

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORTAPPROVED BY OMS
3150-0011
EXPIRES 4-30-82

CONTROL BLOCK										(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)															
01	N	C	M	G	S	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4	5	
LICENSEE CODE					LICENSEE NUMBER					LICENSEE TYPE					CAT										
CONT																									
01	L	0	5	0	0	0	3	7	0	1	0	2	8	8	3	1	1	2	8	8	3	9			
REPORT SOURCE					DOCKET NUMBER					EVENT DATE					REPORT DATE										
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)																									
While in Mode 5, during the performance of component cooling system valve stroke																									
timing-shutdown testing, valves 2KC-338 (reactor coolant pumps supply header pene-																									
tration outside isolation) and 2KC-424 (reactor coolant pumps return header pene-																									
tration inside isolation) stopped in intermediate positions while being closed and																									
were subsequently declared inoperable. This constitutes a degradation of contain-																									
ment isolation valves (T.S.3.6.3) which is reportable per T.S.6.9.1.11(d). Operable																									
redundant valves were available to seal the penetrations if needed. Health and																									
safety of the public were unaffected.																									
SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE																									
03	S	D	11	E	12	X	13	V	A	L	V	E	X	14	B	15	D	16							
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.																									
17	8	3	0	7	4	0	3	L	0																
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRO-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER																									
X	18	X	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	N	23	N	24	L	25	F	1	2	7				
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)																									
Although Unit 2 was in Mode 5 when the inoperable valves were discovered, they are																									
presumed to have been unable to close during earlier higher mode operation. This																									
is attributed to component malfunction. Exercising the valves (Fisher butterfly,																									
type 9220 with limitorque actuators) by manual operation eliminated whatever																									
binding had been occurring and allowed operation from the control room. Test fre-																									
quency will be increased to determine if the "sticking" is a recurring problem, with																									
appropriate measures taken																									
FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)																									
15	G	28	0	0	0	29	NA	B	31	Routine Surveillance Testing															
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)																									
16	Z	33	Z	34	NA																				
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)																									
17	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA																		
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)																									
18	0	0	0	40	NA																				
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)																									
19	Z	42	NA																						
PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)																									
20	N	44	NA																						
NAME OF PREPARER Phillip B. Nardoci PHONE (704) 373-7432																									

DUKE POWER COMPANY

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HAL B. TUCKER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

November 28, 1983

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(704) 373-4531

03 DEC 12 A 9:37

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Subject: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 2
Docket No. 50-370
LER/RO-370/83-74

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-370/83-74. This report concerns T.S. 3.6.3, "The containment isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-2 shall be operable with isolation times as shown in Table 3.6-2." This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

H.B. Tucker / JS

Hal B. Tucker

PEN:jfw
Attachment

cc: Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

Mr. W. T. Orders
NRC Resident Inspector
McGuire Nuclear Station

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