

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000275										PAGE (3) 1 OF 03	
TITLE (4) INOPERABLE CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM																					
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)												
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES						DOCKET NUMBER(S)						
01	07	84	84	002		01	07	84							05000275						
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 8 (Check one or more of the following) (11)																					
OPERATING MODE (9)		15		20.402(b)		20.406(c)		80.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)											
POWER LEVEL (10)		01010		20.406(a)(1)(i)		80.36(a)(1)		80.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(e)											
				20.406(a)(1)(ii)		80.36(a)(2)		80.73(a)(2)(vi)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 306A)											
				20.406(a)(1)(iii)		80.73(a)(2)(i)		80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)													
				20.406(a)(1)(iv)		80.73(a)(2)(ii)		80.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)													
				20.406(a)(1)(v)		80.73(a)(2)(iii)		80.73(a)(2)(viii)													
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																					
NAME WILLIAM W. KESSINGER, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER								TELEPHONE NUMBER 805541-7484													
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																					
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC											
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR							
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO											

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 9, 1984, while in Mode 5 (cold shutdown), both trains of the Control Room Ventilation System were identified as being powered by the same 480V vital bus. It was noted that this condition had existed since December 31, 1983 when components in both trains were removed from service for maintenance. As a result, the action requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.5.1 were not met within the specified seven day time interval (exceeded by two days). The cause of this event was the failure by the operators to identify the resulting electrical lineup after removing components in both trains from service. The Control Room Ventilation System was declared administratively inoperable upon discovery of this condition, and both trains were placed in the recirculation mode. Corrective action to prevent a similar occurrence has included operator training and revision of the relevant operating procedure.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)  DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 4	0 0 2	0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)

Each train of the Control Room Ventilation System (VI) is made up of two pressurization supply fans (FAN), two filter booster fans (FAN), two main supply fans (FAN) and one HEPA filter/charcoal adsorber (FLT). Because of the shared Control Room design, the separate trains are referred to as the Unit 1 train and the Unit 2 train.

Technical Specification 3.7.5.1 defines operability of each train as "...each train consisting of one main supply fan, one filter booster fan and one pressurization supply fan, and one HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber system." Since each train was designed with two independent sets of fans, the inoperability of a train is precluded in the event a single fan, or a single set of fans, is inoperable.

Electrical power is provided to each of the four sets of fans from one of three Unit 1 480V vital buses (BU): bus 1F, 1G or 1H. One set of fans of the Unit 1 train of the Control Room Ventilation System is powered from vital bus 1H with the other set of fans powered from vital bus 1G. The Unit 2 train fan sets are powered from vital buses 1H and 1F, respectively.

On December 31, 1983, the main supply fan (powered by vital bus 1G) of the Unit 1 train was removed from service for maintenance. On the same day, the pressurization supply fan (powered by vital bus 1F) of the Unit 2 train was removed from service for maintenance. The resulting electrical lineup resulted in both trains of the Control Room Ventilation System receiving power from 480V vital bus 1H; thus, in effect having only one operable train. Surveillance Test Procedure M6A requires that the Control Room Ventilation System be declared inoperable when both trains are not powered from separate vital buses.

On January 9, 1984, while in Mode 5 (cold shutdown), an operator observed that both trains of the Control Room Ventilation System were powered from 480V vital bus 1H. At 1439 PST, the Control Room Ventilation system was declared administratively inoperable and both trains were placed in the recirculation mode. Investigation revealed that this condition had existed since 0510 PST on December 31, 1983; thus, exceeding the action statements of Technical Specification 3.7.5.1.

The cause of this event was the failure by licensed operators to recognize the resulting electrical lineup when removing the above mentioned fans from service. As a result of this cognitive error, the plant entered into the action statements of Technical Specification 3.7.5.1.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Corrective actions to prevent a similar occurrence have included written instructions to operating personnel by the General Operating Foreman, dated January 16, 1984, that "...the power selector switches (JS) should be walked down prior to any operations on the system which transfer power or train in service." Additionally, Operating Procedures H-5 and H-5:III have been revised to prevent both trains of the Control Room Ventilation System from being powered by the same 480V vital bus.

In compliance with Action Statement b of Technical Specification 3.7.5.1, during the period from December 31, 1983 to January 9, 1984, no operations involving core alterations or positive reactivity changes were performed. This event consisted of redundant trains of the Control Room Ventilation System being powered by a single vital bus 1H. If this event had occurred in any mode of operation, no potential safety consequences would have resulted if vital bus 1H remained available.

# PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E

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J. O. SCHUYLER  
VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

February 8, 1984

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-050

Document Control Desk  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555


Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-76  
Diablo Canyon Unit 1  
Licensee Event Report 84-002-00  
Inoperable Control Room Ventilation

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i), PGandE is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report concerning the inoperability of the control room ventilation system.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Sincerely,



Enclosure

cc: J. B. Martin  
Service List

IE22  
1/1