

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

1	2	3	4	5	6
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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	G	A	E	I	H	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4		5
7	8	9	14						15	25						26	30						57	58				

LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT 58

CON'T

0	1	L	6	0	5	0	0	0	3	2	1	7	1	1	1	4	8	3	8	1	2	0	9	8	3	9
7	8	60	61	68						69	74						75	80								

REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0	2	On 11/14/83, plant personnel determined that silicone foam had been																											
0	3	applied as a substitute for nelson blocks in nelson frames 1R43-1Z2B1																											
0	4	and 1R43-1Z2B2, thus degrading the fire protection capability of both																											
0	5	penetrations. This event is contrary to the requirements of Tech.																											
0	6	Specs. section 3.13.6. A fire watch was established per Tech. Specs.																											
0	7	section 3.13.6, ACTION a. The health and safety of the public were not																											
0	8	affected by this non-repetitive event (refer to attached narrative).																											

0	9	E	E	11	X	12	Z	13	P	E	N	E	T	R	14	D	15	Z	16	17	8	3	1	0	9	0	3	L	0	18	Z	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	22	Y	23	N	24	Z	25	X	9	9	9	9	26
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47													

SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NRPD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1	0	The cause of this event is unknown. The silicone foam was removed from																											
1	1	the penetrations. They were then returned to their design configuration																											
1	2	and satisfactorily visually inspected per the "INSTALLATION AND REPAIR OF																											
1	3	FIRE BREAKS AND PENETRATIONS: FIRE BARRIERS AND SEALS" procedure (HNP-																											
1	4	6902) and returned to service on 12/06/83.																											

1	5	G	28	0	0	0	29	NA	30	A	31	Worker's Observation																32					
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	44																45	46	47	48	49	50

FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
ACTIVITY CONTENT AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES TYPE DESCRIPTION
PERSONNEL INJURIES TYPE DESCRIPTION
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION
PUBLICITY DESCRIPTION
ISSUED DESCRIPTION8312200114 831209
PDR ADOCK 05000321
S PDR

JEN

NAME OF PREPARER S. B. TIPPS

PHONE: (912)367-7851

NARRATIVE REPORT
FOR LER 50-321/1983-109

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-321

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

This 30-day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.b, because this event showed that the unit did not meet the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.13.6.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

The unit was in cold shutdown for fuel re-constitution when this event occurred.

Detailed description of the event(s):

On 11/14/83, plant personnel determined that silicone foam had been applied as a substitute for nelson blocks in nelson frames 1R43-1Z281 and 1R43-1Z282, which degraded the penetrations' fire protection capability. This event is contrary to Tech. Specs. section 3.13.6 which requires that all penetration fire barriers protecting safety related areas be functional at all times. A fire watch was established per Tech. Specs. section 3.16.6, ACTION a.

Consequences of the event(s):

This event did not affect plant operation, because the plant was in cold shutdown when it was discovered. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

There is no backup system for these penetration fire barriers.

Justification for continued operation:

No justification for continued operation is required, because the unit was in cold shutdown during this event. However, these penetration fire barriers were restored to an operable status before reactor startup.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

This is a non-repetitive event.

Narrative Report for LER 50-321/1983-109
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Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

This event had no impact upon other systems in Unit 1, or Unit 2.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

The cause of this event is unknown. Further investigation will be performed to determine the cause of the event, and an update report will then be issued.

Immediate Corrective Action:

The silicone foam was removed and nelson frames 1R43-1Z2B1 and 1R43-1Z2B2 were returned to their design configuration per the Nelson Electric Company's instruction manual. They were satisfactorily visually inspected per the "INSTALLATION AND REPAIR OF FIRE BREAKS AND PENETRATIONS: FIRE BARRIERS AND SEALS" procedure (HNP-6908) and returned to service on 12/06/83.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

No supplemental corrective action is required.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

No future corrective action is required.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

N/A

Georgia Power Company
Post Office Box 439
Baxley, Georgia 31513
Telephone 912 367-7781
912 537-9444



Georgia Power

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

63 DEC 16 AIO: 57


December 9, 1983
GM-83-1174

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-321/1983-109. This report is required by Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.1.9.b.

for 
H. C. Nix
General Manager

HE
HCN/SBT/djs

xc: R. J. Kelly
G. F. Head
J. T. Beckham, Jr.
P. D. Rice
K. M. Gillespie
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