

Arizona Public Service Company

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REGIONAL

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region V  
Creskide Oaks Office Park  
1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210  
Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. T. W. Bishop, Director  
Division of Resident  
Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs


Subject: Final Report - DER 83-86  
A 50.55(e) Reportable Condition Relating to Seismic Analysis  
Of The Shutdown Heat Exchanger Did Not Adequately Address  
Baseplate Thickness.  
File: 84-019-026; D.4.33.2

Reference: A) Telephone Conversation between P. Narbut and K. C. Parrish  
on December 23 1983  
B) Telephone Conversation between P. Johnson and T. Bradish on  
January 24, 1984

Dear Sir:

Attached is our final written report of the Reportable Deficiency under  
10CFR50.55(e), referenced above.

Very truly yours,



E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.  
APS Vice President, Nuclear  
ANPP Project Director

EEVB/TRB:ru  
Attachment

cc: See Page Two

Mr. T. W. Bishop  
DER 83-86  
Page Two

cc: Richard DeYoung, Director  
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

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FINAL REPORT - DER 83-86  
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)  
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY (APS)  
PVNGS UNITS 1, 2, & 3

I. Description of Deficiency

During the review of NUS Technical Report 1960, Revision 2, Bechtel Log Number N001-7.07-52 it was determined that the original calculations for the seismic analysis of the shutdown heat exchanger base plate, did not adequately address the plate thickness. Subsequent calculations showed that the base plates as currently installed are overstressed in localized areas around the anchor bolt holes.

II. Analysis of Safety Implications

C-E letter V-CE-19449 defines the safety analysis as follows:

An overstress of the heat exchanger base plate could, in the worst case, cause a failure of the base plate and excessive movement of the heat exchanger. Excessive movement of the heat exchanger could reduce the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) boundary.

Based on the above, this condition is evaluated as reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), since if this condition were to remain uncorrected, it would represent a significant safety condition. PVNGS Project also evaluates this condition as reportable under the requirements of 10CFR21.21(b) (3) with the exception of sub-part (vi), which requires the number and location of other possible defective equipment.

III. Corrective Action

- A. C-E letter V-CE-19264, defines that the corrective action is to add one inch reinforcement plates to existing heat exchanger base plates on all 3 units.
- B. Bechtel will implement the modifications via DCP's 1SM-SI-108, 2SM-SI-108 and 3CM-SI-108 prior to fuel load of the respective units.
- C. C-E has submitted revised drawings and documentation.
- D. A copy of this report will be sent to C-E for their review under the requirements of 10CFR21.