(7-77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | I L L S C 1 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | 4 1 0 0 0 (4) | | | (5)
LICENSEE CODE (9–14) | LICENSE NUMBER (15–25) | LICENSE TYPE (26–30) | CAT (57–58)

CON'T
0 1 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 0 5 0 0 0 3 7 3 (7) | 1 1 1 0 9 8 3 (8) | 1 2 0 9 8 3 (9)
DOCKET NUMBER (61–68) | EVENT DATE (69–74) | REPORT DATE (75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 On Nov. 9, 1983, with Unit-1 shutdown for a planned outage, Local Leak Rate Tests were
0 3 performed on the inboard feedwater check valves (1B21-F010A/B). It was determined
0 4 that the Tech. Spec. 3.6.1.2. limit of .6 La (231.4 SCFH) was exceeded. The feedwater
0 5 lines still have two isolation valves in each line which meet the requirements of
0 6 Appendix J to 10CFR50 criteria as containment isolation valves. The feedwater lines
0 7 and check valves are designed and constructed in accordance with standard review plan
0 8 3.6.2-10 so as to preclude the possibility of a credible line break.

0 9	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
	C H (11)	E (12)	B (13)	V A L V E X (14)	C (15)	A (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 3	—	1 4 6	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
A (18)	X (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	A (25)	A 3 9 1 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The leakage was a result of gaps found on the perimeter of the disc seal material.
1 1 These gaps appeared at the seam, or "vulcanized" points of the seal. Alignment prob-
1 2 lems were identified that would have prevented the discs from closing squarely
1 3 against the seal. The Mfr. is supplying LSCS with "one piece" seals, & the alignment
problems are being resolved. Other corrective action outlined in confirmatory letter
1 4 from J. Keppler dated 11-28-83.

1 5	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	B (28)	0 0 0 (29)	NA	C (31)	LLRT

1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
	0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
	Z (42)	NA

IE22

PUBLICITY

2 0	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)
	N (44)	NA

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PDR ADOCK 05000373
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER Randy Dus PHONE: 815/357-6761

GPO 917-926

I. LER NUMBER: 83-146/03L-0

II. LASALLE COUNTY STATION: Unit 1

III. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-373

IV. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On November 9, 1983, with Unit One shutdown for a planned outage, Local Leak Rate Tests were performed on the inboard feedwater check valves (1B21-F010A/B). It was determined that the Technical Specification 3.6.1.2 Limit of .6 La (231.4 SCFH) was exceeded.

V. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The feedwater lines still have two isolation valves in each line which meet the requirements of Appendix J to 10CFR50 criteria as containment isolation valves.

The feedwater lines between the inboard and outboard check valves as well as the valves themselves are specially designed and constructed in accordance with Standard Review Plan 3.6.2-10 and ASME Section 3, so as to preclude the possibility of a credible line break between the check valves. Therefore, it is believed that the check valves would serve their original procured function of preventing a significant loss of vessel inventory in the event of a feedwater line break.

It is, therefore, believed that no immediate safety hazards existed, and that the plant was maintained in a safe condition at all times.

VI. CAUSE:

The subject valves are tilting disc check valves manufactured by the Anchor Darling Company. It was determined that the excessive leakage was a result of gaps found on the perimeter of the disc seal material, one about one-half inch long and the other about one and one-half inches in length. These gaps appeared at the seam, or "vulcanized", points of the seal. It was also noticed that one of the seal's material appeared to be hardened slightly with multiple minute cracks. In addition, alignment problems were identified that would have prevented the discs from closing squarely against the seal.

VII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Immediate action was taken to repair the valves. The valve manufacturer (Anchor-Darling) is now supplying LSCS with new molded (one piece) seals as was used in the original design. Also, a representative of the Anchor-Darling Co. has been on-site to resolve the alignment problems.

As of 11-30-83, an acceptable Local Leak Rate Test had been performed on 1B21-F010B after a molded (one piece) seal was installed and the disc to hinge pin horizontal clearance was adjusted to within Anchor-Darling specifications. Work is progressing on 1B21-F010A to install a molded

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION (Cont'd):

seal and to make more critical adjustments of the vertical positioning of the disc assembly within Anchor Darling Specifications. 1B21-F010A will be Local Leak Rate Tested when the above work is completed prior to startup.

Additional corrective actions to assure that the seal failures in these valves have been identified and the problems corrected are under way. A course of action to procure and install qualified seals in accordance with the requirements of Appendix B of 10CFR Part 50 are outlined in a Confirmatory Action Letter dated 11/28/83 from J. Keppler (NRC) to C. Reed (CECo).

Prepared by: Randy S. Dus

Commonwealth Edison
LaSalle County Nuclear Station
Rural Route #1, Box 220
Marseilles, Illinois 61341
Telephone 815/357-6761

DMB

December 9, 1983

James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator
Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Dear Sir:

Reportable Occurrence Report #83-146/03L-0 Docket #050-373 is being submitted to your office in accordance with LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.(b), conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation or plant shutdown required by a limiting condition for operation.

G. J. Diederich
Superintendent
LaSalle County Station

GJD/GW/rg

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
U.S. NRC Document Management Brnach
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