

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
Browns Ferry - Unit 1DOCKET NUMBER (2)
0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9 1 OF 0 2TITLE (4)
Standby Gas Treatment System Trains in Degraded Mode

EVENT DATE (6)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)	
0	1	17	84	003	00	02	06	84	Browns Ferry - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 6 0	
									Browns Ferry - Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 9 6	

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 8 0	N	20.402(b)		20.406(a)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)			
		20.406(a)(1)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	X	73.71(c)					
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	X	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)					
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
		20.406(a)(1)(v)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)					

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME
David L. Smith
TELEPHONE NUMBER
AREA CODE
205 712 191-101815

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	
A	B, H	A, H, U	X, 9, 9, 9	N						

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ☒ NO
EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During performance of testing of the standby gas treatment (SBGT) trains it was observed that one of the three trains had flow below design. Upon investigation, the discharge dampers on "A" and "C" trains were misadjusted in a nonconservative direction. Readjustment of the dampers and a pitot tube traverse of both trains were immediately accomplished with satisfactory design flow rates. The Final Safety Analysis Report values of 14,000 cfm for the combined flows of the standby gas treatment system could have been met at all times. ("B" train had 9,100 cfm; "A" and "C" combined had approximately 10,000 cfm with misaligned dampers.) Cause of misaligned discharge dampers is unknown. Recurrence control is to check discharge damper positions on a weekly basis.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXF RES. 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Browns Ferry - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9 8 4	—	0 0 1 3	—	0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

Unit 1 was operating 80 percent; Unit 2 was operating at 100 percent; and Unit 3 was in a refueling outage. At 1315, during performance of routine testing on the standby gas treatment system (BH), it was observed that the station instruments were showing the "A" train (AHU) flow to be less than the design flow required by Technical Specifications. At 1445, a pitot tube traverse was performed on the main inlet duct (DUCT) to the "A" train. The measured flow was 5125 cfm. Design flow is 9000 cfm +/- 10 percent.

An investigation revealed that the manual discharge dampers (CDMP) on both "A" and "C" trains were off their marked position. The dampers were returned to their proper position and a pitot tube traverse was performed for the "A" and "C" trains. The measured flows were 8761 cfm and 8827 cfm, respectively. Train "B" had been previously measured to be 9100 cfm.

Upon an accident signal on any unit, all three standby gas treatment systems trains will start. The system is designed to exhaust a minimum of 14,000 cfm of air with two air cleanup trains operating. "B" train was fully operable, and total flow of "A" and "C" combined with "B" would have provided sufficient flow to meet design requirements. Therefore, there was no safety consequences of the event, during an accident, provided no failure of "B" train occurred. Had an accident occurred and "B" failed, secondary containment negative pressure would be less than 0.25 inches of water, and in all probability some increase in the leakage of radioactive material and dose rate would be seen. However, from discovery of the "A" train low flow until full flow was achieved was less than two hours.

Plant Instructions state that manual discharge dampers shall not be moved off their proper positions without performance of a pitot tube traverse. Also, caution order tags and lock nuts were in place on each damper. This was because of a similar event that had occurred.

Due to the unknown nature of this occurrence, additional recurrence control of the three standby gas discharge dampers being added to Operations Section's weekly reactor building manual damper checklist has been accomplished. This will assure even closer surveillance than previously used.

Responsible Plant Section

Unknown

Previous Similar Events

BFRO-50-259/83034

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

P. O. Box 2000

Decatur, Alabama 35602

February 6, 1984

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET
NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BFRO-50-259/84003

The enclosed report provides details concerning standby gas treatment
systems in degraded mode. This report is submitted in accordance with
10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(ii), (a)(2)(v), and (a)(2)(vii).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

G. T. Jones
Power Plant Superintendent
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):
Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900
Atlanta, GA 30303

Nkc Inspector, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

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