

3150-0011

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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 7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 EVENT DATE 74 REPORT DATE 80

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE				COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE	
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LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE				REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.	
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ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	
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PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER											
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NAME OF PREPARER B. R. McPherson PHONE (205) 729-0834

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LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 259 / 83063 Technical Specification Involved 3.7.B.1/4.7.B.1.c

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b(2) * Date Due NRC 12/02/83

Event Narrative:

With unit 1 and unit 3 in a refueling outage and unit 2 in normal operation at 3278 MW(t), the flow distribution through the "B" standby gas treatment (SBGT) train failed the acceptance criteria of SI 4.7.B-3. The acceptance criteria (T.S. 4.7.B.1.c) of SI 4.7.B-3 requires the flow distribution to be within 20-percent across HEPA filters and charcoal filters. The SBGT system is common to units 1, 2, and 3. The train was declared inoperable and was out-of-service for approximately 12 hours. SBGT trains "A" and "C" were operable. There was no effect on public health and safety. T.S. 3.7.B.3 permits operation for seven days with one SBGT train inoperable.

The uneven flow distribution was caused by an accumulation of sand in the moisture separator. The accumulation of sand resulted from modification work performed during the torus outage. The moisture separator was repaired and the roughing filters (MSA DSK-1743-1221) were replaced. "B" SBGT train was successfully tested per SI 4.7.B.3. The SBGT trains are tested and inspected at the end of each refueling outage involving internal torus modifications to ensure flow requirements can be met.

* Previous Similar Events:

BFRO-50-259/82029, 82089, 83010

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

DEC 5 9:37

December 1, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET
NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BFR0-50-259/83063

The enclosed report provides details concerning a standby gas treatment
train that failed to meet flow distribution acceptance criteria. This
report is submitted in accordance with Browns Ferry unit 1 Technical
Specification 6.7.2.b(2).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



H. J. Green
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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Suite 1500
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Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, Browns Ferry

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