

0257

**NORTHEAST UTILITIES**



THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY  
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY  
HOLYoke WATER POWER COMPANY  
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY  
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

General Offices • Selden Street, Berlin, Connecticut

P.O. BOX 270  
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270  
(203) 665-5000

December 19, 1991

Docket No. 50-336  
A10017

Re: Employee Concerns

Mr. Charles W. Hehl, Director  
Division of Reactor Projects  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region I  
475 Allendale Road  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Hehl:

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2  
RI-91-A-0259

We have completed our review of an identified issue concerning activities at Millstone Station. As requested in your transmittal letter of November 19, 1991, our response does not contain any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information. The material contained in this response may be released to the public and placed in the NRC Public Document Room at your discretion. The NRC transmittal letter and our response have received controlled and limited distribution on a "need to know" basis during the preparation of this response.

**ISSUE:**

"There is a double set of doors between the 'A' and 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms. One door is a watertight door and the second is a security door. Both doors are back-to-back on either side of the same wall. To pass between the two rooms, a person must manipulate the watertight door within the relatively short time allowed by the security system. When a security officer responds to a door alarm, as a result of the manipulation of these two sets of doors, the supervisor of the person believed to be responsible for causing the alarm is informed."

**REQUEST:**

"Please provide your review of the above assertion. If the above conditions are valid, notify us of the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence. Provide us with an assessment of the safety significance of any identified deficiencies, including generic considerations. Also provide us

Mr. Charles W. Hehl  
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with your review of the adequacy of security associated with this assertion and an assessment of the significance of any security deficiencies identified."

**RESPONSE:**

The assertion is essentially a statement of fact. The door at issue (Door 236) is constructed as described with the watertight door on the "A" Diesel side. This door is the normal access means into the "B" Diesel room.

Every security door is programmed, via the security computer, with a door lock time and an alarm time. If an individual holds a security door open beyond the total of these two times, a Door Not Closed (DNC) alarm is generated. These alarms make up the bulk of false alarms that can be directly traced to the actions of an individual. Security Reports are written whenever an individual is identified as having caused this type of alarm, and the report is forwarded to the individual's supervisor for information and action, if warranted.

On September 6, 1991, we began an aggressive program to reduce DNC alarms by trending alarm information so that multiple violations attributable to a single individual or to a specific department can be addressed. This trending is part of an effort to resensitize the station population concerning Security alarms.

This specific issue involving Door 236 was first identified to us in mid-October 1991. At that time, a review of the Security computer transaction history for the door indicated that while there were DNC alarms on the door in question, they were not considered excessive. Because of the unique situation involving this pair of doors, a decision was made to increase the door alarm time by 3 seconds. The increase in the alarm time allows an individual to manipulate the watertight door and the security door without undo haste. Trending of the alarms following this change has shown the rate of alarms generated to have decreased by approximately a factor of 5.

There is no nuclear or personnel safety significance to this issue. Door 236 is a vital-area-to-vital-area barrier and, as such, provides emergency egress from either diesel room. Although the door is accessed via a key reader and is alarmed, it is not locked. The same is true of other security doors on-site that are vital-area-to-vital-area barriers and are used for emergency egress from both sides.

There are no security deficiencies identified in connection with this assertion. The security integrity between the two diesel rooms is maintained through functioning door alarms. These alarms are tested once every seven days as required by 10 CFR 73.55. Routine patrols of the diesel rooms are


Mr. Charles W. Hehl  
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December 19, 1991

conducted by Security and Operations personnel, and armed security officers respond to all alarms.

After our review and evaluation of this issue, we find that this issue did not present any indication of a compromise of nuclear safety. We appreciate the opportunity to respond and explain the basis of our actions. Please contact my staff if there are further questions on any of these matters.

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
J. F. Opeka  
Executive Vice President

cc: W. J. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3  
E. C. Wenzinger, Chief, Projects Branch No. 4, Division of Reactor Projects  
E. M. Kelly, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 4A  
J. T. Shedlosky, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Millstone

ENCLOSURE

Issue 259

There is a double set of doors between the "A" and "B" Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms. One door is a watertight door and the second is a security door. Both doors are back-to-back on either side of the same wall. To pass between the two rooms, a person must manipulate the watertight door within the relatively short time allowed by the security system. When a security officer responds to a door alarm, as a result of the manipulation of these two sets of doors, the supervisor of the person believed to be responsible for causing the alarm is informed.

Request:




Please provide your review of the above assertion. If the above conditions are valid, notify us of the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence. Provide us with an assessment of the safety significance of any identified deficiencies, including generic considerations. Also provide us with your review of the adequacy of security associated with this assertion and an assessment of the significance any security deficiencies identified.

Enclosure Page 1

14-0259

# Photos of Security Door

11/91



5/209





(185)

UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I  
476 ALLENDALE ROAD  
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

Docket Number: 50-336      **OCT 29 1991**  
File Number: RI-91-A-0260

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company  
ATTN Mr. John F. Opeka  
Executive Vice President - Nuclear  
P.O. Box 270  
Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270

Dear Mr. Opeka:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission recently received information concerning activities at the Millstone Nuclear Power Facility, Unit 2. The details are enclosed for your review and followup.

We request that the results of your review and disposition of these matters be submitted to Region I within 30 days of the date of receipt of this letter. We request that your response contain no personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so it can be released to the public and placed in the NRC Public Document Room. If necessary, such information shall be contained in a separate attachment which will be withheld from public disclosure. The affidavit required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) must accompany your response if proprietary information is included. Please refer to file number RI-91-A-0260 when providing your response.

The enclosure to this letter should be controlled and distribution limited to personnel with a "need to know" until your investigation of the concern has been completed and reviewed by NRC Region I. The enclosure to this letter is considered Exempt from Public Disclosure in accordance with Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2.790(a). However, a copy of this letter excluding the enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document room.

The response requested by this letter and the accompanying enclosure are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.

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
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

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OCT 29 1991

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated. We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this information.

Sincerely,



Charles W. Hehl, Director  
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure: 10 CFR 2.790(a) Information  
Issues and Requests

cc w/o encl:  
Public Document Room (PDR)  
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)  
State of Connecticut

OCT 29 1991

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated. We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this information.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

*Charles W. Hehl*  
Charles W. Hehl, Director  
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure: 10 CFR 2.790(a) Information  
Issues and Requests

cc w/o encl:  
Public Document Room (PDR)  
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)  
State of Connecticut

bcc w/encl:  
Allegation File, RI-91-A-0260  
E. Conner  
E. Kelly  
W. Raymond  
T. Shedlosky  
EG&G Idaho Representative (LIPINSKI)

Concurrence:

RI-DRP

*E. Conner*  
Conner

10/24/91

RI-DRP

*E. Kelly*  
Kelly

10/24/91

RI-DRP

*Wenzinger*  
Wenzinger

10/25/91

*John*  
10/29