

CALCULATION/PROBLEM COVER SHEET

Calculation/Problem No: 1040-001-006
 Title: Component Cooling Water System 2.3
 Client: Toledo Edison Company Project: D. - Besse Unit 1
 Job No: 1040-001-671 I & E Bulletin 79-01B
 Equipment Qualification

Design Input/References:

Design Inputs are outlined in the Cover Report.

Assumptions:

Assumptions are outlined in the Cover Report.

Method:

Methods are outlined in the Cover Report.

Remarks:

EDS Nuclear Report No. 02-1040-1076.

REV. NO.	REVISION	APPROVED	DATE
0	original	Jeffrey S. Haverly	10-2-81
1	GENERAL MANUAL REVISIONS	NK Woodward	1/3/83
2	GENERAL MANUAL REVISIONS	NK Woodward	11/2/83

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 PDR ADOCK 05000346
 PDR

Facility: Davis-Besse Unit 1
Docket: 50-346

MASTER LIST
HARSH ENVIRONMENT
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

Index No: 103M-001
Rev.: 2

Prepared by:

N. Lewis

Date:

11/1/03

Checked by:

L. Macomber

Date:

11/3/03

Worksheet Index No.	Rev.	Plant ID Number	Generic Name	LOCATION		REMARKS
				Inside Primary Containment	Outside Primary Containment	
203H-005	2	LSLL3757A	Level Switch		Rm. 501	
203H-006	2	LSLL3757B	Level Switch		Rm. 501	
203H-007	2	LSLL3757C	Level Switch		Rm. 501	
203H-008	2	LSLL3758A	Level Switch		Rm. 501	
203H-009	2	LSLL3758B	Level Switch		Rm. 501	
203H-010	2	LSLL3758C	Level Switch		Rm. 501	
203H-011	2	MV13280	Valve Motor Operator		Rm. 314	
203H-012	2	MV13380	Valve Motor Operator		Rm. 314	
	2	BE11C	Motor Control Center		Rm. 304	See 2.21
	2	BE11D	Motor Control Center		Rm. 227	See 2.21
	2	BF11A	Motor Control Center		Rm. 427	See 2.21
	2	CDE11D	Disconnect Switch Cabinet		Rm. 227	See 2.21
	2	CDF11A-1	Disconnect Switch Cabinet		Rm. 427	See 2.21
	2	CDF11A-2	Disconnect Switch Cabinet		Rm. 427	See 2.21
	2	EV13280	Terminal Block Box		Rm. 314	See 2.21
	2	EV13380	Terminal Block Box		Rm. 314	See 2.21
	2	RC3703	Relay Cabinet		Rm. 314	See 2.21
	2	RC3704	Relay Cabinet		Rm. 314	See 2.21
	2	RC3705	Relay Cabinet		Rm. 314	See 2.21
	2	RC3706	Relay Cabinet		Rm. 304	See 2.21

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MASTER LIST
NON-HARSH ENVIRONMENT
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

