

CONTROL BLOCK		(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)	
01	C A S O S 2 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 5		
LICENSEE CODE		LICENSE NUMBER	
CONT		REPORT SOURCE	
01	L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1 7 1 0 1 9 8 3 8 1 1 1 8 8 3 9		
DOCKET NUMBER		EVENT DATE	
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES		REPORT DATE	
02	On 10/19/83, at 0815, with Unit 3 in Mode 1, Unit 3 Train A Containment		
03	Emergency Cooling Unit 3E-399 failed to meet the acceptance criteria of		
04	Technical Specification 4.6.2.3.a.2, and was declared inoperable and LCO		
05	3.6.2.3, Action Statement 'a' was entered. On 10/20/83, at 1000, with		
06	Unit 2 in Mode 1, Unit 2E-399 failed in the same manner, and Unit 2		
07	entered LCO 3.6.2.3, Action Statement 'a'. There was no affect on		
08	public health or safety because of this event.		
09	SYSTEM CODE: S B 11 CAUSE CODE: X 12 CAUSE SUBCODE: Z 13 COMPONENT CODE: V A L V E X 14 COMP. SUBCODE: E 15 VALVE SUBCODE: D 16		
17	LER NO. REPORT NUMBER: 8 3 21 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 1 3 7 24 OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 3 27 REPORT TYPE: L 30 REVISION NO.: 0 32		
18	ACTION TAKEN: E 18 FUTURE ACTION: X 19 EFFECT ON PLANT: Z 20 SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z 21 HOURS: 0 0 0 0 37 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: N 23 NPD-4 FORM SUB: Y 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: A 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: W 2 5 5 26		
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS			
10	The events occurred when 3HV-6371 and 2HV-6371, respectively, failed to		
11	open completely to allow a flowrate of 2000 gpm. In both cases, the		
12	torque settings on the valves were increased, and the systems were de-		
13	clared operable per S023-3-3.30 at 0140 on 10/21/83 and at 1645 on		
14	10/21/83, for Units 2 and 3, respectively. Investigation is continuing.		
15	FACILITY STATUS: 2 28 % POWER: 1 0 0 29 OTHER STATUS: 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Surveillance Test 32		
16	ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE: Z 33 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: NA 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE: NA 36		
17	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER: 0 0 0 37 TYPE: Z 38 DESCRIPTION: NA 39		
18	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER: 0 0 0 40 TYPE: NA 41 DESCRIPTION: NA 42		
19	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE: Z 43 DESCRIPTION: NA 44		
20	PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION: N 45 NA 46		
NAME OF PREPARER: J. G. HAYNES			
PHONE: 714/492-7700			

Southern California Edison Company

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P.O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

J. G. HAYNES
STATION MANAGER

November 18, 1983

SCE

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REGION V

RECEIVED
NRC

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

Subject: Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362
30-Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 83-137 (Docket No. 50-361)
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3

Pursuant to Section 6.9.1.13.b of Appendix A, Technical Specifications to Facility Operating Licenses NPF-10 and NPF-15 for San Onofre Units 2 and 3, respectively, this submittal provides the required 30-day written report and a copy of the Licensee Event Report (LER) form for two occurrences involving Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.2.3 associated with the Containment Cooling Systems. Since the two occurrences involve the same components, system, cause and method of discovery, these events have been combined into a single report in accordance with NUREG-0161.

On October 19, 1983, at 0815, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 50% power, the Unit 3 Train A Containment Emergency Cooling Unit 3E-399 failed to meet the 2000 gallon per minute (gpm) cooling water flow rate acceptance criteria of Technical Specification 4.6.2.3.a.2 during surveillance testing. 3E-399 was declared inoperable, and LCO 3.6.2.3, Action Statement 'a', which requires that the cooling unit be returned to operable status within seven days, was entered.

The inoperability of 3E-399 was due to Component Cooling Water (CCW) Outlet Valve 3HV-6371 failing to completely open. Local indication showed that 3HV-6371 would only open 15%, which resulted in a flow of 500 gpm. As corrective action, the valve's torque setting was increased. On October 21, 1983, at 1645, in accordance with Surveillance Procedure SO23-3-3.30, 3E-399 was restored to service and LCO 3.6.2.3 was satisfied.

1/1 IE-22

November 18, 1983

A similar event occurred on October 20, 1983, at 1000, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100% power. During surveillance testing, Unit 2 Train A Containment Emergency Cooling Unit 2E-399 was declared inoperable when CCW Outlet Valve 2HV-6371 failed to open completely and failed to meet the 2000 gpm cooling water flow rate. LCO 3.6.2.3, Action Statement 'a' was entered. The valve's torque setting was increased. On October 21, 1983, at 0140, in accordance with Surveillance Procedure SO23-3-3.30, 2E-399 was restored to service and LCO 3.6.2.3 was satisfied.

The cause of these failures has not yet been determined, but may have been either excessive valve binding or improper torque setting. Further investigation will be performed, and corrective actions will be taken as necessary on both units to prevent recurrence. There was no impact on the health and safety of plant personnel or the public associated with this event.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

J. B. Martin / J. B. Martin

Enclosure: LER No. 83-137

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)
J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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