

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
Washington Nuclear Project - Unit 2DOCKET NUMBER (2)
0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 1 OF 0 2TITLE (4)
Reactor Trip

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)														
0	1	2	0	8	4	8	4	—	0	0	3	—	0	0	0	2	1	6	8	4	0	5	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																														
5	<table border="1"><tr><td>20.402(b)</td><td>20.406(c)</td><td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td><td>50.73(a)(2)(iv)</td><td>73.71(b)</td></tr><tr><td>20.406(a)(1)(i)</td><td>50.36(c)(1)</td><td></td><td>50.73(a)(2)(v)</td><td>73.71(c)</td></tr><tr><td>20.406(a)(1)(ii)</td><td>50.36(c)(2)</td><td></td><td>50.73(a)(2)(vii)</td><td>OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)</td></tr><tr><td>20.406(a)(1)(iii)</td><td>50.73(a)(2)(i)</td><td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td><td>50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>20.406(a)(1)(iv)</td><td>50.73(a)(2)(ii)</td><td></td><td>50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>20.406(a)(1)(v)</td><td>50.73(a)(2)(iii)</td><td></td><td>50.73(a)(2)(x)</td><td></td></tr></table>	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	
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20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)																												

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME: L. D. Kassakatis
TELEPHONE NUMBER: 5 0 9 3 7 7 - 2 5 0 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs	
A	J	C		N						

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
☐ YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ☒ NO
EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
MONTH: DAY: YEAR:

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During initial low power physics testing the Reactor was brought to criticality using plant operating procedures, and the Intermediate Range Monitoring (IRM) detectors response to neutron flux was being verified. IRMs A, B, and D did not respond to the increasing neutron flux. The five other IRMs C, E, F, G, and H all responded satisfactorily. The Reactor was shutdown because Plant Technical Specifications require a minimum of three operable IRMs per trip system. This required shutdown was reported to the NRC Operations Center pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(1)(i)(A). During investigation of this situation a Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip occurred while the RPS was in the non-coincidence scram mode of operation. This LER provides written follow-up pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(A).

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Washington Nuclear Project - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 4	— 0	0 3	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

Plant Operating Conditions - Prior to the Event:

- a) Power Level - Zero
- b) Mode Switch Position - Locked in Refuel
- c) Control Rod Position - All Rods In
- d) Scram Mode - Non-coincidence Scram Mode
i.e., Neutron Monitoring System Shorting Links Removed

During initial low power physics testing the Reactor was brought to criticality using plant operating procedures, and the Intermediate Range Monitoring (IRM) detectors response to neutron flux was being verified. IRMs A, B, and D did not respond to the increasing neutron flux. The five other IRMs C, E, F, G, and H all responded satisfactorily. The Reactor was shutdown because Plant Technical Specifications require a minimum of three operable IRMs per trip system. This required shutdown was reported to the NRC Operations Center pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(1)(i)(A). LER 84-004 provides written follow-up pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(A).

A maintenance work request (MWR 1992) was initiated by Plant personnel to troubleshoot the three IRMs. A Plant engineer and two instrument technicians were troubleshooting IRM D at the Pre-Amplifier to determine if the correct high voltage was being output to the detector. IRM D was bypassed. The detector cable from the Pre-Amplifier for IRM H, located in the same cabinet, was removed at 0020 hrs. on January 20, 1984. Removing this cable caused a spurious noise signal which generated an IRM scram signal. Since IRM H was not bypassed and the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Neutron Monitoring Shorting Links were removed, this single scram signal caused an RPS trip. The RPS scram signals from an IRM are IRM Upscale Hi-Hi and IRM Inop. This RPS trip was subsequently reported to the NRC Operations Center pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii). This LER provides written follow-up pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv).

The function of the IRM Pre-Amplifier is to pre-condition and amplify the IRM signal from the detector prior to it being sent to the IRM electronics drawer located in the Control Room. A high voltage is supplied to the detector from the High Voltage Power Supply located in the IRM electronics drawer through the Pre-Amplifier.

The personnel involved in the incident failed to recognize the possibility of a scram signal being generated by the removal of the IRM H detector cable.

There were no safety consequences associated with this event. The Reactor was shutdown prior to the event, and all plant systems performed as required during the subsequent Scram.

Corrective Actions: The Plant Manager will ensure that all plant personnel in the Operations, Plant Technical, and Maintenance Departments are briefed or informed by written notice of this event and the need for greater care in determining possible consequences of an action prior to its performance.

Washington Public Power Supply System

P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000

Docket No. 50-397
February 16, 1984

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: **NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2**
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 84-003

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 84-003 for WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of Technical Specification Section 6.9.1.7 and discusses the item of noncompliance, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

This is the follow-up report to the verbal notification given at 1400 hrs. on 1/20/84.

Very truly yours,

J. D. Martin
J. D. Martin (927M)
WNP-2 Plant Manager

JDM:de

Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report No. 84-003

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, Administrator
Region V, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1450 Maria Lane
Walnut Creek, California 94596
A. D. Toth, NRC Resident Inspector (901A)

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