

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
North Anna Power Station Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000338

PAGE (3)

1 OF 012

TITLE (4)
Inadvertent Single Train ECCS Actuation In Mode 5

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)													
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)												
0	1	18	8	4	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	1	0	8	4	0	5	0	0	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)															
POWER LEVEL (10)	0	0	0	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)									
				20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.36(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)									
				20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(a)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 355A)									
				20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)										
				20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)										
				20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.72(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(x)										

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME
E. Wayne Harrell

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE

703 894-5151

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 18, 1984, at 0900 hours with Unit 1 in Mode 5, and the Reactor Coolant System vented and at a temperature of 110 degrees F, an inadvertent single train Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) actuation occurred during the removal of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) output fuses. ECCS is not required in Mode 5 and the SSPS output fuses were removed to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent ECCS actuation occurring during extensive maintenance which would cause equipment realignment and possibly endanger personnel. The ECCS actuation occurred after one train of SSPS output fuses had been removed and the instrument technician requested that the Pressurizer Low Pressure Safety Injection (SI) blocks be reinstated. The operator misinterpreted the request to mean reset Low Pressurizer Pressure SI. The reset allowed Low Pressurizer Pressure actuation to occur. No procedure existed for the pulling of the fuses which resulted in confusion between personnel involved. To preclude further similar occurrences, removal of the SSPS output fuses will be included in a procedure. No transient occurred due to the actuation, all pumps receiving start signals were in pull to lock. No further corrective actions are required.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) North Anna Power Station Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 8	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 4	— 0 0 2	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A's) (17)

INADVERTENT SINGLE TRAIN ECCS ACTUATION IN MODE 5

On January 18, 1984 at 0900 hours with the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) vented to containment atmosphere and at a temperature of 110 degrees F, a single train inadvertent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) actuation occurred during the removal of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) output fuses (EIIS identifier FU). The ECCS is designed to provide adequate RCS inventory in the event of a RCS cooldown accident or loss of coolant accident so that a medium is available for the removal of decay heat. The ECCS also provides the addition of boric acid to the RCS to assure adequate shutdown margin in the above events. In Mode 5 the ECCS is not required to perform the above function and the SSPS output fuses are pulled to preclude an inadvertent ECCS actuation which would realign equipment and possibly endanger personnel involved in maintenance. Pulling the SSPS output fuses terminates the power supply to relays which activate ECCS equipment. No transient occurred due to the above event because all pumps started by ECCS actuation were previously placed in pull to lock, a switch position which defeats the ability to automatically start equipment. One emergency diesel generator (EIIS identifier DG) started but did not close onto the bus since the normal power supply remained available. The diesel was secured and all valves realigned by the event were returned to their previous position.

The unit was being cooled by Residual Heat Removal during the event and since equipment in this system is not affected by an ECCS actuation, the plant remained in a stable condition. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

The above event was caused by the lack of procedural guidance for the removal of the SSPS output fuses and by a personnel error. Although removal of SSPS output fuses is a common evolution during an extended outage, no procedure existed at the time of the event for their removal. Work was performed under administrative control via a lifted lead log. While work was being performed the instrument technician requested the operator to reinstate the block of Low Pressurizer Pressure Safety Injection, the operator misconstrued these instructions to mean reset Low Pressurizer Pressure Safety Injection and when the reset action was performed an ECCS actuation occurred from Low Pressurizer Pressure on the train of SSPS which had not yet had its output fuses pulled.

To prevent recurrence of a similar event, procedures for removal of SSPS fuses will be developed and implemented. The above corrective action will assure that a similar event will not occur in the future. No further corrective actions are required.

Vepco

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

P. O. BOX 402

MINERAL, VIRGINIA 23117

February 10, 1984

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, D.C. 20555

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
Dear Sirs:

Pursuant to North Anna Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following License Event Report applicable to North Anna Unit No. 1.

Report No. LER 84-002-00

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to Safety Evaluation and Control for their review.

Very Truly Yours,



E. Wayne Harrell
Station Manager

Enclosures (3 copies)

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Atlanta, Georgia 30303

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