1.8i of the Technical Specifications for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report was originally due to the Commission on November 25, 1983; however, in a letter dated November 25, 1983, Serial No. BSEP/83-3848, it was reported that this event would be reported by December 9, 1983. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within fourteen (14) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-0161, July 1977. The confirmation facsimile of this event was sent to Mr. O'Reilly in a letter having Serial No. BSEP/83-3677 and dated November 11, 1983.

Very truly yours,

C. R. Dietz, General Manager  
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

RMP/kal/LETC1

Enclosure

cc: Mr. R. C. DeYoung  
NRC Document Control Desk

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