Index No. 3M-002
Rev.: 2

Prepared by: H Lewis Date: 11/1/83
Checked by: [Signature] Date: 11/2/83

Worksheet Index No.	Rev.	Plant ID Number	Generic Name	LOCATION		REMARKS
				Inside Primary Containment	Outside Primary Containment	
	0	AC101	4.16 KV Switchgear Breaker		Rm. 325	
	0	AC108	4.16 KV Switchgear Breaker		Rm. 325	
	0	AC113	4.16 KV Switchgear Breaker		Rm. 325	
	0	ACD2	Transfer Switch		Rm. 324	
	0	ACD3	Transfer Switch		Rm. 324	
	0	AD101	4.16 KV Switchgear Breaker		Rm. 323	
	0	AD108	4.16 KV Switchgear Breaker		Rm. 323	
	0	AD113	4.16 KV Switchgear Breaker		Rm. 323	
	0	BE12A	Motor Control Center		Rm. 429	
	0	C3615	Control Cabinet		Rm. 318	
	0	C3616	Control Cabinet		Rm. 319	
	0	C5715	Station Elec. Distribution Panel		Rm. 505	
	0	C5716	Engineering Safety Feature Panel		Rm. 505	
	0	C5720	Reactor & Station Aux. Panel		Rm. 505	
	0	CDE12A-1	Disconnect Switch Cabinet		Rm. 429	
	0	EV1460	Terminal Block Box		Rm. 328	
	0	EV1495	Terminal Block Box		Rm. 313	
	0	EV50950	Terminal Block Box		Rm. 328	
	0	EV50960	Terminal Block Box		Rm. 328	
	0	FIS1422C	Flow Indicating Switch		Rm. 328	
	0	FIS1422D	Flow Indicating Switch		Rm. 328	
	0	FIS1427C	Flow Indicating Switch		Rm. 328	
	0	FIS1427D	Flow Indicating Switch		Rm. 328	
	0	FIS1432C	Flow Indicating Switch		Rm. 328	
	0	FIS1432D	Flow Indicating Switch		Rm. 328	
	1	MC0751	Component Cooling Pump Rm. Vent Fan		Rm. 328	
	1	MC0752	Component Cooling Pump Rm. Vent Fan		Rm. 328	
	0	MP0431	Component Cooling Pump Motor		Rm. 328	
	0	MP0432	Component Cooling Pump Motor		Rm. 328	
	0	MP0433	Component Cooling Pump Motor		Rm. 328	
	0	MV50950	Valve Motor Operator		Rm. 328	
	0	MV50960	Valve Motor Operator		Rm. 328	

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MASTER LIST
NON-HARSH ENVIRONMENT

Index No: 103M-003
Rev.: 2

Prepared by: H. Lewis
Checked by: L. McDonald

Date: 11/1/03
Date: 11/2/03

[illegible]

Facility: D...-Besse Unit 1
Docket: 50-346

SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Index No. 203H-005
Rev.: 2

Prepared by: N Lewis Date: 11/1/83
Checked by: JM MacDermid Date: 11/2/83

EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	ENVIRONMENT			DOCUMENTATION REF.		Qualification Method	Outstanding Items
	Parameter	Specification	Qualification	Specification	Qualification		
System: Component Cooling Water	Operating Time	1 Year	40 Years	O	Note 2	Analysis	None
Plant ID No. LSL3757A	Temperature (°F)	267.0	Exempt	C-501	Note 1	N/A	None
Component: Level Switch	Pressure (PSIA)	15.61	Exempt	C-501	Note 1	N/A	None
Manufacturer: Magnetrol	Relative Humidity (%)	100.0	Exempt	A	Note 1	N/A	None
Model Number: BS-751-QMP-XSIMD4X	Chemical Spray	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
Function: Component Cooling Water Non-Essential Load Isolation	Radiation	9.0×10^2 RADS	1.5×10^7 RADS	T	CAL-82 Note 2	Analysis	None
Accuracy: Spec: N/A Demon: N/A	Aging	40 Years	40 Years	I	CAL-82 Note 2	Analysis	None
Service: Component Cooling Surge Tank Side 1	Submergence	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
Location: Auxiliary Bldg. Rm. 501							
Flood Level Elev: N/A Above Flood Level: N/A							
Needed for: Hot Shutdown <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>							
Cold Shutdown <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>							

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SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Index No. 203H-005A
Rev.: 2

NOTES

Prepared by: N. Lewis Date: 11/1/83
Checked by: [Signature] Date: 11/2/83

1. The harsh environment seen by this component is due to a main steam line break in the auxiliary feed pump turbine steam supply line. This switch functions to close CCl495 (the air-operated component cooling water auxiliary equipment inlet valve) when the component cooling water in the surge tank reaches the switch's low low setpoint (45 inches).

Closure of CCl495 isolates the component cooling water non-essential loads to assure that the essential loads receive an adequate supply of component cooling water. This isolation is not necessary during high energy line break accidents because the major component cooling water essential load of the decay heat removal coolers and a minor essential load (decay heat pump bearing cooling) will not be needed in the mitigation of the accident. If switch failure was to cause an unintentional isolation of the non-essential loads, it will not be detrimental to plant safety because the equipment comprising these loads are not needed for the mitigation of accidents.

The switch is exempt from qualification because its failure (whether it isolates the non-essential component cooling loads or not) will not degrade other safety-related functions. Failure will not mislead the operator because the switch does not provide an indication function.

