

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION

01 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 0 1 1 0 4 8 3 1 2 0 2 8 3 9
7 8 89 91 DOCKET NUMBER 93 99 KEYWORD 94 99 REPORT DATE 99

0 2 During normal operation on unit 2, while performing SI 4.2.B-7 (Reactor
0 3 Low Pressure) pressure switch, 2-PS-3-74A switch 1 had an as-found setpoint
0 4 of 214.43 psig. T. S. Table 3.2.B trip level setting is 230 ± 15 psig.
0 5 Pressure at this value closes the recirculation discharge valves. There was
0 6 no effect on the health or safety of the public. A redundant switch was available
0 7 and operable.

03		1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		100	
SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE		COMP SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO		ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB		PRIME COMP SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER																																																																																																																																																																			
I B		E		E		I N S T R U		S		Z		8 3		0 7 1		0 3		L		0		E X		Z		Z		0 0 0 0		Y		N		L		B 0 6 9																																																																																																																																																																					

Pressure switch, 2-PS-3-74 switch 1 calibration had drifted. The Barksdale model B2T-M12SS pressure switch was recalibrated, functionally tested, and returned to service. See attached action plan for corrective action, category 3.

1	4																																																
FACILITY STATUS										POWER										OTHER STATUS										METHOD OF DISCOVERY										DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION									
1	5	E	29	0	9	9	29	N/A										30	B	31	Surveillance Testing										32																		
ACTIVITY CONTENT										AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY										LOCATION OF RELEASE																													
RELEASED OF RELEASE																																																	
1	6	Z	33	Z	34	N/A										35	N/A										36																						
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										PERSONNEL INJURIES																																							
NUMBER										NUMBER																																							
TYPE										DESCRIPTION																																							
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	N/A																																									
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										PERSONNEL INJURIES																																							
NUMBER										NUMBER																																							
TYPE										DESCRIPTION																																							
1	8	0	0	0	40	N/A																																											
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										PERSONNEL INJURIES																																							
NUMBER										NUMBER																																							
TYPE										DESCRIPTION																																							
1	9	Z	42	N/A																																													
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										PERSONNEL INJURIES																																							
NUMBER										NUMBER																																							
TYPE										DESCRIPTION																																							
1	0	N	44	N/A																																													
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										PERSONNEL INJURIES																																							
NUMBER										NUMBER																																							
TYPE										DESCRIPTION																																							

NAME OF PREPARER D. C. Goodwin

PHONE (205) 729-0626

NAC USE ONLY

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 260 / 83071 Technical Specification Involved 3.2.B

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(1) Date Due NRC 12/04/83

Event Narrative:

Units 1 and 3 were in refueling outages and unit 2 was operating normally at 99% power. Only unit 2 was affected by this event. During the performance of Surveillance Instruction (SI) 4.2.B-7 (Reactor Low Pressure), pressure switch, 2-PS-3-74A switch 1, had an as-found setpoint of 214.43 psig. Technical Specification (T.S.) Table 3.2.B requires a trip level setting of 230 ± 15 psig. Pressure at this value closes the recirculation discharge valves.

Pressure switch 2-PS-3-74A switch 1 calibration had drifted. The Barksdale model B2T-M12SS pressure switch was recalibrated, functionally tested, and returned to service. There was no effect on the health or safety of the public. A redundant switch was available and operable. See attached action plan for corrective action, category 3.

* Previous Similar Events:

BFRO-50-259/81038
260/81059, 82003, 83002
296/79028, 820021

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP

ACTION PLAN
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT - REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM
AND CORE STANDBY COOLING SYSTEMS
PRIMARY SENSOR SWITCHES

BACKGROUND

The reactor protection system (RPS), the primary containment isolation system (PCIS), and the core standby cooling systems (CSCS) use mechanical-type switches in the sensors that monitor plant process parameters. The plant technical specifications have put very close tolerances on these instruments. As a result, almost any change in switch setpoint requires submittal of a licensee event report (LER). To reduce the frequency of this type LER, the following action plan has been developed.

LONG-TERM SOLUTION

Advances in technology make it possible to replace the mechanical-type switches with a more accurate and more stable electronic transmitter/electronic switch system. This modification is a major change to these safety systems and requires fully qualified safety-grade equipment. This equipment is in limited supply and has long procurement times. TVA is presently reviewing bids for this equipment. The tie-in of the new system to the balance of the RPS, the PCIS, and the CSCS requires a refueling outage. TVA expects to install the electronic systems during the first refueling outage after receipt of equipment.

INTERIM ACTIONS

Because of the long leadtime to implement the long-term solution, several interim actions have been taken. They are based on a review of licensee event reports which can be categorized as follows:

- Category 1: Individual instruments whose setpoints have drifted two consecutive times.
- Category 2: Groups of instruments which exhibit a predictable cyclic setpoint error pattern.
- Category 3: Individual, randomly occurring instrument setpoint drifts which cannot be put in category 1 or 2.

For each category the following action is taken.

- Category 1: The instrument is replaced with an identical instrument.
- Category 2: The margin between the instrument setting and the technical specification limit is increased.
- Category 3: The instrument is readjusted to the specified setpoint.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

December 2, 1983

DEC 5 9:37

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET
NO. 50-260 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-52 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BFRO-50-260/83071

The enclosed report provides details concerning a reactor low-pressure
switch that had a setpoint which had drifted out of technical specification
limits. This report is submitted in accordance with Browns Ferry unit 2
Technical Specification 6.7.2.b(1).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


H. J. Green
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, Browns Ferry

OFFICIAL COPY

IE 22

1/1