

CONTROL BLOCK

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 An administrative review to identify how T.S. surveillance requirements were
03 being procedurally addressed disclosed discrepancies in three areas. These
04 areas are: response time testing of 8 R.P.S. contacts, pre-startup testing of
05 the ATWS instrumentation and setpoint calibration of the containment spray per-
06 missive pressure instrumentation. This event caused no threat to the public
07 health and safety.
08

09 Z Z 11 A 12 X 13 Z Z Z Z Z Z 14 Z 15 Z 16
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CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Administrative error was determined to be the cause of these procedural defi-
11 ciencies. An immediate plant shutdown was initiated until testing proved the
12 operability of RPS at which time the shutdown was terminated. In addition, the
13 recalibration of the spray permissive setpoints was completed and appropriate
14 procedure changes were initiated to assure future testing will be performed.
15

15 E 28 0 8 5 29 NA 30 B 31 Administrative Review
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

16 Z 33 Z 34 NA 35 NA 36
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17 0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA 39
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

18 0 0 0 40 NA 41
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19 Z 42 NA 43
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

20 N 44 NA 45
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

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BOSTON EDISON COMPANY
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-293

Attachment to LER 83-057/01T-0

An administrative review was conducted to assess the implementation of Technical Specification requirements by Station surveillance procedures. The review found three areas where discrepancies existed. These areas are as follows:

1. Response time testing of eight R.P.S. initiating contacts, required by Tech. Spec. Section 3.1, had not been incorporated into the Station procedure and therefore had not been performed.
2. ATWS/ARI instrumentation functional testing, required by Tech. Spec. Table 4.2-G to be performed prior to every reactor startup, had not been incorporated into Station procedures and therefore had not been performed. However, the monthly functional testing of the ATWS/ARI System has been performed satisfactorily since the requirement was inserted into the Tech. Spec.
3. The procedure for calibration of the containment spray permissive setpoint required the instruments to be set at 2.2 psig instead of $1 < P < 2$ psig required by T.S. Table 3.2.B (Pg. 47).

The cause of these deviations has been determined to be administrative errors in the implementation of procedure changes to comply with Technical Specifications. The corrective actions taken are as follows:

1. The RPS was declared inoperable, requiring a plant shutdown be initiated. Following adequate timing of the relays, the shutdown was terminated. A procedure change has also been initiated to assure that the relays will be functionally tested and timed as required by the Tech. Specs.
2. A change to the startup procedure was initiated to assure that ATWS/ARI tests are performed before a reactor startup.
3. The drywell setpoint pressure switch procedure was revised to reflect the requirement of T.S. Table 3.2.B. The pressure switches were then recalibrated in accordance with the revised procedure.

BOSTON EDISON COMPANY
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BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02199

WILLIAM D. HARRINGTON
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR

December 1, 1983

BECO Ltr. #83-291

Regional Administrator, Region 1
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Docket Number 50-293
License DPR-35

Dear Sir:

The attached Licensee Event Report 83-057/01T-0 "Missed Surveillances", is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.9.B.1.f.

If there are any questions on this subject, please contact us.

Respectfully submitted,

W D Harrington
W. D. Harrington

/ko

Enclosure: LER 83-057/01T-0

cc: Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

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