2. Materials evaluation conducted. Materials sensitive to radiation and/or thermal aging summarized on attached evaluation.

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COMPONENT MATERIALS EVALUATION SHEET

Index No. 203H-005B

Rev.: 2

Checked by: [Signature] Date: 11/1/93

Plant I.D. No.: LSSL3757A

Component: Level Switch

Manufacturer: Magnetrol

Model No.: BS-751-QMP-XS1MD4X

[illegible]

Material & Parts List Reference: ROC-25A

* Only non-metallic parts are listed. Metallic parts are not considered sensitive to thermal aging and are not affected by radiation.

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SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Index No. 203H-006
Rev.: 2

Prepared by: N Lewis Date: 11/1/83
Checked by: J Macdonell Date: 11/2/83

EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	ENVIRONMENT			DOCUMENTATION REF.		Qualification	Outstanding
	Parameter	Specification	Qualification	Specification	Qualification	Method	Items
System: Component Cooling Water	Operating Time	1 Year	40 Years	O	Note 2	Analysis	None
Plant ID No. LSL3757B	Temperature (°F)	267.0	Exempt	C-501	Note 1	N/A	None
Component: Level Switch	Pressure (PSIA)	15.61	Exempt	C-501	Note 1	N/A	None
Manufacturer: Magnetrol	Relative Humidity (%)	100.0	Exempt	A	Note 1	N/A	None
Model Number: BS-751-QMP-XSIMD4X	Chemical Spray	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
Function: Component Cooling Water Non-Essential Load Isolation	Radiation	9.0 x 10 ² RADS	1.5 x 10 ⁷ RADS	T	CAL-82 Note 2	Analysis	None
Accuracy: Spec: N/A Demon: N/A	Aging	40 Years	40 Years	I	CAL-82 Note 2	Analysis	None
Service: Component Cooling Surge Tank Side 1	Submergence	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
Location: Auxiliary Bldg. Rm. 501							
Flood Level Elev: N/A							
Above Flood Level: N/A							
Needed for: Hot Shutdown <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>							
Cold Shutdown <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>							

Facility: Dabbs-Besse Unit 1
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SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Index No. 203H-006A
Rev.: 2

Prepared by: N Lewis Date: 11/1/93
Checked by: [Signature] Date: 11/2/93

NOTES

1. The harsh environment seen by this component is due to a main steam line break in the auxiliary feed pump turbine steam supply line. This switch functions to close various motor-operated valves in the component cooling water system when the cooling water in the surge tank reaches the switch's low low setpoint (35 inches).

Closure of these valves isolates the component cooling water non-essential loads to assure that the essential loads receive an adequate supply of component cooling water. This isolation is not necessary during high energy line break accidents because the major component cooling water essential load of the decay heat removal coolers and a minor essential load (decay heat pump bearing cooling) will not be needed in the mitigation of the accident. If switch failure was to cause an unintentional isolation of the non-essential loads, it will not be detrimental to plant safety because the equipment comprising these loads are not needed for the mitigation of accidents.

The switch is exempt from qualification because its failure (whether it isolates the non-essential component cooling loads or not) will not degrade other safety-related functions. Failure will not mislead the operator because the switch does not provide an indication function.

2. Materials evaluation conducted. Materials sensitive to radiation and/or thermal aging summarized on attached evaluation.

Prepared by:

Checked by:

Plant I.D. No.: LSSL3757B

Manufacturer: Magnetrol

THERMAL AGING

RADIATION

Parts List *

Materials List

Qualification

Reference

qualification

Reference

O-Ring Seal

Gasket

Switch

Cover

Wire Insulation

BUNA-N

Asbestos

Melamine

Polycarbonate

Silicone

40 Years @ 104°F

Not Sensitive

45.5 Years @ 122°F

Greater than

40 Years @ 122°F

40 Years @ 176°F

CAL-82

CAL-82

CAL-82

CAL-82

CAL-82

 1.5×10^7 RADS

Not Sensitive

 1.6×10^8 RADS 7.0×10^7 RADS 7.0×10^7 RADS

CAL-82

CAL-82

CAL-82

CAL-82

CAL-82

Material & Parts List Reference: ROC-25A

* Only non-metallic parts are listed. Metallic parts are not considered sensitive to thermal aging and are not affected by radiation.

