NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [| | | | |] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | LICENSEE CODE: N J O C P 1 (2) | LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | CAT: (5)

CON'T 0 1 | REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 2 1 9 (7) | EVENT DATE: 0 9 2 2 8 3 (8) | REPORT DATE: 1 1 1 8 8 3 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 Reactor building ventilation isolation valve V-28-12 failed to close

0 3 when its pilot solenoid was de-energized. Also, a tailed "CLOSE" posi-

0 4 tion switch caused false closure indication for V-28-12. Safety signi-

0 5 ficance was minimal as redundant valve was operable. Event constitutes

0 6 degradation of secondary containment integrity as defined in the T.S.

0 7 section 1.14.c and as required by T.S. 3.5.B.1. Event is considered

0 8 reportable per T.S. parapgraph 6.9.2.b.2.

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE: S D (11) | CAUSE CODE: X (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE: Z (13) | COMPONENT CODE: I N S T R U (14) | COMP SUBCODE: S (15) | VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR: 8 3 | — | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 1 8 | / | OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 3 | REPORT TYPE: L | — | REVISION NO.: 0

ACTION TAKEN: B (18) | FUTURE ACTION: X (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) | HOURS (22): 0 0 0 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB: Y (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: A (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: N 0 0 7 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Failure of V-28-12 to close was caused by solid dirt blockage of the air

1 1 operating cylinder closure port. A failed position switch caused false

1 2 position indication. Air operator was cleaned, tested and put back in

1 3 service. Replacement position switch has been ordered. All position

1 4 switches in system were checked. All air operators will be inspected.

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS: H (28) | % POWER: 0 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30): N/A | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Preparation for solenoid replacement

1 6 | ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): N/A | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE: Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39): N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41): N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9 | TYPE: Z (42) | DESCRIPTION: N/A

PUBLICITY

2 0 | ISSUED: N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45): N/A | NRC USE ONLY

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NAME OF PREPARER Michael Goldie PHONE (609) 971-4639

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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

November 18, 1983

Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Dr. Murley:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-18/03L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report (LER) to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-18/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

PBF:dam
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Director (3 copies)
Office of Management Information and
Program Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-18/03L

Report Date

November 18, 1983

Occurrence Date

September 22, 1983

Identification of Occurrence

Reactor Building Ventilation System Isolation Valve V-28-12 failed to close when its pilot solenoid was de-energized during maintenance activities. This constitutes a degradation of secondary containment integrity as described in the Technical Specifications, definition 1.14.C, and, as required by Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.B.1.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was shutdown for refueling and maintenance. The mode switch was in REFUEL and the vessel defueled and drained.

Description of Occurrence

Plant electricians were lifting leads locally on Reactor Building Ventilation System Isolation Valves V-28-11 and V-28-12 in preparation for pilot solenoid replacement. When the leads were lifted, valve V-28-11 closed and V-28-12 was noted as remaining open. The valve status indicator in the control room indicated both valves had closed. Prior to continuing maintenance, valve V-28-12 was manually closed.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The apparent cause of this occurrence was solid dirt blockage of the air operating cylinder closure port which prohibited valve movement.

A failed 'close' position switch for valve V-28-12 resulted in the valve status indicator indicating that the valve had closed.

Analysis of Occurrence

Secondary containment integrity is required to minimize atmospheric release of airborne radioactive material, and to provide for controlled release of the reactor building atmosphere under accident conditions. Despite the failure of this valve, V-28-12, to close upon signal initiation, the ability for ventilation isolation was still maintained by the redundant valve V-28-11. Taking into consideration the above, the safety significance of this occurrence is considered minimal. Valve V-28-12 was then manually closed and disabled by lifted leads until repaired.

Corrective Action

The air operator was removed, disassembled, cleaned, repaired, and reinstalled. Following reassembly, the valve was tested twice satisfactorily. The valve was then placed back in service.

An engineering study of the Instrument Air System is in progress that will identify and implement improvements to enhance system performance. In addition, system piping at various locations will be examined to determine present piping integrity. Corrective actions, if needed, will then be addressed.

The position switches on all other Reactor Building ventilation isolation valves have been checked. Valves V-28-12 and V-28-14 have inoperable limit switches. Replacement position switches are on order for V-28-12 and V-28-14. Information tags on V-28-12 and V-28-14 control switches alert the operators to possible indication errors.

The Preventive Maintenance Program will be revised to include:

1. Periodic valve position verification, including verification of position indication for all isolation valves which have common indication for more than one (1) valve. (Note: The IST Program presently includes position verification for isolation valves in primary containment). This verification will be performed prior to startup following the current outage.

2. Periodic inspection of Reactor Building isolation valve operators.

Failure Data

Limit Switch: (mfg.) Namco Controls
Catalog #EA510-17702