

CONTROL BLOCK ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)01 C A S I O S 2 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 LICENSE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 37 CAT 38

CONT

01 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1 7 1 0 2 8 8 3 8 1 1 2 3 8 3 9
7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On 10/20/83, it was determined that 26 inadequate fire rated assemblies
03 in various fire zones, identified during a special Quality Control fire
04 barrier inspection on 08/22 and 08/23/83, were inoperable. In accordance
05 with LCO 3.7.9, Action Statement 'a', compensatory fire watches were
06 established within one hour of discovery on 08/22 and 08/23. The health
07 and safety of the public were not affected.

08

09 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
A B 11 X 12 Z 13 X X X X X X 14 Z 15 Z 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2017 LER/NO REPORT NUMBER 8 3 12 1 2 7 27 0 3 30 L 31 0 32
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
X 18 D 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 N 23 N 24 Z 25 Z 9 9 9
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The cause of the inoperabilities of the fire rated assemblies is unknown
11 but is believed to be due to design or construction errors. Compensatory
12 measures will remain in place until the fire rated assemblies are re-
13 paired.

14

15 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
E 28 0 0 0 29 NA B 31 Routine Plant Inspection
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2016 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
Z 33 Z 34 NA NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2017 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39) NA
0 0 0 37 Z 38
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2018 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41) NA
0 0 0 40
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2019 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION (43) NA
Z 42
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2020 PUBLICATION ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) NA
N 44
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

NAME OF PREPARER J. G. HAYNES

PHONE 714/492-7700

RECEIVED
NRC

Southern California Edison Company

NOV 28 PM 12: 29

SCE

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P.O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

REGION V

TELEPHONE
(714) 492-7700

J. G. HAYNES
STATION MANAGER

November 23, 1983

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

Subject: Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362
30-Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 83-127 (Docket No. 50-361)
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3

Pursuant to Section 6.9.1.13.b of Appendix A, Technical Specifications to Facility Operating Licenses NPF-10 and NPF-15 for San Onofre Units 2 and 3, respectively, this submittal provides the required 30-day written report and a copy of the Licensee Event Report (LER) form for occurrences involving Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.9 associated with fire rated assemblies. Since this occurrence involved shared systems between Units 2 and 3, in accordance with NUREG-0161, a single LER for Unit 2, LER No. 83-127 (Docket No. 50-361), is enclosed.

On August 22 and 23, 1983, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 90% power and Unit 3 in Mode 3, during a special inspection by Quality Assurance of Unit 2 and 3 fire rated assemblies, 33 assemblies were suspected to be inadequate and six Nonconformance Reports (NCR's) were issued. In accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.9, Action Statement 'a', compensatory fire watches were established within one hour, notwithstanding that it was not known whether the observed condition resulted in the inoperability of the assemblies.

An engineering evaluation was conducted as part of the NCR evaluation process. On October 20, 1983, the evaluation was completed, and it was determined that 28 of the fire rated assemblies were inoperable.


1/1
IF-22

November 23, 1983

The cause of the inoperability of the 28 fire rated assemblies is believed to be due to design or construction errors. The assemblies are being repaired and compensatory fire watches will remain in effect until repairs are completed.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,



Enclosure: LER No. 83-127

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)
J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Division of Technical Information and Document Control

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)