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SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Index No. 203H-007
Rev.: 2

Prepared by: N Lewis Date: 11/1/83
Checked by: [Signature] Date: 11/2/83

EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	ENVIRONMENT			DOCUMENTATION REF.		Qualification Method	Outstanding Items
	Parameter	Specification	Qualification	Specification	Qualification		
System: Component Cooling Water	Operating Time	1 Year	40 Years	O	Note 2	Analysis	None
Plant ID No. LSL3757C	Temperature (°F)	267.0	Exempt	C-501	Note 1	N/A	None
Component: Level Switch	Pressure (PSIA)	15.61	Exempt	C-501	Note 1	N/A	None
Manufacturer: Magnetrol	Relative Humidity (%)	100.0	Exempt	A	Note 1	N/A	None
Model Number: BS-751-QMP-XSIMD4X	Chemical Spray	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
Function: Component Cooling Water Non-Essential Load Isolation	Radiation	9.0×10^2 RADS	1.5×10^7 RADS	T	CAL-82 Note 2	Analysis	None
Accuracy: Spec: N/A Demon: N/A	Aging	40 Years	40 Years	I	CAL-82 Note 2	Analysis	None
Service: Component Cooling Surge Tank Side 1	Submergence	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
Location: Auxiliary Bldg. Rm. 501							
Flood Level Elev: N/A							
Above Flood Level: N/A							
Needed for: Hot Shutdown <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>							
Cold Shutdown <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>							

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SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Index No. 203H-007A
Rev.: 2

NOTES

Prepared by: N Lewis
Checked by: J. M. Smith

Date: 11/1/83
Date: 11/2/83

1. The harsh environment seen by this component is due to a main steam line break in the auxiliary feed pump turbine steam supply line. This switch functions to close various motor-operated valves in the component cooling water system when the cooling water in the surge tank reaches the switch's low low setpoint (35 inches).

Closure of these valves isolates the component cooling water non-essential loads to assure that the essential loads receive an adequate supply of component cooling water. This isolation is not necessary during high energy line break accidents because the major component cooling water essential load of the decay heat removal coolers and a minor essential load (decay heat pump bearing cooling) will not be needed in the mitigation of the accident. If switch failure was to cause an unintentional isolation of the non-essential loads, it will not be detrimental to plant safety because the equipment comprising these loads are not needed for the mitigation of accidents.

The switch is exempt from qualification because its failure (whether it isolates the non-essential component cooling loads or not) will not degrade other safety-related functions. Failure will not mislead the operator because the switch does not provide an indication function.

2. Materials evaluation conducted. Materials sensitive to radiation and/or thermal aging summarized on attached evaluation.

Facility: Davis-Besse Unit 1
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COMPONENT MATERIALS EVALUATION SHEET

Index No.: 203H-007B
Rev.: 2

Prepared by: W. G. G. G. Date: 1/19/83
Checked by: W. G. G. G. Date: 1/19/83

Plant I.D. No.: LSL3757C
Manufacturer: Magnetrol

Component: Level Switch
Model No.: BS-751-QMP-XS1MD4X

		THERMAL AGING		RADIATION	
Parts List *	Materials List	Qualification	Reference	Qualification	Reference
O-Ring Seal	BUNA-N	40 Years @ 104°F	CAL-82	1.5×10^7 RADS	CAL-82
Gasket	Asbestos	Not Sensitive	CAL-82	Not Sensitive	CAL-82
Switch	Melamine	45.5 Years @ 122°F	CAL-82	1.6×10^8 RADS	CAL-82
Cover	Polycarbonate	Greater than	CAL-82	7.0×10^7 RADS	CAL-82
		40 Years @ 122°F			
Wire Insulation	Silicone	40 Years @ 176°F	CAL-82	7.0×10^7 RADS	CAL-82

Material & Parts List Reference: ROC-25A

* Only non-metallic parts are listed. Metallic parts are not considered sensitive to thermal aging and are not affected by radiation.

