

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

December 13, 1983

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Denton:

In the interest of the) Docket No. 50-259
Tennessee Valley Authority)


By letter from L. B. Vassallo to H. G. Parris dated September 27, 1983, we received an NRC request for additional information regarding scram discharge volume (SDV) and scram discharge instrument volume (SDIV) for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 1. In a telephone discussion with your staff on October 20, 1983, we provided detailed responses to the requests. Enclosed is a summary of the responses which we provided in that discussion that were found acceptable by your staff.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Subscribed and sworn to before
me this 13th day of Dec. 1983.


Notary Public
My Commission Expires 9-5-84

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
ATTN: James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Mr. R. J. Clark
Browns Ferry Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
7920 Norfolk Avenue
Bethesda, Maryland 20814

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ENCLOSURE
RESPONSE TO D. B. VASSALLO'S LETTER TO H. G. PARRIS
DATED SEPTEMBER 27, 1983
SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME AND SCRAM DISCHARGE INSTRUMENT VOLUME
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT
UNIT 1

1. NRC QUESTION

With regard to your July 13, 1983 license amendment request, the proposed limiting conditions for operation seems to permit that one of the two redundant SDV vent or drain valves may be inoperable for an indefinite period of time provided that the redundant valve is operable. Describe and justify how this practice complies with the principles of redundancy, or propose an LCO for the SDV vents and drains comparable to those imposed on systems/components needed for safe shutdown or those needed to mitigate the effects of an accident.

TVA RESPONSE

Refer to the justification for the SDV modification technical specifications in my letter to you dated July 13, 1983.

2. NRC QUESTION

The proposed surveillance requirements are incomplete with respect to the verification of acceptable opening and closing times as stated in Surveillance Criterion 1, and the implementation of an integrated system test at approximately 50 percent rod density as stated in Surveillance Criterion 3 of the staff's Generic Safety Evaluation Report regarding BWR Scram Discharge System dated December 1, 1980, which was transmitted to you by letter dated December 9, 1980. Justify the exclusion of the surveillance elements as discussed and discuss the means by which Surveillance Criteria 1 and 3 are fulfilled.

TVA RESPONSE

The technical specifications regarding opening and closing times of the SDV vent and drain valves are in accordance with the BWR standard technical specifications provided in the letter from D. G. Eisenhower to All Operating Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) dated July 7, 1980, in regard to resolution of OIE Bulletin 80-14. In contract with NRC, Franklin Research Center prepared technical evaluation report (TER) TER-C5506-67/71/76 dated February 5, 1982, which reviewed TVA's modifications and technical specifications on the SDV. By letter from R. J. Clark to H. G. Parris dated May 19, 1982, amendment Nos. 83, 80, and 54 for units 1, 2, and 3, respectively, the technical specifications were amended to include the opening and closing times in the TER. In addition, as discussed in the October 20, 1983 teleconference, the integrated system test at 50 percent rod density is not required.