

**Omaha Public Power District**  
1623 Harney Omaha, Nebraska 68102  
402/536-4000

February 14, 1984  
LIC-84-039

Mr. James R. Miller, Chief  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
Division of Licensing  
Operating Reactors Branch No. 3  
Washington, D.C. 20555

References: (1) Docket No. 50-285  
(2) Response to Section 2.2-2.4 of Enclosure 3,  
NUREG-0612 Transmitted to NRC by District  
Letter, Jones to Eisenhower (LIC-82-033), Dated  
January 21, 1982  
(3) Technical Evaluation Report Prepared by Franklin  
Research Center and Transmitted to District by  
NRC Letter, Clark to Jones, Dated May 17, 1983

Dear Mr. Miller:

Fort Calhoun Station  
Control of Heavy Loads

The purpose of this letter is to formally submit changes to the scheduled completion dates for items identified as "Proposed Corrective Actions" on page 33 of Reference (2). These commitment changes were discussed on January 16, 1984 and January 26, 1984 with Mr. E. G. Tourigny of your staff. In accordance with agreements made during that telephone conversation, the new schedule and justification is as follows:

Proposed Corrective Action #1

A procedure will be written to provide an alternate path for shut-down cooling water in the event of a load drop in the area bounded by Columns 10 and 11 and the biological shield wall in the containment. This procedure will permit the use of the polar crane in the area. Commitment date: January 21, 1984.

Present Status, Justification, and New Schedule

This procedure is not yet finalized. The present Plant Review Committee approved load handling procedure for the polar crane (OI-HE-1), however, prohibits load handling in the area bounded by Columns 10 and 11 and the biological shield wall. This restriction will not be removed until the proposed procedure for

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providing an alternate path is approved by the Plant Review Committee. Further, the Fort Calhoun Technical Specifications prohibit use of the polar crane for transporting of loads over the reactor coolant system if the temperature of the coolant or steam in the pressurizer exceeds 225°F.

Because of the restrictions currently in place and because the polar crane will not be used until the refueling outage, the District seeks an extension on this item until March 2, 1984.

#### Proposed Corrective Action #2

A procedure will be written to prevent the loss of the raw water pumps due to a load drop accident destroying the power supply cables. The procedure will:

- (a) Prohibit loads from being carried over the area above the cable tray supplying power to all four raw water pumps, and/or
- (b) Outline emergency repair procedures to connect the fire pump discharge into the raw water header to provide component cooling during the repair of the raw water power cables.

Commitment date: January 21, 1984.

#### Present Status, Justification, and New Schedule

Loss of all raw water pumps is presently covered by an emergency procedure (EP-22), "Loss of Raw Water". This procedure requires a reactor trip and reactor coolant system cooldown to 300°F at the maximum allowable rate. The procedure also calls for putting pump AC-16 in service to supply water to the demineralized water plant for steam generator makeup. This emergency procedure is now being revised to also allow the use of fire pumps to supply cooling water to the raw water system (via temporary hose connections). The revised procedure is presently being evaluated by the Plant Review Committee and is expected to be approved by February 10, 1984.

This delay will not have any effect on the plant safety because: (1) EP-22 adequately addresses loss of raw water pumps and (2) raw water pumps are not required for hot shutdown.

#### Proposed Corrective Action #3

The design of the access door to the reactor vessel cavity at elevation 976'6" will be reviewed. This design evaluation will ensure that the door can withstand hydrostatic pressure of the flooded cavity after a postulated load drop shears off all nozzles of

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the reactor vessel and the vessel falls into the cavity. If the door design is found to be deficient, appropriate steps will be taken to ensure the reactor core remains covered with coolant. Commitment date: End of the 1984 refueling outage.

#### Present Status, Justification, and New Schedule

At the time this commitment was made, the District believed that a simple structural modification to the reactor vessel cavity door would be all that was required. During the 1983 refueling outage, as-built conditions of the reactor vessel cavity door were checked. Based upon this, the District realized that in addition to the door modification, the ventilation duct which penetrates through this door also needed strengthening. Because of very high radiation levels in this area, the field measurements could not be completed. The District plans to complete the measurements during the 1984 refueling outage and install this modification during the 1985 outage.

The District did not inform the Commission about this delay earlier because installation and design difficulties in completing this modification have been very recently identified. The District believes that because of very high radiation levels in this area and additional equipment and design effort required for sealing the ventilation duct opening, the full modification cannot be completed during one outage.

It is the District's belief that an 18-month delay will not have any significant effect on plant safety because of the very low probability of a reactor vessel head drop accident. This probability is considered very low because of the very infrequent handling of the reactor vessel head (3 times during 18 months). Further, this load handling is done by using the polar crane which is designed to meet applicable industry standards [page 23 of Reference (3)]. Further, all load handling within the containment building is governed by written plant procedures. Personnel using this crane have been adequately trained. The District's new proposed completion date is the end of the 1985 refueling outage.

#### Proposed Corrective Action #4


The geared rotary limit switches will be wired for the upper limit on the main hook and the auxiliary hook of the containment polar crane. This will provide redundant limit switches and prevent a 2-blocking accident.

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Status

This was completed during the 1983 refueling outage.

Sincerely,



W. C. Jones  
Division Manager  
Production Operations

WCJ/DJM:jmm

cc: LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae  
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20036

Mr. E. G. Tourigny, Project Manager  
Mr. L. A. Yandell, Senior Resident  
Inspector