

NRC Form 366  
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Surry Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3
-----------------------------------	--------------------------------------	----------------------

TITLE (4)

Reactor Trip

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0	1	1	4	8	4	8	4	0	0	0
0	2	1	3	8	4	0	2	1	3	8
0	5	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9)  POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 2	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 8: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
	20.402(b)		20.405(c)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)			
	20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)			
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)			
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME J. L. Wilson - Manager	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 10 4 3 15 7 1 - 3 1 18 14
--------------------------------	--

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH DAY YEAR /    /    /
--	-------------------------------	-------------------------------

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 1-14-84 following a trip on 1-13-84, the unit was at 2% power. The electricians were replacing an open coil in a reactor trip relay. When the first coil lead was removed the "A" reactor trip breaker de-energized resulting in a reactor trip.

The EMP used to replace reactor trip relay coils has 2 steps to prevent unnecessary reactor trips. These two steps are 1) a precaution to close the Reactor Trip Bypass breaker, and 2) installation of a jumper to prevent de-energizing other relays in the train. The Bypass breaker was not closed, and due in part to the complicated wiring connections of the reactor trip relays, the jumper was installed incorrectly. When the first coil lead was lifted, the "A" RTB was de-energized resulting in the trip.

The defective coil was replaced. The individuals involved were disciplined for not following procedures.

8402230160 840213  
PDR ADOCK 05000281  
S PDR

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)  SURREY POWER STATION	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 8 4 - 0 0 2 - 0 0 0 2 OF 0 3	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

1. Description of the Event

Following the reactor trip on 1-13-84 (See LER-84-001) the Safety Nuclear and Operating Committee required that Periodic Test 8.5 (CLS Hi Hi) be performed before returning the Unit to power. On 1-14-84, the reactor was at 2% power waiting for the completion of this P.T. During the P.T. a Reactor Trip Relay (EIIS No. RLY) was found to have an open coil. The electricians were in the process of replacing this relay in accordance with EMP-C-RT-24. When the leads were removed from the coil, "A" reactor trip breaker (RTB) (EIIS No. 52) opened at 0630 hours. The operator observed the rod bottom lights and the turbine trip by reactor trip first out lit and immediately pushed the manual trip pushbutton which opened "B" RTB.

During this event, no component failures were experienced and all protective and safety systems performed as expected. Because of the low power condition of the plant, no significant transient was experienced.

2. Safety Consequences and Implications

The "A" and "B" RTB's functioned as designed during the event and were available at all times.

If this event had occurred from 100% power it would have increased the challenge to the plant control and safety systems, however, since 100% power trips are analyzed, the possibility of an unreviewed safety question was not created, and the public's health and safety were not affected.

3. Cause

The EMP used to replace reactor trip relay coils has 2 steps to prevent unnecessary reactor trips. These two steps are 1) a precaution to close the Reactor Trip Bypass breaker, and 2) installation of a jumper to prevent de-energizing other relays in the train. The Bypass breaker was not closed, and due in part to the complicated wiring connections of the reactor trip relays, the jumper was installed incorrectly. When the first coil lead was lifted, the "A" RTB was de-energized resulting in the trip.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

The Operators performed all appropriate EP's and FRP's to ensure that plant conditions were stabilized. Also, the STA performed a review of the status trees and completed ADM-14 to ensure specific plant parameters remained within safe bounds.

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)  SURREY POWER STATION	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 8 4 - 0 0 2 - 0 0 0 3 OF 0 3	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

5. Additional Corrective Action

The defective reactor trip relay coil was replaced.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

The individuals involved were disciplined for failure to follow the procedure and all personnel have been reinstructed in the requirements to follow procedures.

The procedure will be modified to provide more definitive instructions for safe replacement of relays.

7. Generic Implications

It is possible for this event to occur on either unit, however, the actions taken above should reduce the chances of a repeat occurrence.