Facility: Davis-Besse Unit 1
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SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Index No. 203H-008
Rev.: 2

Prepared by: N. Lewis
Checked by: [Signature]

Date: 11/1/83
Date: 11/2/83

EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	ENVIRONMENT			DOCUMENTATION REF.		Qualification Method	Outstanding Items
	Parameter	Specification	Qualification	Specification	Qualification		
System: Component Cooling Water	Operating Time	1 Year	40 Years	0	Note 2	Analysis	None
Plant ID No. LSLL3758A	Temperature (°F)	267.0	Exempt	C-501	Note 1	N/A	None
Component: Level Switch	Pressure (PSIA)	15.61	Exempt	C-501	Note 1	N/A	None
Manufacturer: Magnetrol	Relative Humidity (%)	100.0	Exempt	A	Note 1	N/A	None
Model Number: BS-751-QMP-XSIMD4X	Chemical Spray	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
Function: Component Cooling Water Non-Essential Load Isolation	Radiation	9.0×10^2 RADS	1.5×10^7 RADS	T	CAL-82 Note 2	Analysis	None
Accuracy: Spec: N/A Demon: N/A	Aging	40 Years	40 Years	I	CAL-82 Note 2	Analysis	None
Service: Component Cooling Surge Tank Side 2	Submergence	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
Location: Auxiliary Bldg. Rm. 501							
Flood Level Elev: N/A Above Flood Level: N/A							
Needed for: Hot Shutdown <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cold Shutdown <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>							

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SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Index No. 203H-008A
Rev.: 2

NOTES

Prepared by: N Lewis Date: 11/1/83
Checked by: [Signature] Date: 11/2/83

1. The harsh environment seen by this component is due to a main steam line break in the auxiliary feed pump turbine steam supply line. This switch functions to close CCl460 (the air-operated component cooling water valve to the emergency instrument air compressor) when the component cooling water in the surge tank reaches the switch's low low setpoint (45 inches).

Closure of CCl460 isolates this component cooling water non-essential load to assure that the essential loads receive an adequate supply of component cooling water. This isolation is not necessary during high energy line break accidents because the major component cooling water essential load of the decay heat removal coolers and a minor essential load (decay heat pump bearing cooling) will not be needed in the mitigation of the accident. If switch failure was to cause an unintentional isolation of the compressor, it will not be detrimental to plant safety because the compressor is not needed for the mitigation of accidents.

The switch is exempt from qualification because its failure (whether it isolates the non-essential component cooling loads or not) will not degrade other safety-related functions. Failure will not mislead the operator because the switch does not provide an indication function.

2. Materials evaluation conducted. Materials sensitive to radiation and/or thermal aging summarized on attached evaluation.

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COMPONENT MATERIALS EVALUATION SHEET

Index No.: 203H-008B
Rev.: 2

Prepared by: J. Sam Date: 11/1/91
Checked by: J. Sam Date: 11/2/91

Plant I.D. No.: LSLL3758A
Manufacturer: Magnetrol

Component: Level Switch
Model No.: BS-751-QMP-XS1MD4X

		THERMAL AGING		RADIATION	
Parts List *	Materials List	Qualification	Reference	Qualification	Reference
O-Ring Seal	BUNA-N	40 Years @ 104°F	CAL-82	1.5×10^7 RADS	CAL-82
Gasket	Asbestos	Not Sensitive	CAL-82	Not Sensitive	CAL-82
Switch	Melamine	45.5 Years @ 122°F	CAL-82	1.6×10^8 RADS	CAL-82
Cover	Polycarbonate	Greater than	CAL-82	7.0×10^7 RADS	CAL-82
Wire Insulation	Silicone	40 Years @ 122°F	CAL-82	7.0×10^7 RADS	CAL-82
		40 Years @ 176°F	CAL-82		

Material & Parts List Reference: ROC-25A

* Only non-metallic parts are listed. Metallic parts are not considered sensitive to thermal aging and are not affected by radiation.

