

CONTROL BLOCK:

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 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'T

0	1
7	8

REPORT SOURCE

L	6	0	5	0	0	0	3	4	6	7	0	8	3	1	8	3	8	0	9	3	0	8	3	9
60	61	DOCKET NUMBER					62	69	EVENT DATE					74	75	REPORT DATE					80			

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

(NP-33-83-58) On 8/31/83 while performing ST 5080.02, Independent Offsite AC Sources

Bus Transfer, the automatic unit power supply transfer to each of the 345 KV trans-

mission lines did not function properly during separate tests. Since the unit was in

Mode 5 and one AC power source was operable at all times, the action statement of

Technical Specification 3.8.1.2 was not entered. This occurrence is being reported

to document a component failure.

SYSTEM CODE E B (11)		CAUSE CODE E (12)		CAUSE SUBCODE X (13)		COMP. SUBCODE S (15)		VALVE SUBCODE Z (16)	
EVENT YEAR 8 3 (22)		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 4 7 (26)		OCCURRENCE CODE / (27)		REPORT TYPE L (30)		REVISION NO. 0 (32)	
ACTION TAKEN B (18)		FUTURE ACTION X (19)		EFFECT ON PLANT Z (20)		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z (21)		HOURS 0 0 0 (22)	
ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y (23)		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N (24)		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N (25)		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER G 0 8 0 (26)			

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause was that the reserve source selector switch contacts were not being properly
1 1 made. These switches were found to have "self wiping" contacts and require the switch
1 2 to be operated regularly to clean the contacts. These switches are not normally
1 3 operated except every 18 months when the test is performed. These switches will be
1 4 operated every month to insure the contacts stay clean.

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION		
1	5	D	28	10	000	29	NA	B	31	During performance of ST 5080.02
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	44	45	46	80
ACTIVITY RELEASED		CONTENT OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE				
1	6	Z	33	Z	34	NA	44	45		
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	44	45		80
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION				
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA		
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	44	45		80
PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION						
1	8	0	0	0	40	NA	41			
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	44	45		80
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		TYPE		DESCRIPTION						
1	9	Z	42	NA	43					
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	44	45		80
PUBLICITY		ISSUED		DESCRIPTION						
2	0	N	44	NA	45					
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	44	45		80

8310120222 830930
PDR ADOCK 05000346
S PDR

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NRC USE ONLY

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NAME OF PREPARER

Ron Uebbing

PHONE _____

419-259-5000, Ext. 294

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-58

DATE OF EVENT: August 31, 1983

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Failure of the independent offsite AC sources bus transfer during test

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 5, with Power (MWt) = 0 and Load (Gross MWe) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On August 31, 1983, while performing Surveillance Test ST 5080.02, "Independent Offsite AC Sources Bus Transfer", the automatic unit power supply transfer to each of the 345 KV transmission lines did not function properly. At 1030 hours, the automatic transfer of the 13.8 KV bus from the startup transformer 02 supply to the startup transformer 01 supply was not completed because breaker HX01B did not close. At 1520 hours, the automatic transfer test of the 13.8 KV bus from startup transformer 01 supply to the startup transformer 02 supply was not completed because breaker HX02A did not close.

This demonstration of operability of the automatic transfer of unit power supplies is required by Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.b. Since the unit was in Mode 5 at the time of this occurrence and one AC power source was operable at all times, the action statement of Technical Specification 3.8.1.2 was not entered. This occurrence is being reported to document a component failure.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence was that the reserve source selector switch contacts were not being properly made. These switches were found to have "self wiping" contacts and require the switch to be operated regularly to clean the contacts. These switches are not normally operated except every 18 months when the surveillance test is performed.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. There was one AC power source remaining operable at all times.

Corrective Action: Under Maintenance Work Orders 1-83-4618-00 and 1-83-4612-00, circuit breaker HX01B and HX02A control circuits, respectively, were checked for proper conditions. The only problem found was the reserve source selector switch contacts only made proper circuit contact after being operated several times. These switches are General Electric Type SBM control switches and their contacts are self cleaning when operated.

These switches have been added to the Monthly Equipment Log to be operated every month to insure the contacts stay clean.

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-58
PAGE 2

A check was also made to insure I.E. Information Notice No. 80-13 "Type
SBM Control Switch Defective Cam Followers" did not apply to these switches.

Failure Data: There have been no previous similar occurrences.

LER #83-047

DMB



September 30, 1983

Log No. K83-1340
File: RR2 (NP-33-83-58)

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator, Region III
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

LER No. 83-047
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
Date of Occurrence: August 31, 1983

Enclosed are three copies of Licensee Event Report 83-047 which are being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30 day written notification of the subject occurrence.

Yours truly,

Terry D. Murray
Station Superintendent
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

TDM/ljk

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Richard DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Encl: 30 copies

Mr. Norman Haller, Director
Office of Management and Program Analysis
Encl: 3 copies

Mr. Walt Rogers
NRC Resident Inspector
Encl: 1 copy

OCT 5 1983

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