

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3DOCKET NUMBER (2)
0 5 0 0 0 3 6 2 1 OF 0 2TITLE (4)
JANUARY 7, 1984, REACTOR TRIPEVENT DATE (5)
MONTH DAY YEAR
0 1 0 7 8 4 8 4
LER NUMBER (6)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER
- 0 0 3 - 0 0
REPORT DATE (7)
MONTH DAY YEAR
0 2 0 6 8 4
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
FACILITY NAMES
DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 5 0 0 0 0
0 5 0 0 0 0THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)
OPERATING MODE (9) 3
POWER LEVEL (10) 01010
20.402(b) X 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)
20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(a)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)
20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(a)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vi) OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.405(a)(1)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)
20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME J. G. HAYNES, STATION MANAGER
TELEPHONE NUMBER
AREA CODE 7 1 4 4 9 2 7 7 0 0COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
X A I A R I O D I C 4 9 10 NSUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO
EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 1/7/84, at 0030, with Unit 3 in Mode 3 at 0% power, while performing a planned Reactor shutdown, Control Element Assembly (CEA) 64 slipped thirty (30) inches. The Control Element Assembly Calculators (CEAC) detected the deviation of CEA 64 from its group and generated penalty factors, which, when used by the Core Protection Calculators (CPC's), resulted in Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) and Local Power Density (LPD) trips on all four Reactor Protection channels. All eight reactor trip breakers opened, fully inserting all CEA's not already inserted. The CEA 64 slip was caused by sluggish operation of the CEA drive mechanism. The vendor has been requested to review this event and to provide appropriate corrective action.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 3	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 2	8 4	— 0 0 3	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On January 7, 1984, at 0030, with Unit 3 in Mode 3 at 0% power and a planned Reactor shutdown in progress, Control Element Assembly (CEA) 64 slipped thirty (30) inches. The Control Element Assembly Calculators (CEAC) detected the deviation of CEA 64 from its CEA group and generated a penalty factor. This penalty factor is used by the Core Protection Calculators (CPC's) in the Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) and Local Power Density (LPD) programs to account for local power peaks that could result from a misaligned CEA. The CPC's generated a DNBR and LPD trip on all four channels of the Reactor Protection System (RPS). All eight reactor trip breakers opened, fully inserting all CEA's not already inserted.

Since the secondary plant was shutdown and reactor power was at 0%, no operator action was required to stabilize plant parameters.

The Safety Analysis Report shows that a single CEA drop from 100% power, assuming the most reactive CEA and the worst case axial shape index, does not result in a violation of any specified acceptable fuel design limits. There are no credible circumstances under which this event would have resulted in the plant being outside design limits.

Since the unit was in Mode 3 and the RPS actuation was not required for plant safety, a four hour report pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72.b.2(ii) was not considered appropriate. Our continuing review of this matter has clarified that all RPS actuations, when the RPS function is not in bypass, should be reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72.b.2(ii). Consequently, operators have been instructed at preshift briefings to make the required report.

The cause of the misalignment of CEA 64 was sluggish operation of the CEA drive mechanism which causes the upper and lower grippers to sequence improperly. The event is similar to those reported in LER 83-062, 83-097, and 83-110 (Docket No. 50-362). As corrective action, the vendor has been requested to review this event and those previously reported and to provide appropriate corrective action.

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Southern California Edison Company



SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P.O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

J. G. HAYNES
STATION MANAGER

February 6, 1984

TELEPHONE
(714) 492-7700

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-362
30-Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 84-003
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73.a.2(iv), this submittal provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving the actuation of the Reactor Protection System.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

J. G. HAYNES
STATION MANAGER

RCClark:2454u:jll

Enclosure: LER No. 84-003

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)
J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, NRC Region V)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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