

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:                      (1) (PLE/SE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 C I O F S V 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 2 0 4 5  
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 58  
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT 58

CON'T  
01 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 7 7 1 1 0 2 8 3 8 1 2 0 2 8 3 9  
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80  
DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On November 2, 1983, with the reactor shutdown, one Class I hydraulic shock suppressor  
03 was found inoperable. Since it must be assumed the snubber was inoperable during power  
04 operation, this event constitutes operation in a degraded mode of LCO 4.3.10 and is  
05 reportable per Fort St. Vrain Technical Specification AC 7.5.2(b)2. No effect on public  
06 health or safety. No accompanying occurrence. Similar reports are RO's: 83-016,  
07 83-022, and 83-031.

08  
09 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE  
H H 11 E 12 B 13 S U P P O R T 14 D 15 Z 16  
9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20  
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 3 21 22  
18 ACTION TAKEN C 18 Z 19 33 34  
19 FUTURE ACTION Z 19 34  
20 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20 35  
21 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 36  
22 HOURS 0 0 0 0 37 40  
23 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 41  
24 NPD-4 FORM SUB. Y 24 42  
25 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A 25 43  
26 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER I 2 0 7 26 44 47  
27 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)  
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10 Leaking reservoir gaskets allowed the loss of oil.  
11 BFS-244E is a one and one-half inch ITT Grinnell, Figure 201 hydraulic snubber.  
12 The snubber was removed and replaced with a tested, qualified spare. No further  
13 corrective action is anticipated or required.

14  
15 FACILITY STATUS G 28 29 N/A 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY C 31 Special Snubber Inspection 32  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 80  
16 ACTIVITY CONTENT Z 33 Z 34 N/A 35 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY N/A 36 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 80

17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37 Z 38 N/A 39 DESCRIPTION 39  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 80  
18 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40 N/A 41 DESCRIPTION 41  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 80  
19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 N/A 43 DESCRIPTION 43  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 80

20 PUBLICATION ISSUED N 44 N/A 45 DESCRIPTION 45  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 80  
NAME OF PREPARER                      PHONE (303) 785-2224  
NRC USE ONLY  
68 69 80

REPORT DATE: December 2, 1983

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-048

OCCURRENCE DATE: November 3, 1983

ISSUE 0  
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FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION  
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO  
16805 WELD COUNTY ROAD 19 1/2  
PLATTEVILLE, COLORADO 80651-9298

REPORT NO. 50-267/83-048/03-L-0

Preliminary

IDENTIFICATION OF  
OCCURRENCE:

On November 3, and November 4, 1983, plant instrumentation technicians testing the 1D helium circulator (C-2104) bearing water differential pressure switches found two of the three switches inoperable. This event constitutes operation in a degraded mode of LCO 4.4.1, Table 4.4-3, and is reportable per Fort St. Vrain Technical Specification AC 7.5.2(b)2.

EVENT  
DESCRIPTION:

During special inspection/testing, with the reactor and the 1D helium circulator shut down, PDIS-21182 and PDIS-21184 were found inoperable. These switches are used to monitor the pressure differential between the bearing water supply cavity and the main drain of the 1D helium circulator. On sensing low pressure differential (less than 475 psid) the switches act to trip the circulator. The third switch, PDIS-21180, was found to be operating at the correct setpoint.

Referring to Figure 1, as the pressure differential between the water supply cavity and main drain decreases, the pressure differential indicating switches (PDIS) ① will individually close at their respective setpoints. This applies a voltage to the switch input modules (XDIS) ②, tripping them. Each tripped XDIS module transmits a signal to both "A" and "B" logic channels ③. When either "A" or "B" AND logics receive inputs from any two of the three XDIS modules, they will transmit a signal to the "A" or "B" logic OR gate ④, respectively. The OR gates transmit any input signal to the respective special control relay (XCR) ⑤ to energize auxiliary relays to trip the circulator.

The pressure differential indicating switches are manufactured by ITT Barton, Model P-288A.




FIGURE 1



CAUSE  
DESCRIPTION:

Component Failure.

The bearing water pressure differential switches were inoperable due to an accumulation of dirt and oil on the switches.

CORRECTIVE  
ACTION:

The pressure differential switches were replaced, calibrated, and returned to service.

The Public Service Company Nuclear Engineering Division is presently investigating the problems experienced with the ITT Barton pressure differential switches. The results of this investigation will be reported in a future report.

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