

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)

Turkey Point Unit 3

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 2 5 0 1 OF 0 2

PAGE (3)

TITLE (4)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation - Reactor Trip

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
									N/A		0 5 0 0 0
0 1	2 5	8 4	8 4	0 0	5	0 0	0 2	2 3	N/A		0 5 0 0 0
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
N		20.402(b)		20.405(c)		X		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)	
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)	
1 0 1 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
		20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Paul A. Roach, Regulation and Compliance Engineer

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE

3 0 5 2 4 5 - 2 9 1 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
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EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 25, 1984, a reactor trip occurred. The root cause was determined to be due to an accidental trip of a 4160 volt bus feeder breaker by a member of the plant construction work force. The breaker trip de-energized the bus and its power supplies to a main feedwater pump and condensate pump. The reduced feedwater flow transient resulted in a reactor trip on Reactor Protection System logic - "Steam Flow/Feedwater Flow Mismatch" coincident with "Low 'C' Steam Generator Water Level". All equipment functioned as designed on initiation of the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Signal (ESFAS). Immediate corrective actions stopped all construction work in the plant until a Plant Construction Administrative Site Procedure could be prepared, approved, and implemented. Long-term corrective action is to follow-up implementation of the new procedure, including training of personnel on implementation of the procedure and possible procedure revisions to clarify and streamline instructions to affected personnel. The health and safety of the public were not affected. Similar occurrences: LER 250-84-003.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Turkey Point Unit 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000250	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		84	005	000	2	OF 02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)

On January 25, 1984, at 12:55 p.m., the Unit 3 reactor tripped from 100% power. The root cause was determined to be due to an accidental trip of the 3C 4160 volt bus normal feeder breaker (3AC16) by a member of the construction work force. The breaker trip de-energized the 3C bus and its power supplies to the 3B steam generator (S/G) feedwater pump and 3C condensate pump. The reduced feedwater flow transient resulted in a reactor trip on Reactor Protection System (RPS) logic - "Steam Flow/Feedwater Flow Mismatch" (1/2 channels) coincident with "Low 'C' S/G Water Level" (1/3 S/Gs).

The accidental trip of breaker 3AC16 occurred when an electrician slipped while pulling electrical cables inside the 3AC16 breaker cubicle located in the 3C 4160 volt bus enclosure. The breaker was racked-in and closed. The cubicle door was open to facilitate access to the open ends of the electrical conduits, located within the cubicle, for the cable pulls. However, due to the confinement of the cubicle and the close proximity of the manual breaker trip mechanism to the open ends of the conduits, no margin for error in movement existed. This situation resulted in the accidental actuation of the manual breaker trip mechanism while the electrician was attempting to perform the cable pulls. The trip of breaker 3AC16 de-energized the 3C 4160 volt bus which ultimately resulted in the reactor trip.

The immediate corrective action taken stopped all construction work in the plant until a procedure could be developed and implemented that will control the activities of the plant construction work force to prevent recurrence of a similar type event. A Plant Construction Administrative Site Procedure, ASP-19 - Construction Work Permits and Safety Tagging, was prepared and approved by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee and implemented prior to rescheduling any plant construction work. Long-term corrective action is to follow-up implementation of ASP-19, including training of personnel on how to fill out the plant construction work permit form and on maintaining updated schedules of plant construction activities. Also, revision of ASP-19 to clarify and streamline instructions to all affected personnel will be performed as required.

All equipment functioned as designed on initiation of the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation signal generated in the RPS. Following completion of the post trip review, having identified no other problems, the unit evolution - hot shutdown to power operation commenced. The unit returned to full power at 5:35 a.m., on January 26, 1984.



February 23, 1984
PNS-LI-84-62

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Reportable Event 84-05
Turkey Point Unit 3
Date of Event: January 25, 1984
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation - Reactor Trip

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J.W. Williams, Jr.", with a stylized flourish at the end.

J.W. Williams, Jr.
Vice President
Nuclear Energy

JWW/PLP:djc

Attachment

cc: J.P. O'Reilly, Region II, USNRC
Harold F. Reis, Esquire
File 933.1

IE22
1/1