

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | |1
 1 6

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01	7	0	1	8	9	A	R	A	N	0	12	15	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	26	4	1	1	1	1	1	4	57	1	5						
					LICENSEE CODE							LICENSE NUMBER							LICENSE TYPE							CAT													
01	7	0	1	8	REPORT SOURCE					16	60	61	0	5	0	0	0	3	1	3	17	68	69	0	9	1	6	8	3	18	74	75	1	1	1	8	8	3	19
										DOCKET NUMBER							EVENT DATE							REPORT DATE															

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

0 2 | Observations of fire protection deficiencies have been listed in the attachment to this LER. The attachment

0 3 | consists of a list which includes the discovery date, facility status code, method of discovery code, discovery

0 4 | description, cause code, cause and corrective actions. These occurrences are reportable per Technical Specifi-

0 5 | cation (T.S.) 6.12.3.2. Other occurrences regarding fire protection deficiencies were reported in LER's

0 6 | (50-313) 81-003 and 82-018.

0 7	
0 8 7 8	9

SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE

80

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE						COMP SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE		80					
0 9		A B		A 12		X 13		Z Z Z Z Z Z 14						Z 15		Z 16					
7 8		9 10		11		12		13		18						19		20			
LER/RO		EVENT YEAR				SEQUENTIAL		OCCURRENCE						REPORT		REVISION					
17 REPORT		1 8 3		---		REPORT NO.		CODE						TYPE		NO					
NUMBER		1 21 22		23		0 2 3		/						0 3		---		2			
						24 26		27						28 29		30		31 32			
ACTION		FUTURE		EFFECT		SHUTDOWN		ATTACHMENT						NPRD-4		PRIME COMP.		COMPONENT			
TAKEN		ACTION		ON PLANT		METHOD		SUBMITTED						FORM SUB		SUPPLIER		MANUFACTURER			
1 X 18		1 X 19		1 Z 20		1 Z 21		1 0 0 0 0 22						1 N 24		1 Z 25		1 Z 9 9 9 26			
33		34		35		36		37 40						41		42		43 44 47			

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

1 0 | The causes and corrective actions for the individual occurrences are listed in the attachment. A complete fire
1 1 | protection system walkdown inspection is in progress as validation of the "ANO Fire Protection Program Manual."
1 2 | Interim controls have been placed on construction activities to assure restoration of fire systems after work
1 3 | is performed. In the interim, AP&L has established a roving fire inspector program for the purpose of monitor-
1 4 | ing activities affecting fire systems. Future action to prevent recurrence is the development of an integrated
7 8 | 9

FACILITY STATUS										% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	
1	1	5						E	28	1	0	0	29	NA		C	131	See attachment
7							8								44		45	46
ACTIVITY										CONTENT								80

ACTIVITY RELEASED		CONTENT OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	6	133	134	NA	135	NA	136
7	8	9	10	11	44	45	80
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES							

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										44	45	80
NUMBER			TYPE		DESCRIPTION							
1	7		0	0	0	37	2	38	NA			
7		8	9		11		12					139

PERSONNEL INJURIES										80
NUMBER				DESCRIPTION						
1	0	1	8	1	0	0	0	40	NA	
7	9	11	12							141
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY										80

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		TYPE DESCRIPTION		80	
1	9	7	42	NA	143

PUBLICITY										
ISSUED		DESCRIPTION								
2	0	N	44	NA						
8		9	10							145
										68
										69
										80

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8312120327 831118
PDR ADOCK 05000313
S PDR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

LER No. 50-313/83-023/03X-2

Occurrence Date: 09/16/83

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (Continued)

program to provide assurance that fire systems are maintained as required.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-023

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO: 1
DISCOVERY DATE: 09/16/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: Special fire door gap inspections were performed using new acceptance criteria. Excessive gap was observed between fire door and floor or threshold for the following:
1) Door 91 to computer room
2) Door 97 to ventilation equipment room
3) Door 65 to control room
4) Door 49 to electrical penetration room
5) Door 48 to ES switchgear room
6) Door 47 between ES switchgear rooms
7) Door 48 to ES switchgear room
8) Door 56 to Corridor 98
9) Door 45 to cable spreading room
10) Door 43 to cable spreading room
11) Door 52 to N. battery room
12) Door 51 to S. battery room
13) Door 53 to Corridor 98
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire door gap inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: Original installation specifications did not address gaps between doors and floors or thresholds
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Posted fire watch immediately. If fire detection equipment for the area was operable per TS 3.2.1.2 the fire watch was relieved. The fire doors which were deficient were repaired, except for Doors 56 & 91. Corrective actions for Doors 56 & 91 will be taken pending completion of engineering evaluations and/or modifications. The areas associated with Doors 56 & 91 have operable fire detection equipment per T.S.3.2.1.2.

