



601 Williams Boulevard ■ Richland, Washington 99352 ■ Tel: (509) 943-8200

Subject: Work Order 3900-4000
Washington Public Power Supply System
WNP-2
CAC Valve Power Supply
Responds to: NA

Main Office
550 Kinderkamack Road
Oradell, New Jersey 07649
(201) 265-2000

September 29, 1983
BRGO-RO-83-014
Response Required: NA

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Attention: Director

Dear Sir:

This letter is to report to you a condition we have deemed reportable under 10CFR21. This was discussed with R. Dodds of your Region V staff on September 28, 1983.

The concern is that the control circuits for valves CAC-FCV-1A and 1B, which are safety related, are powered from a non-Class 1E power supply.

Valves CAC-FCV-1A and 1B must be capable of isolating (closing) and opening post accident in order to meet their safety related design requirements. Failure of the non-Class 1E power supply post accident would prevent subsequent valve opening which is necessary in order to control oxygen concentration within primary containment.

Complete details are provided in the evaluation attached.

If you have further questions, please contact W.G. Conn at (509) 943-8241.

WGC:MCD:lvs

Very truly yours,

Attachment

cc: BPA - Mr. W.S. Chin
SS - Mr. B.A. Holmberg, w/a
SS - Mr. L.T. Harrold, w/a
SS - Mr. J.G. Tellefson, w/a
SS - Mr. R.T. Johnson, w/a
NRC - Mr. J.B. Martin, w/a

Region V

W.G. Conn
W.G. Conn
Project Licensing Supervisor

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CAC VALVE POWER SUPPLY #83-20

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY

The control circuits for CAC-FCV-1A and 1B which are safety related are powered from a non-Class 1E power supply.

SAFETY IMPLICATION

CAC-FCV-1A and 1B must be capable of isolating (closing) and opening post accident in order to meet their safety related design requirements. Failure of the non-Class 1E power supply post accident would prevent subsequent valve opening which is necessary in order to control oxygen concentration within primary containment.

CAUSE OF DEFICIENCY

Failure to recognize that the valves have two safety functions

- Isolation (close)
- Oxygen/Hydrogen recombination (open)

The isolation function is provided since the valve operator fails in the closed position on loss of power.

The failure to provide Class 1E power supplies to the subject valves is considered to be a random error.

ACTION TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

There are no generic considerations associated with this deficiency. Correction of the specific is sufficient to preclude recurrence.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

PED 218-E-C105 has been issued to provide divisionalized Class 1E power supplies to the two valves.