




**LOUISIANA**

POWER & LIGHT/Waterford 3 SES/P. O. Box B/Killona, LA 70066

December 2, 1983

W3K83-1880  
Q-3-A35.07.93



Mr. John T. Collins  
Regional Administrator, Region IV  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000  
Arlington, Texas 76012

REFERENCE: Telecon C. Hooper (LP&L) and W. Crossman (USNRC) of  
November 4, 1983

Dear Mr. Collins:

SUBJECT: Waterford SES Unit No. 3  
Docket No. 50-382  
Significant Construction Deficiency No. 93  
"Charging and Letdown Containment Isolation Valve Deficiency"  
First Interim Report

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e), attached are two copies of the interim response to Significant Construction Deficiency No. 93, "Charging and Letdown Containment Isolation Valve Deficiency." This item was previously identified as PRD No. 129.

Very truly yours,

T. F. Gerrets  
Quality Assurance Manager

TFG:CNH:SSTG

Attachment

cc: Director  
Office of Inspection & Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555  
(15 copies)

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Mr. John T. Collins  
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cc: Director  
Office of Management  
Information and Program Control  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. E. L. Blake  
Shaw, Pittman, Potts, & Trowbridge  
1800 M Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20036

Mr. W. M. Stevenson  
Monroe & Lemann  
1424 Whitney Building  
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130

Records Center  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500  
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

INTERIM REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 93  
"CHARGING AND LETDOWN CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE DEFICIENCY"

INTRODUCTION

This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e). It describes the failure of valve 1CH-F-2501 A/B (CVC-103) to close following Hot Functional Testing (HFT). This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e).

To the best of our knowledge, this deficiency has not been reported to the USNRC pursuant to 10 CFR 21.

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM

Following the cooldown after HFT, it was discovered that that valve 1CH-F-2501 A/B (CVC-103), (supplied by WKM), was stuck in the open position. This valve had been exposed to 550°F service temperature for several days during HFT of the charging and letdown system.

It appears that the malfunction occurred due to the upstream float of the seat which reduced the clearance between the seat and the gate, thereby causing the gate to stick open.

SAFETY EVALUATION

Valves 1CH-F2501 A/B (inside Containment, powered from SB division) and 1CH-F-1518 A/B (outside Containment, SA division) provide Containment isolation for the letdown line. Failure of 1CH-F-2501 A/B to close would, if left uncorrected, violate the requirements of GDC55. Although there is in fact another safety Class 1 valve (1CH-F-1516 A/B) upstream of the affected valve 1CH-F-2501 A/B), which would automatically close on high containment pressure or low pressurizer pressure, it is powered from the SA division. The requirements for independent power sources would therefore, not be met if valve 1CH-F-2501 A/B failed to close.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Vendor service technician (WKM) has repaired the valve with new seats which are sized for maximum interference fit in the seat pocket in order to eliminate the previously experienced seat float. The valve has since been satisfactorily tested in the cold fluid condition.

Further testing has been recommended to verify the proper operation of this valve during hot fluid conditions and the subsequent cooldown. An update or final report will be submitted to the USNRC on or before February 17, 1984.