NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | LICENSEE CODE: W I P B H 1 (2) | LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | CAT: (5)

CON'T 0 1 | REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 6 (7) | EVENT DATE: 1 0 2 7 8 3 (8) | REPORT DATE: 1 1 2 3 8 3 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 With the unit in cold shutdown an inspection of the 4160 V AC breaker
0 3 for SI pump 1P15B was performed. A wire in the 86 lockout relay circuit
0 4 was found loose. With the circuit open, the electrical protection for
0 5 the pump motor was disabled. This event is reportable in accordance
0 6 with Technical Specification 15.6.9.2.B.2. No operating occurrence
0 7 took place as a result of this event.
0 8

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	S F (11)	X (12)	Z (13)	E L E C O N (14)	Z (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 3	—	0 1 1	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
B (18)	X (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	N (25)	W 1 2 0 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The wire was apparently accidentally pulled loose during the course of
1 1 an inspection. It cannot be determined if this occurred during this
1 2 inspection or the prior refueling outage. Corrective action consisted
1 3 of reconnecting the loose wire and tying the wire bundle down more
1 4 securely. All other breakers will be inspected for this problem.

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	H (28)	0 0 0 (29)	N/A	B (31)	Routine insp./preventive maint.

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	N/A	N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	N/A

8312020305 831123
PDR ADOCK 05000266
S PDR

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	N/A

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PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)
2 0	N (44)	N/A

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER: C. W. Fay PHONE: 414/277-2811

GPO 917-926

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 83-011/03L-0

Wisconsin Electric Power Company
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1
Docket No. 50-266

On October 27, 1983 with Unit 1 in a cold shutdown condition a routine preventive maintenance inspection was performed on the 4160 V AC breaker which serves safety injection pump 1P15B. This breaker is a Westinghouse Type 50DH360E, 4.16 KV, 1200 amp, three-phase breaker. During the inspection, a loose wire was found on the frame auxiliary switch terminal block. The wire had been pulled out of its terminal lug. The open circuit was located between a breaker "A" contact and the 86 lockout relay coil. As a result, the protective relaying for the safety injection pump motor would not have tripped the breaker if an overload/fault had occurred in the motor. A motor overload alarm would have been raised in the control room. It should be noted that the safety injection pump was functionally ready and able to operate. A problem would have resulted from this event only if an overload/fault condition had occurred in the motor. All other breaker trip/breaker close circuits would have functioned normally.

It has been determined that the wire probably was caught and pulled loose during a breaker inspection. As the breaker phase barriers are removed and installed, they are slid directly over the wire harness to the auxiliary switch terminal block. Normally, the wiring harness is not in a position to be caught on the phase barrier. In this case, the wires were not adequately secured and were able to get out of position.

It is most likely that the wire was pulled loose as the phase barrier was removed due to the method of removal and the construction of the breaker. Also, once the phase barrier has been removed, the wire is in a visible location and would be noticed immediately. For these reasons, it is felt that the wire was pulled loose at the time of this inspection rather than during the prior refueling outage inspection. But, if the wire had been pulled loose during the prior inspection, as the phase barrier was being installed, it could have gone unnoticed. Therefore, the possibility exists that Unit 1 could have operated without overload/overcurrent/ground fault protection on safety injection pump motor 1P15B. This pump is normally in a standby condition and was not required to operate except for periodic testing during the time interval in question. A review was done to determine the possible ramifications of operating a faulted safety injection pump motor during an emergency with a loss of motor electrical protection. The results of this review indicated that one train of safeguards electrical loads could have been degraded but the effects would have been within the scope of the plant safety analyses.

The loose wire was reconnected prior to reassembling the breaker and the entire bundle secured so that it could not be caught during subsequent barrier removals. Most of the other safeguards 4 KV breakers on Unit 1 have been inspected with specific attention paid to the position of this wiring bundle. The wires are checked to ensure that they lie within the terminal block cover and are secured such that they cannot get out of position. Of the breakers inspected, none have shown deficiencies in this regard. Additionally, no similar problem has occurred in the past. For this reason, it is felt that this occurrence is an isolated case and does not indicate a generic problem.

Future corrective actions will be to complete the inspection of the remaining Unit 1 4 KV breakers and to inspect all of the Unit 2 breakers during the next refueling outage, paying specific attention to this problem. Additionally, a review will be made of the protection of the present 4 KV bus system.

DMB

Wisconsin Electric POWER COMPANY
231 W. MICHIGAN, P.O. BOX 2046, MILWAUKEE, WI 53201

November 23, 1983

Mr. J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrator
Office of Inspection and Enforcement,
Region III
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

DOCKET NO. 50-266
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 83-011/03L-0
SAFETY INJECTION PUMP BREAKER
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report No. 83-011/03L-0 (a 30-day report) with attachment. This report concerns the degraded breaker control circuit for safety injection pump 1P15B due to a loose wire. This event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 15.6.9.2.B.2, "Conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation or plant shutdown required by a limiting condition for operation."

Very truly yours,

C. W. Fay

Vice President-Nuclear Power

C. W. Fay

Enclosure

Copy to NRC Resident Inspector

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