

CONTROL BLOCK: 

						1
--	--	--	--	--	--	---

 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1
---	---

N	J	S	G	S	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--	--	---

  
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58  
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE

CON'T

0	1
7	8

REPORT SOURCE

L	6	0	5	0	0	0	2	7	2	7	1	1	1	1	8	3	8	1	2	0	9	8	3	9
60	61								68	69					74	75								80
DOCKET NUMBER										EVENT DATE										REPORT DATE				

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | On November 11, 1983, while performing a routine shutdown, the Steam Dump Pressure

0 3 | Controller signal went to full scale low. This caused RCS pressure to decrease below

0 4 | the technical specification DNB limit. Pressure was restored within the allowable band

0 5 | within 2 minutes; well within the time specified by the action requirement (2 hours).

0 6 | No undue risk to the health or safety of the public was involved. The event constituted

0 7 | operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is

0 8 | therefore reportable in accordance with technical specification 6.9.1.9b.

0	9	SYSTEM CODE C C		11	CAUSE CODE X	12	CAUSE SUBCODE X	13	COMPONENT CODE X X X X X X					14	COMP SUBCODE X	15	VALVE SUBCODE Z	16								
7	8	9	10		11		12		13					18	19	20										
17	LER RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR 8 3		21	22	23	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 5 6		24	25	26	27	OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3		28	29	REPORT TYPE L		30	31	REVISION NO. 0		32			
ACTION TAKEN G		18	FUTURE ACTION X		19	EFFECT ON PLANT Z		20	SHUTDOWN METHOD Z		21	HOURS 0 0 0 0		22	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y		23	NPRD-4 FORM SUR N		24	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER Z		25	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER Z 9 9 9		26
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1	0	The Pressure Controller was declared inoperable and is scheduled for repair during the
1	1	next available shutdown. A temporary change was made to the shutdown procedure.
1	2	A supplemental report will be issued.

1	3	
1	4	

1		5		FACILITY STATUS		% POWER			OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
1	5	D	0	2	0	N/A	A	Operator Observation						
28	29	30	31	32										

ACTIVITY CONTENT  
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 Z 33 34

7 8 9 10 11

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

N/A

44

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

N/A

45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER				TYPE	DESCRIPTION				
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	39	N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	8	0	0	0	40
		N/A			

1		9		Z		42		N/A		43	
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION											

PUBLICITY  
 ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) N/A  
 8312200332 831209  
 PDR ADOCK 05000272  
 S PDR  
 NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER J. L. Rupp

NRC USE ONLY  
 68 69 80  
 (609) 339-4309  
 PHONE:



**PSEG**

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

December 9, 1983

Dr. Thomas E. Murley  
Regional Administrator  
USNRC  
Region 1  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Dr. Murley:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70  
DOCKET NO. 50-272  
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-056/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-056/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

J. M. Zupko, Jr.  
General Manager -  
Salem Operations

JR:k11

CC: Distribution

IE22  
11

Report Number: 83-056/03L  
Report Date: 12-09-83  
Occurrence Date: 11-11-83  
Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 1  
Public Service Electric & Gas Company  
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

DNB Parameters - Pressurizer Pressure - Out-of-Specification

This report was initiated by Incident Report 83-206

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 20 % - Unit Load 127 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0600 hours, November 11, 1983, while performing a routine shutdown for maintenance in accordance with IOP-5 (Minimum Load to Hot Standby) procedure, the steam dump was placed in main steam pressure control. While lowering the pressure controller setpoint, the signal went to full scale low causing the steam dumps to open; this caused Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure to decrease below the Technical Specification DNB Parameter minimum limit of 2220 PSIA. This pressure transient was accompanied by a decrease in average RCS temperature. The operator immediately raised the steam dump pressure controller setpoint to full scale high to close the steam dumps and halt the transient. The steam dumps closed and pressure and temperature were restored to the normal operating bands at 0602 hours (two minutes after the occurrence). Minimum pressure and temperature reached were 2160 PSIA and 542 degrees. Technical Specification Action Statement 3.2.5 was entered at 0600 hours.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation did not positively identify the component responsible for causing the pressure controller signal to go to full scale low. At the present time, the servo unit is suspected to have malfunctioned.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

In accordance with the Technical Specification basis for Limiting Condition for Operation 3.2.5, compliance with the Specification limits assure DNB parameters are within the steady state envelope of operation assumed in the transient and accident analyses of the FSAR. The limits are consistent with the initial FSAR assumptions, and have been analytically demonstrated to maintain a minimum DNBR of 1.30 throughout each analyzed transient.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

## Action Statement 3.2.5 requires:

With any of the DNB parameters exceeding its limit, restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours, or reduce thermal power to less than 5% of rated thermal power within the next 4 hours.

The 2 hour limit contained in the action statement ensures that, following unexpected transients of the type involved in this occurrence, DNB parameters are returned within the envelope assumed in the FSAR. In this instance, pressurizer pressure was within the DNB limit within 2 minutes (well within the 2 hours allowed by the action requirement); therefore, no undue risk to the health or safety of the public was involved in this event.

The occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b. It should also be noted that in the event the operator had failed in his attempt to shut the steam dumps, a Pressurizer Pressure Low trip would have initiated a reactor shutdown at 1880 PSIA, maintaining a minimum DNBR of 1.30 as demonstrated by the FSAR.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As noted, pressurizer pressure was returned to within specification at 0602 hours, November 11, 1983, and Action Statement 3.2.5 was terminated.


Investigation proceeded while the unit was shutdown; but as previously noted, the cause was not positively determined. Due to the components involved, a thorough investigation cannot be completed during normal power operation. The steam dump pressure controller will be scheduled for repair during the next available shutdown. A supplemental report will be issued identifying the cause, corrective action and failure data.

To prevent this occurrence from happening again during the next routine shutdown, the controller was declared inoperable and a temporary change was made to IOP-5; item 5-4 was changed to use MS-10 Valves in place of the pressure controller.

FAILURE DATA:

Unknown at this time

Prepared By J. Rupp

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
General Manager -  
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 83-148