

NRC FORM 366
(12-81)
10 CFR 50U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORTAPPROVED BY OMB
3150-0011CONTROL BLOCK: ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01	P	A	S	E	S	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	4	5
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32

CONT

01	L	6	0	5	0	0	0	3	8	7	7	1	0	1	9	8	3	8	1	1	2	1	8	3	9
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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 The alternate power supply breaker to 4KV Bus 1A203 was removed for preventive

03 maintenance and Limiting Condition for Operation 3.8.1.1.a was not declared. With

04 this breaker removed, Bus 1A203 did not have two "independent" off-site sources of

05 power. The remaining 3 buses emergency buses were not affected and there were no

06 adverse consequences to public health and safety.

07

08

09	E	B	11	A	12	A	13	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	14	Z	15	Z	16
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17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

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CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 At the time the breaker was removed, 1A203 was considered to have two off-site

11 sources since the 13.8 KV tie-breaker was available and both off-site sources

12 could feed 1A203. Since both sources would have to use the normal supply breaker

13 to 1A203, the requirement for two physically independent sources was not met.

14 Shift supervision was instructed on the proper interpretation of this requirement.

15	E	28	1	0	0	29	NA	30	1	31	Observation	32
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16	Z	33	Z	34	NA	35	NA	36
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17	0	0	0	37	38	NA	39
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18	0	0	0	40	41	NA	42
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19	Z	42	43	NA	44	45	46	47
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NAME OF PREPARER A.P. Piemontese

PHONE: (717) 542-2181

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PDR ADOCK 05000387
S PDRJE22
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NRC USE ONLY

ATTACHMENT

LER # 83-130/01X-1

Pennsylvania Power & Light Company
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station
Docket Number: 50-387

On October 19, 1983 a Preventive Maintenance Activity (PM) was performed on the alternate supply breaker to Bus 1A203. This bus is one of four emergency 4KV buses. The breaker was removed for inspection and insulation resistance testing as part of the plant Preventive Maintenance Program.

Technical Specification 3.8.1.1.a requires two physically independent circuits between the off-site transmission network and the onsite class 1E distribution system.

At the time the PM was released for work both off-site sources were capable of supplying 1A203 since the 13.8KV tie-breaker was available and capable of automatic closure. This was originally considered to satisfy 3.8.1.1.a. It was subsequently identified that this alignment would necessitate that both off-site sources use a portion of the non-1E system and the normal supply breaker to 1A203 and therefore, did not satisfy the requirement of physical independency.

Shift supervision has been instructed on the proper interpretation of Technical Specification 3.8.1.1.a. Also, the event has been placed on the Supervisor of Operations Weekly Training Agenda to ensure the intent of 3.8.1.1.a is understood by all licensed operators.

A review of maintenance records revealed a similar PM activity took place on September 23, 1983.



Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

November 21, 1983

Two North Ninth Street • Allentown, PA 18101 • 215 / 770-5151

Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 83-139/01X-1
ER 100450 FILE 841-23
PLA-1959

Docket No. 50-387
License No. NPF-14

Dear Dr. Murley:

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 83-139/01X-1. This event was determined to be reportable per Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.b, in that during a preventive maintenance activity, two physically independent sources of off-site power were not available to one emergency bus. The remaining three emergency buses were not affected. The system was restored to service and Operations personnel were instructed in the interpretation of Technical Specification 3.8.1.1.a.

This update is provided to clarify the position of the 13.8 KV Tie-Breaker (0A10502) during the event. The breaker was open, but capable of automatic closure if required.

H.W. Keiser
Superintendent of Plant-Susquehanna

APP/pjg

Attachment

cc: G.G. Rhoads
Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P.O. Box 52
Shickshinny, PA 18655

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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