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SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Index No. 203H-009
Rev.: 2

Prepared by: N Lewis Date: 11/1/83
Checked by: [Signature] Date: 11/2/83

EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	ENVIRONMENT			DOCUMENTATION REF.		Qualification Method	Outstanding Items
	Parameter	Specification	Qualification	Specification	Qualification		
System: Component Cooling Water	Operating Time	1 Year	40 Years	0	Note 2	Analysis	None
Plant ID No. LSL3758B	Temperature (°F)	267.0	Exempt	C-501	Note 1	N/A	None
Component: Level Switch	Pressure (PSIA)	15.61	Exempt	C-501	Note 1	N/A	None
Manufacturer: Magnetrol	Relative Humidity (%)	100.0	Exempt	A	Note 1	N/A	None
Model Number: BS-751-CMP-XSIMD4X	Chemical Spray	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
Function: Component Cooling Water Non-Essential Load Isolation	Radiation	9.0 x 10 ² RADS	1.5 x 10 ⁷ RADS	T	CAL-82 Note 2	Analysis	None
Accuracy: Spec: N/A Demon: N/A	Aging	40 Years	40 Years	I	CAL-82 Note 2	Analysis	None
Service: Component Cooling Surge Tank Side 2	Submergence	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
Location: Auxiliary Bldg. Rm. 501							
Flood Level Elev: N/A							
Above Flood Level: N/A							
Needed for:							
Hot Shutdown <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>							
Cold Shutdown <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>							

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SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Index No. 203H-009A
Rev.: 2

Prepared by: N Lewis
Checked by: [Signature]

Date: 11/1/83
Date: 11/2/83

NOTES

1. The harsh environment seen by this component is due to a main steam line break in the auxiliary feed pump turbine steam supply line. This switch functions to close various motor-operated valves in the component cooling water system when the cooling water in the surge tank reaches the switch's low low setpoint (35 inches).

Closure of these valves isolates the component cooling water non-essential loads to assure that the essential loads receive an adequate supply of component cooling water. This isolation is not necessary during high energy line break accidents because the major component cooling water essential load of the decay heat removal coolers and a minor essential load (decay heat pump bearing cooling) will not be needed in the mitigation of the accident. If switch failure was to cause an unintentional isolation of the non-essential loads, it will not be detrimental to plant safety because the equipment comprising these loads are not needed for the mitigation of accidents.

The switch is exempt from qualification because its failure (whether it isolates the non-essential component cooling loads or not) will not degrade other safety-related functions. Failure will not mislead the operator because the switch does not provide an indication function.

2. Materials evaluation conducted. Materials sensitive to radiation and/or thermal aging summarized on attached evaluation.

Facility: Davis-Besse Unit 1
Docket: 50-346

COMPONENT MATERIALS EVALUATION SHEET

Index No.: 203H-009B
Rev.: 2

Prepared by: J. Lee Date: 11/1/83
Checked by: D. M. Lee Date: 11/2/83

Plant I.D. No.: LSL3758B

Component: Level Switch

Manufacturer: Magnetrol

Model No.: BS-751-QMP-XS1MD4X

		THERMAL AGING		RADIATION	
Parts List *	Materials List	Qualification	Reference	Qualification	Reference
O-Ring Seal	BUNA-N	40 Years @ 104°F	CAL-82	1.5×10^7 RADS	CAL-82
Gasket	Asbestos	Not Sensitive	CAL-82	Not Sensitive	CAL-82
Switch	Melamine	45.5 Years @ 122°F	CAL-82	1.6×10^8 RADS	CAL-82
Cover	Polycarbonate	Greater than	CAL-82	7.0×10^7 RADS	CAL-82
Wire Insulation	Silicone	40 Years @ 122°F	CAL-82	7.0×10^7 RADS	CAL-82
		40 Years @ 176°F			

Material & Parts List Reference: ROC-25A

* Only non-metallic parts are listed. Metallic parts are not considered sensitive to thermal aging and are not affected by radiation.

Facility: Dabbs-Besse Unit 1
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SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Index No. 203H-010
Rev.: 2

