UPDATE REPORT, PREVIOUS REPORT DATE May 20, 1983

NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | N J 0 C P 1 (2) LICENSEE CODE | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) LICENSE NUMBER | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) LICENSE TYPE | CAT (5)

CON'T 0 1 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 0 5 0 0 0 2 1 9 (7) DOCKET NUMBER | 0 4 1 8 8 3 (8) EVENT DATE | 1 1 1 7 8 3 (9) REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During the monthly 10 hour operability test of Standby Gas Treatment

0 3 System (SGTS) II, a high differential pressure across both HEPA filters

0 4 was observed. SGTS II was declared inoperable and SGTS I was tested

0 5 satisfactorily. Safety significance is minimal as the redundant system

0 6 remained fully operable. Operation in degraded mode per LCO in Tech.

0 7 Spec. Section 3.5.B.3.b. Reportable per Tech. Spec. 6.9.2.b.2.

0 8

0 9 SYSTEM CODE S C (11) | CAUSE CODE A (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE A (13) | COMPONENT CODE Z Z Z Z Z Z (14) | COMP SUBCODE Z (15) | VALVE SUBCODE Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR 8 3 | — | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 0 7 | / | OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 | REPORT TYPE X | — | REVISION NO. 1

ACTION TAKEN G (18) | FUTURE ACTION H (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD Z (21) | HOURS (22) 0 0 0 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER Z (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER Z 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Cause was a lack of post maintenance testing following corrective

1 1 maintenance on the SGTS flow sensing pitot tube. SGTS II has been

1 2 returned to service following successful completion of DOP testing. SGTS

1 3 surveillance procedures have been revised to reflect proper flow curves

1 4 for position of pitot tube. Noncontrolled curve removed from Control Rm.

1 5 FACILITY STATUS H (28) | % POWER 0 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30) N/A | METHOD OF DISCOVERY B (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Surveillance Test

1 6 ACTIVITY RELEASED Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) N/A | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7 NUMBER 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39) N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8 NUMBER 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41) N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9 TYPE Z (42) | DESCRIPTION N/A

PUBLICITY

2 0 ISSUED N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45) N/A | NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER Robert J. Murdock PHONE 609-971-4891 IE22

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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

November 17, 1983

Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Dr. Murley:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report Update
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-07/03X-1

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report Update to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-07/03X-1 in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

PBF/dam
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information and
Program Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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Forked River, NJ 08731

IE22
1/1

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report Update
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-07/03X-1

Report Date

November 17, 1983

Previous Report Date

May 20, 1983

Occurrence Date

April 18, 1983

Identification of Occurrence

Operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation as specified in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.B.3.b when Standby Gas Treatment System II was declared inoperable during surveillance testing.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was in the refuel mode with the core completely off-loaded and all fuel stored in the Spent Fuel Pool.

Description of Occurrence

On Monday, April 18, 1983, during a 10 hour operability test of Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) II, a high differential pressure across both HEPA filters was observed.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

On March 10, 1983, corrective maintenance was performed on the SGTS flow sensing pitot tube. The pitot tube was removed from the system, a mounting bushing installed and the pitot tube reinstalled.

No postmaintenance testing was specified on the job order or performed on the pitot tube to verify that existing flow curves in SGTS procedures would still be representative of flow in the Standby Gas Treatment System.

The pitot tube had apparently not been placed back in the same position which existed prior to maintenance. This resulted in a lower differential pressure output for a given flow.

Since the allowable differential pressure drop for a HEPA filter is dependent on the flow and the system flow was calculated to be lower than actual system flow (using the curve corresponding to previous pitot tube position), the maximum allowable pressure drop for System II HEPA filters was believed to be exceeded.

Both System II HEPA filters and pre-filter were replaced and both HEPA filters were DOP tested in accordance with plant procedures.

The pitot tube output error was discovered by plant engineering personnel on May 10, 1983, while reviewing test results from SGTS airflow capacity tests.

Therefore, the apparent cause of this occurrence was not specifying a postmaintenance test requirement for the pitot tube.

Another factor which contributed to the error in determining proper SGTS flow was the use of a noncontrolled flow curve by operations personnel. Prior to the date of this occurrence, the procedure which tests the SGTS (651.4.001, Rev. 12) did not contain a flow curve but referenced another related SGTS procedure (651.4.005) flow curve. Rather than utilize the flow curve in that procedure, a noncontrolled curve in the Control Room was utilized. April 18, 1983, was the first date that operations personnel used Revision 13 to procedure 651.4.001, which included its own flow curve.

The noncontrolled flow curve used prior to April 18, 1983 was outdated in October 1982 by procedure revisions which were performed at that time, and was no longer an accurate curve for determining flow.

Analysis of Occurrence

The function of the SGTS is to filter and exhaust the reactor building atmosphere to the stack in the event of certain accident situations which could potentially release large quantities of radioactive material to either the secondary or primary containments. The SGTS consists of two separate filter trains, each capable of providing 100% treatment capacity, each initiating automatically during containment isolation.

SGTS I was tested immediately following the failure of SGTS II and was found to be fully capable of performing its intended function. Therefore, the safety significance of this event is considered minimal.

Corrective Action

The prefilter and both HEPA filters for SGTS II were replaced. The subsequent test on SGTS II verified acceptable flow and differential pressure across the HEPA filters.

SGTS II has been returned to an operable status after satisfactory completion of the required DOP test.

SGTS 10 hour tests between March 10, 1983 and April 18, 1983 were reviewed to ensure that HEPA filter differential pressure limits were not exceeded due to the improper execution of procedure 651.4.001. No limits were found to be exceeded.

All Standby Gas Treatment System surveillance procedures have been revised so that the flow calibration curves are representative of the pitot tube output characteristics.

The noncontrolled SGTS flow curve was removed from the Control Room. In addition, a memorandum to Operations personnel will emphasize the requirement to utilize only controlled aids. This LER revision will be required reading for Operations personnel.

Maintenance personnel will be instructed to perform calibration of flow instruments following sensing element repairs.