

CONTROL BLOCK

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 N C M G S 2 00 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CONT

01 REPORT SOURCE L 05 0 0 0 0 3 7 0 1 2 2 3 8 3 0 2 0 3 8 4 9
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

02 While in Mode 3 (preparing for cold shutdown), an isolation transformer for a
03 circuit containing the 2A generator breaker synchronization check relays overheated
04 and began to emit smoke. In response, operators swapped 6.9 kv busses 2TA (which feeds
05 2ETA, 4.16kv essential power train A) and 2TC to bus line 2B and then isolated bus
06 line 2A, thus deenergizing the transformer. Isolation of bus line 2A constituted a
07 degraded condition of the A.C. sources-operating (T.S.3.8.1.1) which is reportable
08 per T.S.6.9.1.11(b). During this incident, one offsite power source was operable at
09 all times, and both diesel generators were operable. Health and safety of the public
10 were unaffected.

09 E G 11 E 12 G 13 R E L A Y X 14 S 15 Z 16
17 LER/NO REPORT NUMBER 8 3 18 0 9 0 19 0 3 20 L 21 0
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

10 It is thought that one of the solid state synchronization check relays (GE Model
11 SLJ99AA1A) shorted, causing the isolation transformer to overheat due to increased
12 current in the transformer secondary. This failure is not considered to be generic.
13 The failed relay and the overheated isolation transformer (Jenkins Electric Model
14 MT-19T) were replaced. Bus line 2A was returned to service.

15 X 28 0 0 0 0 29 Mode 3 30 A 31 Personnel Observation
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

16 Z 33 Z 34 NA 35 NA 36
37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

17 0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA 39
40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

18 0 7 0 40 NA 41
42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

19 Z 42 NA 43
44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

20 N 44 NA 45
46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

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VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

February 3, 1984

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
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Subject: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 2
Docket No. 50-370
LER/RO-370/83-90

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-370/83-90. This report concerns T.S. 3.8.1.1, "As a Minimum, the Following A.C. Electrical Power Sources Shall Be Operable: a. Two Physically Independent Circuits Between the Offsite Transmission Network and the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power System, ...". This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,



Hal B. Tucker

PBN:jfw
Attachment

cc: Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. W. T. Orders
NRC Resident Inspector
McGuire Nuclear Station

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
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