CP&L

Carolina Power & Light Company

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P. O. Box 101, New Hill, N. C. 27562
October 31, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Northwest (Suite 2900)
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

NRC-134

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
1986-90 - 900,000 KW - UNITS 1 & 2
WELD DEFICIENCIES IN UNIT 1 CHILLED WATER VALVE,
ITEM 127

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Attached is the final report on the subject item which was deemed reportable per the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR, Part 21, on May 5, 1983. With this report, Carolina Power & Light Company considers this matter closed.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours very truly,

R. M. Parsons
Project General Manager
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant

RMP/sh

Attachment

cc: Messrs. G. Maxwell/R. Prevatte (NRC-SHNPP)
Mr. R. C. DeYoung (NRC)

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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

UNIT NO. 1

WELD DEFICIENCIES IN UNIT 1 CHILLED WATER VALVE ITEM 127

FINAL REPORT

OCTOBER 28, 1983

REPORTABLE UNDER 10CFR50.55(e) AND 10CFR21

SUBJECT

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Unit No. 1
10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR Part 21 reportable weld deficiencies in three-way chilled water valve purchased under Purchase Order NY-435176, Item 168.

ITEM

Deficiency and Disposition Report 1422; Valve 3CX-W25SB-1 was found to have vendor shop weld defects.

SUPPLIED BY

ITT Hammel Dahl, Warwick, Rhode Island

NATURE OF DEFICIENCY

In March 1983, the Quality Assurance Department, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, reported lack of penetration on the I.D. of vendor shop welds in the above-referenced valve.

DATE PROBLEM OCCURRED

Refer to the section above.

DATE PROBLEM REPORTED

On April 7, 1983, Mr. K. V. Hate' notified the NRC (Mr. A. Hardin) of a potentially reportable item per the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR Part 21. The NRC was informed that an HVAC chilled water valve supplied by ITT Hammel Dahl was found to have shop weld deficiencies. Failure of the valve could result in the loss of control room cooling.

On May 5, 1983, Mr. N. J. Chiangi notified the NRC (Mr. A. Hardin) that the April 7, 1983 potentially reportable item concerning shop weld deficiencies in an HVAC chilled water valve supplied by ITT Hammel Dahl was evaluated and found to be reportable per the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR Part 21.

SCOPE OF PROBLEM

The deficiency involves loss of safety-related chilled water.

SAFETY IMPLICATION

Loss of safety-related chilled water could potentially jeopardize the allowable environmental operating temperature of certain safety components and the environment envelop of the main control room.

REASON DEFICIENCY IS REPORTABLE

Failure of the valve could result in the reduction of cooling to Safety Train "B" Air Handling Units. No means of automatic isolation in vicinity of deficiency; therefore, some "B" train is sacrificed.

Incorporating additional single-failure criterion (loss of Safety Train A), the environmental qualification of essential components could potentially be jeopardized due to exceeding the allowable operating temperature.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Valve was shipped back to the vendor for repair and received back at the site after repairs were performed on it.

PREVENTATIVE MEASURE

The valve weld deficiencies have been repaired by the vendor, hydrotested, inspected and accepted by vendor QA, the Authorized Nuclear Inspector and Ebasco Inspector. The valve has been received back at the site. The following is the summary of the preventive measures which ITT Hammel Dahl Conoflow Corporation has informed us are being adopted.

Vendor's QC procedure has been revised to require more stringent inspections to the weld procedures and sign-off. Fabrication control papers have been rewritten in a more clear and a step-by-step manner which requires welder sign-off and the work is verified by the shop foreman. Training sessions for shop and QA/QC people were held to upgrade the level of performance. Written warnings have been issued to the responsible welder and the QC inspector involved in this specific case.

FINAL REPORT

This is the final report. CP&L considers this subject closed.