Prepared by: N Lewis Date: 11/1/83
Checked by: [Signature] Date: 11/2/83

EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	ENVIRONMENT			DOCUMENTATION REF.		Qualification Method	Outstanding Items
	Parameter	Specification	Qualification	Specification	Qualification		
System: Component Cooling Water	Operating Time	1 Year	40 Years	O	Note 2	Analysis	None
Plant ID No. LSL3758C	Temperature (°F)	267.0	Exempt	C-501	Note 1	N/A	None
Component: Level Switch	Pressure (PSIA)	15.61	Exempt	C-501	Note 1	N/A	None
Manufacturer: Magnetrol	Relative Humidity (%)	100.0	Exempt	A	Note 1	N/A	None
Model Number: BS-751-QMP-XSIMD4X	Chemical Spray	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
Function: Component Cooling Water Non-Essential Load Isolation	Radiation	9.0 x 10 ² RADS	1.5 x 10 ⁷ RADS	T	CAL-82 Note 2	Analysis	None
Accuracy: Spec: N/A Demon: N/A	Aging	40 Years	40 Years	I	CAL-82 Note 2	Analysis	None
Service: Component Cooling Surge Tank Side 2	Submergence	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
Location: Auxiliary Bldg. Pm. 501							
Flood Level Elev: N/A							
Above Flood Level: N/A							
Needed for:							
Hot Shutdown <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>							
Cold Shutdown <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>							

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SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Index No. 203H-010A
Rev.: 2

NOTES

Prepared by: N Lewis Date: 11/1/83
Checked by: [Signature] Date: 11/2/83

1. The harsh environment seen by this component is due to a main steam line break in the auxiliary feed pump turbine steam supply line. This switch functions to close various motor-operated valves in the component cooling water system when the cooling water in the surge tank reaches the switch's low low setpoint (35 inches).

Closure of these valves isolates the component cooling water non-essential loads to assure that the essential loads receive an adequate supply of component cooling water. This isolation is not necessary during high energy line break accidents because the major component cooling water essential load of the decay heat removal coolers and a minor essential load (decay heat pump bearing cooling) will not be needed in the mitigation of the accident. If switch failure was to cause an unintentional isolation of the non-essential loads, it will not be detrimental to plant safety because the equipment comprising these loads are not needed for the mitigation of accidents.

The switch is exempt from qualification because its failure (whether it isolates the non-essential component cooling loads or not) will not degrade other safety-related functions. Failure will not mislead the operator because the switch does not provide an indication function.

2. Materials evaluation conducted. Materials sensitive to radiation and/or thermal aging summarized on attached evaluation.

Facility: Davis-Besse Unit 1
Docket: 50-346

COMPONENT MATERIALS EVALUATION SHEET

Index No.: 203H-010B
Rev.: 2

Prepared by: Re for Date: 11/1/87
Checked by: W. M. B. B. B. Date: 11/2/87

Plant I.D. No.: LSL3758C
Manufacturer: Magnetrol

Component: Level Switch
Model No.: BS-751-QMP-XS1MD4X

		THERMAL AGING		RADIATION	
Parts List *	Materials List	Qualification	Reference	Qualification	Reference
O-Ring Seal	BUNA-N	40 Years @ 104°F	CAL-82	1.5×10^7 RADS	CAL-82
Gasket	Asbestos	Not Sensitive	CAL-82	Not Sensitive	CAL-82
Switch	Melamine	45.5 Years @ 122°F	CAL-82	1.6×10^8 RADS	CAL-82
Cover	Polycarbonate	Greater than 40 Years @ 122°F	CAL-82	7.0×10^7 RADS	CAL-82
Wire Insulation	Silicone	40 Years @ 176°F	CAL-82	7.0×10^7 RADS	CAL-82

Material & Parts List Reference: ROC-25A

* Only non-metallic parts are listed. Metallic parts are not considered sensitive to thermal aging and are not affected by radiation.

Facility: Davis-Besse Unit 1
Docket: 50-346

SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Index No.: 203H-011
Rev.: 2

Prepared by: J. Lewis Date: 11/1/87
Checked by: [Signature] Date: 11/2/87

EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	ENVIRONMENT			DOCUMENTATION REF.		Qualification Method	Outstanding Items
	Parameter	Specification	Qualification	Specification	Qualification		
System: Component Cooling Water System	Operating Time	35 Seconds	16 Days	K	M-28 V-24G Note 1	Simultaneous Test	None
Plant ID No. MV13280	Temperature (°F)	221.0	250.0	C-314	M-28 V-24G	Simultaneous Test	None
Component: Valve Motor Operator	Pressure (PSIA)	19.76	39.7	C-314	M-28 V-24G	Simultaneous Test	None
Manufacturer: Limitorque	Relative Humidity (%)	100.0	100.0	A	M-28 V-24G	Simultaneous Test	None
Model Number: SMB-000 O/N: 366321M S/N: 170407	Chemical Spray	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
Function: Component Cooling System Inlet to CRD Booster Pump No. 1	Radiation	1.0×10^6 RADS	2.0×10^7 RADS	T	M-28 V-24G	Sequential Test	None
Accuracy: Spec: N/A Demon: N/A	Aging	40 Years	40 Years	I	CAL-93	Sequential Test Analysis	None
Service: CC CRD Booster Pump No. 1 Suction Valve	Submergence	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
Location: Auxiliary Bldg. Rm. 314							
Flood Level Elev: N/A Above Flood Level: N/A							
Needed for: Hot Shutdown <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>							
Cold Shutdown <input type="checkbox"/>							

