

CONTROL BLOCK

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 N C M G S 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CONT

0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 5 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 9 7 1 1 0 3 8 3 8 1 2 0 2 8 3 9
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 While in Mode 1, during periodic testing of the solid state protection system
0 3 train "A", a bad universal logic card was found which would not have provided
0 4 feedwater isolation of a Lo Tave signal after a reactor trip (from Train A).
0 5 This constitutes a degradation of the reactor trip system instrumentation (T.S.
0 6 3.3.1) and engineered safety features actuation system instrumentation (T.S.3.
0 7 3.2) which is reportable pursuant to T.S.6.9.1.11(b). The train B logic circuitry
0 8 was satisfactorily tested and would have been capable of providing feedwater isolation
0 9 if required. Health and safety of the public were unaffected.

0 9 I B 11 E 12 G 13 I N S T R U 14 X 15 Z 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 3 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 This is attributed to component failure due to a failed two-out-of-four logic
1 1 circuit found on a universal logic card. The universal logic card was replaced
1 2 SSPS train A satisfactorily tested and declared operable. Troubleshooting, repair
1 3 and testing exceeded the two hours T.S. action statements permit 1 train to be
1 4 bypassed, therefore load reduction was commenced until train A was declared
operable (1 hour later at 93% power).

1 5 E 28 0 9 6 29 NA B 31 Routine Surveillance Testing
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

1 6 Z 33 Z 34 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

1 7 0 0 0 37 38 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

1 8 0 0 0 40 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

1 9 Z 42 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

2 0 N 44 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

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NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

03 DEC 12 A 9:37
December 2, 1983

TELEPHONE
(704) 373-4531

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Subject: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1
Docket No. 50-369
LER/RO-369/83-108

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-369/83-108. This report concerns T.S. 3.3.1, "As a minimum, the reactor trip system instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be operable..."; and T.S. 3.3.2, "The engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be operable...". This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

H.B. Tucker / HBT

Hal B. Tucker

PBN:jfw
Attachment

cc: Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. W. T. Orders
NRC Resident Inspector
McGuire Nuclear Station

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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