

CONTROL BLOCK: [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []										(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)																																																																													
01		A		L		B		R		F		2		0		0		0		0		0		0		0		3		4		1		1		1		4		5																																															
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CONT		01		REPORT		SOURCE		L		0		5		0		0		0		2		6		0		7		1		1		1		0		8		3		8		1		2		0		8		8		3		8																																	
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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)																																																																																							
02		During performance of SI 4.2.A-7 (High Flow Main Steam Line																																																																																					
03		Calibration and Functional Test) on unit 2 it was discovered that																																																																																					
04		Pdis-1-36B, 1-13B and 1-050B (which are all channel B ₁) had experienced setpoint																																																																																					
05		drift to a setpoint greater than 140% rated steam flow. Tech. Spec. 3.2.A																																																																																					
06		requires 2 instrument channels per Trip System to be operable for this PCIS																																																																																					
07		function. Pdis-1-25B was operable in B ₁ and redundant channel B ₂ was fully operable.																																																																																					
08		There was no danger to the health or safety of the public.																																																																																					
09		SYSTEM CODE: S D 11 CAUSE CODE: E 12 CAUSE SUBCODE: E 13 COMPONENT CODE: I N S T R U 14 COMP SUBCODE: S 15 VALVE SUBCODE: 2 16																																																																																					
10		LEAD REPORT NUMBER: 17 EVENT YEAR: 8 3 21-22 SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z 21 HOURS: 0 0 0 22 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y 23 NRC FORM SUB: N 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: L 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: B O 8 0 26																																																																																					
11		ACTION TAKEN: E 18 FUTURE ACTION: C 19 EFFECT ON PLANT: 2 20 SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z 21 HOURS: 0 0 0 22 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y 23 NRC FORM SUB: N 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: L 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: B O 8 0 26																																																																																					
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)																																																																																							
10		The Barton Model 278 Pressure Switches had experienced setpoint drift.																																																																																					
11		Pdis-1-36B and 1-13B were calibrated, functionally tested and returned to																																																																																					
12		service. Pdis-1-50B was replaced, calibrated, functionally tested and returned																																																																																					
13		to service. These pressures switches are scheduled to be replaced by pressure																																																																																					
14		transmitters and analog trip devices during the next unit 2 refueling outage.																																																																																					
FACILITY STATUS: 15 N POWER: 1 0 0 29 OTHER STATUS: N/A 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY: E 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Surveillance Testing 32																																																																																							
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE: Z 33 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: N/A 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE: N/A 36																																																																																							
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER: 0 0 0 37 TYPE: Z 38 DESCRIPTION: N/A 39																																																																																							
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER: 0 0 0 40 DESCRIPTION: N/A 41																																																																																							
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE: Z 42 DESCRIPTION: N/A 43																																																																																							
PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION: N 44 N/A 45																																																																																							
NAME OF PREPARER: G. T. Chambers PHONE: (205) 729-0626																																																																																							

Tennessee Valley Authority
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Form BF 17
BF 15.2
2/12/82

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 260 / 83072 Technical Specification Involved 3.2.A

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(4) Date Due NRC 12/10/83

Event Narrative:

Units 1 and 3 were in refueling outages. Unit 2 was at 100% power. Only unit 2 was affected by this event. During performance of SI 4.2.A-7 (High Flow Main Steam Line Calibration and Functional Test) it was discovered that Pdis-1-36B, 1-13B and 1-50B had experienced setpoint drift to a setpoint greater than the 140% rated steam flow. Tech. Spec. 3.2.A requires 2 instrument channels to be operable per trip system. In trip channel A instrument channels A₁ and A₂ were fully operable. In trip channel B instrument channel B₁ had one operable² switch and B₂ was fully operable.

The Barton Model 278 switches (Pdis-1-36B and 1-13B) were calibrated, functionally tested and returned to service. Pdis-1-50B was replaced and the new switch was calibrated, functionally tested and placed in service. These switches are scheduled to be replaced by pressure transmitters and analog trip system during the next unit 2 refueling outage. There was no danger to the health or safety of the public.

* Previous Similar Events:

BFRO-50-259/81084
260/79025
296/78020

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
1750 Chestnut Street Tower 11

December 8, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET
NO. 50-260 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-52 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BFRO-50-260/83072

The enclosed report provides details concerning the setpoint drift of a
pressure switch for the high flow on the main steam line. This report
is submitted in accordance with Browns Ferry unit 2 Technical
Specification 6.7.2.b(1).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



H. J. Green
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, Browns Ferry

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2/22 11

ACTION PLAN
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT - REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM
AND CORE STANDBY COOLING SYSTEMS
PRIMARY SENSOR SWITCHES

BACKGROUND

The reactor protection system (RPS), the primary containment isolation system (PCIS), and the core standby cooling systems (CSCS) use mechanical-type switches in the sensors that monitor plant process parameters. The plant technical specifications have put very close tolerances on these instruments. As a result, almost any change in switch setpoint requires submittal of a licensee event report (LER). To reduce the frequency of this type LER, the following action plan has been developed.

LONG-TERM SOLUTION

Advances in technology make it possible to replace the mechanical-type switches with a more accurate and more stable electronic transmitter/electronic switch system. This modification is a major change to these safety systems and requires fully qualified safety-grade equipment. This equipment is in limited supply and has long procurement times. TVA is presently reviewing bids for this equipment. The tie-in of the new system to the balance of the RPS, the PCIS, and the CSCS requires a refueling outage. TVA expects to install the electronic systems during the first refueling outage after receipt of equipment.

INTERIM ACTIONS

Because of the long leadtime to implement the long-term solution, several interim actions have been taken. They are based on a review of licensee event reports which can be categorized as follows:

- Category 1: Individual instruments whose setpoints have drifted two consecutive times.
- Category 2: Groups of instruments which exhibit a predictable cyclic setpoint drift pattern.
- Category 3: Individual, randomly occurring instrument setpoint drifts which cannot be put in category 1 or 2.

For each category the following action is taken.

- Category 1: The instrument is replaced with an identical instrument.
- Category 2: The margin between the instrument setting and the technical specification limit is increased.
- Category 3: The instrument is readjusted to the specified setpoint.