ility: Davis Unit 1
cket: 50-346

SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Index No.: H-011A
Rev.: 2

pared by: N Lewis
acked by: ATC [Signature]

Date: 11/1/83
Date: 4/2/83 -

NOTES

The test subjected the valve motor operator to a transient of 250°F and 39.7 psia for 30 minutes, followed by a cooldown to 120°F in 1.5 hours. The valve motor operator was then exposed to a second transient of 250°F and 39.7 psia for 22 hours, then a cooldown to 200°F and 24.7 psia which was maintained for 15 days. The temperature in Room 314 peaks at 221°F in 1.55 seconds. The pressure in Room 314 peaks at 19.76 psia in 0.086 seconds. The temperature and pressure in Room 314 return to ambient conditions after 8 minutes.

Based on this information, it can be concluded that the laboratory test subjected the valve motor operator to an overall more severe environment than that which would result from the postulated HELB. Since the valve motor operator remained operable throughout the test, it can be concluded that the valve motor operator will remain functional during and after exposure to the accident environment which would result from the postulated HELB. (Reference C-314)

Facility: Davis Besse Unit 1
 Pocket: 50-346

SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Index No.: 103H-012
 Rev.: 2

Prepared by: J. Lewis Date: 11/1/83
 Checked by: [Signature] Date: 11/2/83

EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	ENVIRONMENT			DOCUMENTATION REF.		Qualification Method	Outstanding Items
	Parameter	Specification	Qualification	Specification	Qualification		
System: Component Cooling Water System	Operating Time	35 Seconds	16 Days	K	M-28 V-24G Note 1	Simultaneous Test	None
Plant ID No. MV13380	Temperature (°F)	221.0	250.0	C-314	M-28 V-24G	Simultaneous Test	None
Component: Valve Motor Operator	Pressure (PSIA)	19.76	39.7	C-314	M-28 V-24G	Simultaneous Test	None
Manufacturer: Limitorque	Relative Humidity (%)	100.0	100.0	A	M-28 V-24G	Simultaneous Test	None
Model Number: SMB-000 P/N: 366321M S/N: 170406	Chemical Spray	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
Function: Component Cooling System Inlet to CRD Booster Pump No. 2	Radiation	1.0 x 10 ⁶ RADS	2.0 x 10 ⁷ RADS	T	M-28 V-24G	Sequential Test	None
Accuracy: Spec: N/A Demon: N/A	Aging	40 Years	40 Years	I	CAL-93	Sequential Test Analysis	None
Service: CC CRD Booster Pump No. 2 Suction Valve	Submergence	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
Location: Auxiliary Bldg. Rm. 314							
Flood Level Elev: N/A Above Flood Level: N/A							
Needed for: Hot Shutdown <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cold Shutdown <input type="checkbox"/>							

Facility: Davis-Besse Unit 1
Docket: 50-346

SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Index No.: 203H-012A
Rev.: 2

Prepared by:

N Lewis

Date:

11/1/83

Checked by:

W. L. O'Connell

Date:

11/2/83

NOTES

1. The test subjected the valve motor operator to a transient of 250°F and 39.7 psia for 30 minutes, followed by a cooldown to 120°F in 1.5 hours. The valve motor operator was then exposed to a second transient of 250°F and 39.7 psia for 22 hours, then a cooldown to 200°F and 24.7 psia which was maintained for 15 days. The temperature in Room 314 peaks at 221°F in 1.55 seconds. The pressure in Room 314 peaks at 19.76 psia in 0.086 seconds. The temperature and pressure in Room 314 return to ambient conditions after 8 minutes.

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