

# Arizona Public Service Company

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January 31, 1984  
ANPP-28763-BSK/TRB

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region V  
Creskide Oaks Office Park  
1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210  
Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. T. W. Bishop, Director  
Division of Resident  
Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs


Subject: Final Report - DER 82-73  
A 50.55(e) Reportable Condition Relating to ITT Grinnell Pipe  
Support Clamps In Unit 2 MSSS Have Excess Gap, May Not  
Properly Secure Pipe.  
File: 84-019-026; D.4.33.2

Reference: A) Telephone Conversation between P. Narbut and G. Duckworth  
on November 24, 1982  
B) ANPP-22589, dated December 23, 1982 (Interim Report)  
C) ANPP-23222, dated March 10, 1983 (Time Extension)  
D) ANPP-23428, dated April 5, 1983 (Time Extension)  
E) ANPP-24002, dated June 8, 1983 (Time Extension)  
F) ANPP-27536, dated August 8, 1983 (Interim Report, Rev. 1)  
G) ANPP-28460, dated December 19, 1983 (Time Extension)

Dear Sir:

Attached is our final written report of the Reportable Deficiency under  
10CFR50.55(e), referenced above.

Very truly yours,



E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.  
APS Vice President, Nuclear  
ANPP Project Director

EEVB/TRB:ru  
Attachment

cc: See Page Two

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Mr. T. W. Bishop  
DER 82-73  
Page Two

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FINAL REPORT - DER 82-73  
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)  
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY (APS)  
PVNGS UNITS 1, 2, & 3

I. Description of Deficiency

During the installation of the below listed pipe supports, it was found that the pipe clamps did not fit firmly onto the pipe.

<u>Support Tag No.</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Reference NCR No.</u>
13-SG-103-H-003	2	PC-4870
13-SG-059-H-003	2	PC-4871
13-SG-103-H-002	2	PC-4872
13-SG-059-H-002	2	PC-4873
13-SG-070-H-003	2	PC-4874
13-SG-070-H-002	2	PC-4875
13-SC-307-H-005	2	PA-5307

A template check of the SA-625 special pipe clamps supplied by ITT Grinnell per Purchase Order Specification 10407-13-PM-209 verified that a gap existed between the pipe and pipe clamp across the width of the clamps. This condition resulted in a sliding fit rather than the required fit necessary for the associated snubber or sway strut to function as designed. The condition is only associated with this particular pipe clamp which is fabricated from increased stock thickness to satisfy the specified 3.0g side load requirement.

Bechtel corresponded with ITT Grinnell concerning this condition. ITT Grinnell indicated the sliding fit condition could be corrected by setting the required spacing at the load bolt, and inner clamp bolts (using the spacer provided with clamp) and then tightening the outer clamp bolts to bring the clamp in contact with the pipe. Attempts to do this did not result in acceptable fits. The subject clamps were then replaced with conforming clamps. ITT Grinnell witnessed installations of the seven (7) subject clamps which were identified as being defective and concluded that all but two did not fit firmly. Five (5) clamps (Mark Nos. 2-SG-059-H002, 2-SC-059-H003, 2-SG-070-H003, 2-SG-103-H002 and 2-SC-103-H003) were found to be unacceptable.

II. Analysis of Safety Implications

This condition is evaluated as reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), since if left uncorrected the unacceptable pipe clamps would result in a safety significant condition. These clamps do not fit the pipe firmly which is required for bi-directional loading during a safe-shutdown earthquake (SSE).

## II. Analysis of Safety Implications (Continued)

The PVNGS project also considers this deficiency to be reportable under the requirements of 10CFR Part 21. This report addresses the reporting requirements specified under the requirements of 10CFR Part 21(b) (3) with the exception of subpart (vi) which requires the number and other location of possible defective components be identified.

## III. Corrective Action

- A. The five (5) defective pipe clamps will be returned to ITT Grinnell. Replacement clamps were installed via NCRs PC-4870, PC-4871, PC-4872, PC-4873, and PC-4874.
- B. Pipe clamps Mark No. 2-SI-070-H002 and No. 2-SI-307-H005 have been evaluated by Bechtel Engineering and ITT Grinnell as acceptable (Reference NCRs PC-4875 and PX-6076).
- C. This report covers all Unit 1, 2, and 3 deficient pipe clamps identified by nonconformance reports to date. Receipt inspection is being conducted to provide advance identification of any future nonconforming pipe clamps of this type. Any nonconforming pipe clamps identified during this inspection will be documented on a new DER.
- D. A copy of this report will be transmitted to ITT Grinnell for information.