ITEM NO: 2
DISCOVERY DATE: 09/17/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: As a continuation of Item 1, excessive gap was observed between fire door and floor or threshold for the following:
1) Door 82 to Stairway #1
2) Door 25 to Stairway #1
3) Door 11 to Stairway #1
4) Door 42 to controlled access
5) Door 68 to controlled access
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire door gap inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: Original installation specifications did not address gaps between doors and floors or thresholds
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Posted fire watch immediately. If fire detection equipment for the area was operable per TS 3.2.1.2 the fire watch was relieved. The fire doors which were deficient were repaired.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-023 (cont'd)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO: 3
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/11/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: The piping penetration for halon system number 1 for the Unit 1 control room under floor was found to be inadequately sealed. The control room is manned continuously, and smoke detectors under the floor were operable.

METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause is inadequate installation controls or incomplete restoration after maintenance. It could not be determined when the discrepancy occurred.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: The penetration was sealed the full depth of the wall. The penetration sealing was then inspected and found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 4
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/13/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of Room 160, revealed a conduit above fire door FD-91 was not properly sealed, and a door to terminal box TB-627 was not properly secured. Fire detection equipment was operable.

METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy could have been a result of inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration following maintenance.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: TB-627 was closed and secured. The conduit above FD-91 was sealed. An inspection was performed, and repairs were found to be satisfactory.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-023 (cont'd)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO: 5
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/13/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of Room 161 revealed that 4 conduit penetrations were not sealed. The conduits that were unsealed were B4645, B4646, B4647, and B4648.

METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection.
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy could have been inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration during maintenance.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The conduits penetrations were sealed in accordance with applicable requirements. The penetrations were inspected and verified to be sealed satisfactorily.

ITEM NO: 6
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/14/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: A inspection of Room 89 revealed a ½ inch hole in fire door FD-42.

METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause is inadequate work controls following maintenance or modification of a fire door. The degradation associated with holes in fire doors was not recognized until recent communication with Underwriters Laboratory.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The hole in the door was repaired in accordance with applicable requirements. An inspection was performed, and repairs were found to be satisfactory.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-023 (cont'd)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO: 7
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/14/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of Room 123 revealed that fire door FD-284 had 5 small (approximately 1/8") holes in the Unit 2 side and 2 small (approximately 1/8") holes in the Unit 1 side.

METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection.
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause is inadequate work controls following maintenance or modification of the fire door. The degradation associated with such holes in fire doors was not recognized until recent communications with Underwriters Laboratory.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The holes in FD-284 were sealed in accordance with applicable requirements. An inspection was performed, and repairs were found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 8
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/14/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of Room 88, communications room, revealed that a telephone conduit penetration was not sealed.

METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection.
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy could have been a result of inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration during maintenance.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was in the immediate area and was informed of the discrepancy so as to establish a fire watch for the conduit penetration. The conduit penetration was sealed in accordance with applicable requirements. An inspection performed and the seal was found to be satisfactory.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-023 (cont'd)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO: 9
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/14/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of Room 82 revealed a conduit cover missing and a conduit penetration not sealed.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy could have been a result of inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration following maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A cover was installed on the conduit, and the conduit penetration was sealed. An investigation was performed and the repairs were found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 10
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/14/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of Room 161 revealed that piping penetrations for chilled water had degraded on one side of the wall.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: E
CAUSE: The cause is not precisely known but could be due to piping stresses. The wall involved with this discrepancy is a plaster wall.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The piping penetration seals were repaired in accordance with applicable requirements. The penetrations were inspected and found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 11
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/14/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: An inspection revealed electrical box covers not secured in a communications room on the 372' elevation of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy could have been a result of inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration during maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch in the immediate area was informed of the discrepancy so as to establish a fire watch of the unsealed boxes. The box covers were subsequently secured.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-023 (cont'd)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO: 12
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/15/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of the controlled access area revealed that a conduit cover was missing and a conduit was not properly sealed.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause is inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy could have been a result of inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration following maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The conduit cover was replaced and the conduit penetration was sealed. An inspection was performed, and the repairs were found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 13
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/15/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of the ventilation equipment room on the 404' elevation of the turbine auxiliary building revealed an unsealed conduit penetration.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause is inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy could have been a result of inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration following maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The conduit penetration was sealed in accordance with applicable requirements. The penetrations were inspected and verified to be sealed satisfactorily.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-023 (cont'd)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO: 14
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/15/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of the wall area around Fire Door 68 (turbine deck to Unit 1 controlled access) revealed a phone wire through an unsealed penetration and two unsealed conduit penetrations. Also the conduits were missing conduit covers at elbows right at the penetrations.

METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy could have been a result of inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration during maintenance.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The penetrations were subsequently sealed and the conduit covers installed. An inspection was performed and repairs were found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 15
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/15/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: An inspection revealed three unsealed penetrations in the turbine auxiliary building, 404' elevation.

METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy could have been inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration during maintenance.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The penetrations were sealed in accordance with applicable requirements. The penetrations were inspected and verified to be sealed satisfactorily.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-023 cont'd

FIRE BARRIER DEFICIENCIES

ITEM NO:	16
DISCOVERY DATE:	10/15/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE:	E
DESCRIPTION:	An inspection revealed three unsealed penetrations and an improperly sealed terminal box (TB-047) in the diesel fuel vault (354' elevation). Although first believed to be non-reportable, a subsequent evaluation on 11/11/83 determined the deficiencies to be reportable.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY:	C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION:	Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE:	B
CAUSE:	The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The deficiencies could have been the result of inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration following maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:	The penetrations and terminal box were sealed, inspected and found to be satisfactory by 10/23/83.
ITEM NO:	17
DISCOVERY DATE:	10/16/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE:	E
DESCRIPTION:	An inspection of a fire wall between the turbine and Auxiliary Building revealed that an electrical access box cover was missing.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY:	C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION:	Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE:	A
CAUSE:	The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy was most likely a result of incomplete restoration after maintenance or modification.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:	A fire watch was established immediately. The electrical access box cover was installed. An inspection was performed, and repairs were found to be satisfactory.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-023 cont'd

FIRE BARRIER DEFICIENCIES

ITEM NO:	13
DISCOVERY DATE:	10/16/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE:	E
DESCRIPTION:	An inspection of the west wall of the turbine deck revealed three conduit junction boxes with missing covers.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY:	C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION:	Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE:	B
CAUSE:	The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The deficiencies could have been a result of inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration following maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:	A fire watch was posted immediately. The covers were replaced, inspected and found to be satisfactory.
ITEM NO:	19
DISCOVERY DATE:	10/17/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE:	E
DESCRIPTION:	An inspection of a fire wall in Room 128, revealed that a ventilation duct penetration was not properly sealed, 2 pipe penetrations were not sealed, a junction box was not sealed and small holes in the wall near the ceiling were not sealed.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY:	C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION:	Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE:	B
CAUSE:	The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancies could have been a result of inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration after maintenance or modifications.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:	A fire watch was established immediately. The penetrations were sealed in accordance with approved methods. Inspections were conducted, and repairs were found to be satisfactory.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-023 cont'd

FIRE BARRIER DEFICIENCIES

ITEM NO: 20
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/17/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of Room 198 (Shift Supervisor's office) revealed that a conduit penetration in the door frame of FD-198 was not sealed and a mounting bracket penetration on FD-198 was not properly sealed.

MEDHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE BODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancies could have been a result of inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration after maintenance or modifications.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: A fire watch was posted immediately. The penetrations were sealed in accordance with approved methods. An inspection was conducted, and repairs were found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 21
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/22/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: An inspection revealed the penetration of the east wall of the diesel fuel vault for the interceptor drain pipe to be improperly sealed.

METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The deficiency could be a result of inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration following maintenance.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: A fire watch was posted immediately. The penetration was sealed, inspected, and found to be satisfactory.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-023 cont'd

FIRE BARRIER DEFICIENCIES


ITEM NO:	22
DISCOVERY DATE:	10/22/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE:	E
DESCRIPTION:	An inspection revealed an inadequate piping penetration between the turbine building and auxiliary building in the vicinity of the condensate pumps.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY:	C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION:	Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE:	E
CAUSE:	The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The deficiency could have been caused by inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration following maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:	A fire watch was posted immediately. The penetration was sealed, inspected and found to be satisfactory.
ITEM NO:	23
DISCOVERY DATE:	10/25/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE:	E
DESCRIPTION:	An inspection revealed two unsealed screw anchor penetrations in the wall between the turbine building and a ventilation equipment room (404' elevation).
METHOD OF DISCOVERY:	C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION:	Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE:	B
CAUSE:	The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The deficiencies could have been caused by inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration following maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:	A fire watch was immediately posted. The penetrations were sealed, inspected and found to be satisfactory.



ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

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November 18, 1983



1CAN118308

Mr. J. E. Gagliardo, Director
Division of Resident Reactor Projects
and Engineering Programs
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011


Subject: Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-313
License No. DPR-51
Licensee Event Report
No. 83-023/03X-2

Gentlemen:

This letter transmits revision 2 to LER No. 83-023/03X, concerning fire barrier inspections. Our letter dated October 10, 1983, (1CAN108304) which transmitted Revision 0 of this LER, stated that the results of fire barriers and systems inspections would be conveyed to your office on a weekly basis via telephone and the LER updated at three week intervals.

In order to simplify the reporting of fire barrier deficiencies this LER will be updated in writing approximately weekly until completion of the current inspection effort thus eliminating the necessity for weekly verbal updates.

Very truly yours,


John R. Marshall
Manager, Licensing

JRM:RJS:s1

Attachment

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Norman M. Haller, Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

13-22
1/1