NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

| 0 1 | LICENSEE CODE: O H D B S 1 (2) | LICENSE NUMBER: Ø Ø - Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø - Ø Ø (3) | 4 | LICENSE TYPE: 1 1 1 1 (4) | CAT: (5) |

CON'T | 0 1 | REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: Ø 5 Ø Ø Ø 3 4 6 (7) | EVENT DATE: 1 1 Ø 3 8 3 (8) | REPORT DATE: 1 2 Ø 1 8 3 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 (NP-33-83-82) On 11/3/83 at 0006 hours, position indication for Auxiliary Feedwater
0 3 (AFW) Pump 2 Steam Isolation Valve MS107A was lost in the Control Room. AFW Train 2
0 4 was thereby declared inoperable, placing the unit in the action statement of Technical
0 5 Specification 3.7.1.2. There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or
0 6 station personnel. AFW Train 1 was operable at all times during this occurrence.
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0 8

0 9	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
	C H (11)	E (12)	A (13)	V A L V E X (14)	E (15)	D (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
8 3	—	Ø 5 9	/	Ø 3	L	—	Ø

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
A (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	Ø Ø Ø Ø	Y (23)	Y (24)	Z (25)	Z 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause of this occurrence was a component failure attributed to the blown
1 1 control power fuse in the control circuitry of valve MS107A. On 11/3/83 at 0042 hours,
1 2 the blown fuse was replaced under Maintenance Work Order 83-1027. This restored the
1 3 position indication of MS107A. AFW Train 2 was declared operable, removing the unit
1 4 from the action statement.

| 1 5 | FACILITY STATUS: E (28) | % POWER: Ø 9 8 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30): NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: A (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Operator observation |

| 1 6 | ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): NA |

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
| 1 7 | NUMBER: Ø Ø Ø (37) | TYPE: Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39): NA |

PERSONNEL INJURIES
| 1 8 | NUMBER: Ø Ø Ø (40) | DESCRIPTION (41): NA |

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LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
| 1 9 | TYPE: Z (42) | DESCRIPTION: NA |

PUBLICITY
| 2 0 | ISSUED: N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45): NA | NRC USE ONLY |

DVR 83-155 NAME OF PREPARER Sushil Jain PHONE: 419-259-5000, Ext. 243

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-82

DATE OF EVENT: November 3, 1983

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Loss of control power to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2 steam isolation valve MS107A

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWt) = 2717 and Load (Gross MWe) = 894.

Description of Occurrence: On November 3, 1983, at 0006 hours, position indication for Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2 steam isolation valve MS107A was lost in the Control Room. At the same time, "AFP 2 TROUBLE" annunciator and "AFP 2 LOW SUCTION PRESSURE TRIP" computer alarms were enunciated. Auxiliary Feedwater Train 2 was thereby declared inoperable. This placed the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.1.2, which required that the inoperable system be restored within 72 hours or the unit be placed in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence was a component failure attributed to the blown control power fuse in the control circuitry of valve MS107A.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. Both auxiliary feedwater trains would have been available in all cases except in the event of a main steam line break in Steam Generator 1-2. Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1 was operable at all times during this occurrence.

Corrective Action: On November 3, 1983 at 0042 hours, the circuit was checked for faults, however, none were found. The blown fuse was replaced under Maintenance Work Order 83-1027. This restored the position indication of MS107A in the Control Room and cleared the aforementioned alarms. Auxiliary Feedwater Train 2 was thereby declared operable, and the unit was removed from the action statement.

Failure Data: A previous similar occurrence was reported in Licensee Event Report NP-33-79-111 (79-095).

LER #83-059

DMB

TOLEDO EDISON

December 1, 1983

Log No. K83-1648
File: RR2 (NP-33-83-82)

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator, Region III
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

LER No. 83-059
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
Date of Occurrence: November 3, 1983

Enclosed are three copies of Licensee Event Report 83-059 which are being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30 day written notification of the subject occurrence.

Yours truly,

Terry D. Murray

Terry D. Murray
Station Superintendent
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

TDM/ljk

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Richard DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Encl: 30 copies

Mr. Norman Haller, Director
Office of Management and Program Analysis
Encl: 3 copies

Mr. Walt Rogers
NRC Resident Inspector
Encl: 1 copy

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