

CONTROL BLOCK

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 N C M G S 1 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 5  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CONT

01 REPORT SOURCE L 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 9 0 8 3 1 8 3 0 9 3 0 8 3 9  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 While attempting to open valve 1NM-200B for stroke timing during performance of  
03 the "Nuclear Sampling Valve Stroke Timing-Quarterly" periodic test, the valve failed  
04 to open (but the operator aid computer indicated the valve was in an intermediate  
05 position). The valve (S/G B blowdown line sample containment isolation inside) was  
06 subsequently declared inoperable. This constitutes a degradation of containment  
07 isolation valves (T.S.3.6.3) which is reportable pursuant to T.S.6.9.1.11(d) and  
08 similar to RO's 369/81-150 and 81-152. Redundant isolation valve 1NM-201A was cap-  
09 able of isolating the penetration. Health and safety of the public were unaffected.

09 S D 11 E 12 A 13 V A L V O P 14 Z 15 Z 16  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 3 0 7 5 0 3 L 0  
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

ACTION TAKEN 18 X 19 X 20 Z 21 Z 22 0 0 0 0 23 N 24 N 25 L 26 R 3 7 8  
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 A ground fault alarm received simultaneously with the valves failure to open indi-  
11 cated problems with the valve actuator. Investigation determined that the actuator  
12 (Rotork 11NA1) was burned up. The redundant isolation valve was closed and deener-  
13 gized in accordance with the T.S. action statements. Since the valve is located  
14 inside containment the actuator will be replaced or repaired during an upcoming  
15 outage.

15 E 28 1 0 0 29 NA 30 B 31 Routine Surveillance  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

16 Z 33 Z 34 NA 35 NA 36  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

17 0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA 39  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

18 0 0 0 40 NA 41  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

19 Z 42 NA 43  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

20 N 44 NA 45  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

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September 30, 1983

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VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE  
(704) 373-4531

83 OCT 11 P 1:51

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Subject: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-369  
LER/RO-369/83-75

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-369/83-75. This report concerns T.S. 3.6.3, "The containment isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-2 shall be operable with isolation times as shown in Table 3.6-2". This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

*H.B. Tucker*

Hal B. Tucker

PBN:jfw  
Attachment

cc: Document Control Desk  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. W. T. Orders  
NRC Resident Inspector  
McGuire Nuclear Station

Records Center  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500  
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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