

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 1 2 7 5										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 1 2																													
TITLE (4) SPURIOUS SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION																																																	
EVENT DATE (5) MONTH DAY YEAR 0 1 1 6 8 4 8 4										LER NUMBER (6) SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 1 5 8 4										REPORT DATE (7) MONTH DAY YEAR 0 1 1 6 8 4										OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0																			
OPERATING MODE (9) 5										THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)																																							
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0										20.402(b) 20.405(a)(1)(i) 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v)										20.405(e) 30.36(e)(1) 30.36(e)(2) 30.73(a)(2)(i) 30.73(a)(2)(ii) 30.73(a)(2)(iii)										30.73(a)(2)(iv) 30.73(a)(2)(v) 30.73(a)(2)(vii) 30.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 30.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 30.73(a)(2)(ix)										73.71(b) 73.71(e) OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)									
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) NAME JACQUELINE HINDS, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER																														TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 0 5 5 9 5 - 7 3 5 1																			
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																																																	
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPDOS										CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPDOS										REPL. TABLE TO NPDOS																													
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)																				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)										MONTH DAY YEAR																			
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)																				X NO																													

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

While in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), the plant experienced a spurious safety injection actuation. The event was initiated by a momentary voltage drop on instrument AC Bus 1-1 while Channel III Bistables for Hi Steam Line Delta P were in the tripped position. All required equipment started automatically. Water was not injected into the Reactor Coolant System. The cause of the momentary voltage drop could not be determined, and there are no planned corrective actions as a result of this event.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0500027584	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		84	-003	-000	2	OF	2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

At 1440 PST on January 16, 1984, a momentary voltage drop on 120V Vital Instrument AC Bus 1-1 (BU, ED) caused a spurious safety injection actuation. The plant was in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) and the following conditions contributed to the event. The Hi Steam Line Delta P Channel III Bistables (PDS, JC) for Steam Generators (SG, AB) 1-2 and 1-3 were tripped to allow work on the transmitters. Both trains of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) (JE) were in the "operate" mode for slave relay testing. The Boron Injection Tank outlet valves (ISV, BQ) were closed with their breakers open.

The voltage drop on Instrument AC Bus 1-1 and the tripped position of the Channel III Bistables satisfied the 2/3 logic for a safety injection actuation on High Steam Line Delta P. The SSPS trains were in the "operate" mode and received the safety injection signal.

Upon receiving the safety injection signal, the following components started automatically: a centrifugal charging pump (P, CB), a residual heat removal pump (P, BP), a component cooling water pump (P, CC), all five containment fan cooler units (CLR, BK), and a diesel generator (DG, EK). Also, Phase 'A' of the Containment Isolation System (JM) was initiated. Water was not injected into the Reactor Coolant System due to the closed outlet valves on the Boron Injection Tank. The equipment was restored to its pre-safety injection status, and notification of a Significant Event was completed by the control room staff.

Investigations were conducted in an effort to determine the cause of the voltage drop on the instrument AC bus. The exact cause of the voltage drop could not be determined; however, it most probably resulted from maintenance or testing activities at the time. These activities will decrease with plant startup.

A previous safety injection actuation event was reported in LER 84-001-00. However, the circumstances surrounding that event were different.

Under the conditions existing at the time, this event had no safety consequences or implications and in no way affected the public's health and safety. An assessment of this or a similar event under the alternate condition of being at power is included as an analyzed (Condition II) event in the Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 15.2.14 (Spurious Operation of the Safety Injection System at Power).

There are no planned corrective actions as a result of this event.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E

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JAMES D. SHIFFER
MANAGER

DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIONS
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

February 15, 1984

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-056

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555


Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-76
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 84-003-00
Spurious Safety Injection Actuation

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), PGandE is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report concerning a spurious safety injection actuation.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Sincerely,


for James D. Shiffer

Enclosure

cc: J. B. Martin
M. M. Mendonca
Service List

IE22
1/1