Duquesne Light

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March 1, 1995
ND3MNO:3647

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-334, Licensee No. DPR-66
LER 95-002-00

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen.

In accordance with Appendix A, Beaver Valley Technical Specifications, the following Licensee Event Report is submitted:

LER 95-002-00, 10 CFR 50.73.a.2.i.B, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications-"Safety Related 480 Volt Bus Found Seismically Unqualified".

L. R. Freeland
General Manager
Nuclear Operations

STC/clp

Attachment

070099

IE22
1/1

cc: Mr. T. T. Martin, Regional Administrator
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FORM 366 (5-92) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 5/31/95

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1	05000334	1 OF 4

Safety Related 480 Volt Bus Found Seismically Unqualified

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
1	30	95	95	-- 002 --	00	3	1	95	N/A	
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
									N/A	

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 20 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)					
POWER LEVEL (10)	0	20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	(Specify in abstract below and in Text NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)
L. R. Freeland, General Manager Nuclear Operations	(412) 643-1258

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS				COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
B	ED	XXXX	XXXX	N						

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO				

ABSTRACT (Limited to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On January 30, 1995 at 1130 hours, with the unit in an undefined Mode (i.e. all fuel removed from the reactor vessel), a seismic mounting deficiency was identified on a 480v Motor Control Center (MCC). A weld was missing on the rear base anchorage system for MCC-E7. This MCC is a Class 1E power supply that supplies power to support equipment for the Train "A" Emergency Diesel Generator.

Upon discovery of this deficiency, the redundant train MCC powering support equipment for the Train "B" Emergency Diesel Generator (MCC-E8) was immediately inspected and found to meet all design requirements.

The MCC-E7 deficiency was corrected by installing additional seismic supports.

This deficiency, which existed since original installation of MCC-E7, was discovered during a seismic qualification inspection.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On January 30, 1995, at 1130 hrs, Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 1 was being maintained in an undefined mode, with all the fuel removed from the reactor vessel. A seismic qualification inspection in response to a NRC concern (NRC unresolved safety issue USI-A-46) revealed a seismic mounting deficiency on 480v Emergency Power Motor Control Center (MCC) MCC-E7. The MCC is a Class 1E power supply that supplies power to support equipment for the Train "A" Emergency Diesel Generator.

The designed mounting system at the base of the MCC consists of two steel channels welded together by an intermittent (stitch) fillet weld. A four inch steel "C" channel with the open side facing downward is imbedded in the concrete base. A three inch steel "C" base channel is welded on top of the four inch channel with the fillet weld. The MCC frame angle is welded to the base channel and secures the MCC to the base structure as shown below.



DESIGN DETAIL

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT continued

The mounting deficiency on MCC-E7 consisted of a missing fillet weld that was supposed to join the rear base channel anchoring the MCC cabinet to the embedded channel. Contrary to design, the installed embedded steel channel was only three inches wide instead of the intended four inch width and the fillet weld was missing. See figure below.



AS FOUND
REAR ANCHOR

The front mounting anchor of MCC-E7 was inspected and found to meet all design requirements. Both front and rear anchors on MCC-E8 (the corresponding Train B power supply) were found to meet all design requirements. Although the core was off loaded and there were no immediate Technical Specification concerns, the Train A Class 1E power supply was conservatively declared inoperable until the seismic supports were installed.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event was determined to be improper installation of the rear mounting anchor of MCC-E7 during initial construction.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Seismically qualified tie straps were installed prior to placing the plant in a condition requiring Train A Class 1E Emergency Power Supply operability. These straps returned the MCC to a fully seismically qualified condition.

REPORTABILITY

This written report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.a.2.i.B as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 requires two Class 1E power supplies to be operable during Modes 1 through 4. Because the anchor defect existed since original installation and the plant had operated in these Modes, operation prohibited by Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 occurred.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

There were minimal safety implications due to this event. The anchorage deficiency was limited to one of the two anchors securing the MCC. Additionally, supported conduit entering the top of MCC-E7 would have aided in preventing the MCC overturning during a seismic event. The redundant (train B) power supply MCC-E8 remained fully seismically qualified during the period the deficiency existed on MCC-E7.

SIMILAR EVENTS

Previous LER's have been submitted concerning seismic deficiencies discovered during inspection activity. The most recent reports were submitted in 1991 and are listed below.

1. LER 91-018-00 - "Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Flow Indicating Switches As-Found Configuration not Supported by Seismic Analysis." Submitted July 8, 1991.

2. LER 91-026-01 - "Potentially Inoperable Charging Pump Due to Missing Nuts on High Speed Coupling." Submitted April 27, 1992.

3. LER 91-028-00 - "Inoperable Overpressure Protection Due to Inadequate Seismic Qualification." Submitted November 1, 1991.