

## U. S. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL ON EDUCATION

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CONT

0	1
---	---

REPORT SOURCE

L	6	0	5	0	0	0	2	6	0	7	1	2	1	4	8	3	8	0	1	1	2	8	4	9
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 65 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

During normal operation, while performing SI 4.1.A-8 (RPS-High Water Level

net response to simulated step change in level. Design criteria specifies

a maximum response time of 71 seconds. Tech. Spec. 3.1.A requires 2 operable

instrument channels per trip system. There was no danger to the health of

safety of the public. Redundant level switch LS-85-45E was operable.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

Cause of transmitter response is not known. The Rosemount 1153 transmitter

(LT-85-45G) was replaced. SI 4.1.A-8 (Calibration and Functional Test) was

performed and the system returned to normal. Faulty transmitter is being

sent to vendor for analysis and a follow-up report will be issued.

8401240502 840112  
PDR ADCK 05000260  
S PDR

NAC USE ONLY

G. T. Chambers

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 260/ 83080 Technical Specification Involved 3.1.A

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(2) Date Due NRC 01/13/84

Event Narrative:

Units 1 and 3 were in refueling outages. Unit 2 was at 93% power. Only unit 2 was affected by this event. During performance of SI 4.1.A-8 (Reactor Protection System - High Water Level in Scram Discharge Tank) LT-85-45G was found to operate in 76 seconds in response to a simulated step change in level. Design criteria calls for a step change response in a maximum time of 71 seconds. Tech. Spec. 3.1.A requires 2 operable instrument channels per trip system and this event reduced that number to one in "A" trip system. "B" trip system was also available and operable.

Cause of slow transmitter response is not known. The Rosemount 1153 transmitter LT-85-45G was replaced, the new transmitter was calibrated, functionally tested and returned to service. Faulty transmitter is being sent back to factory for analysis and a follow-up report will be issued when the analysis is complete. There was no danger to the health or safety of the public. Redundant level switch LS-85-45E was operable.

\* Previous Similar Events:

BFRO-50-260/83063

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

\*Revision: JRP

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

1750 Chestnut Street Tower 11

January 10, 1984

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Suite 2900  
101 Marietta Street, NW.  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET  
NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE  
REPORT BFRO-50-259/83071

The enclosed report provides details concerning a continuous air  
monitor that was inoperable because of a broken drive belt. This  
report is submitted in accordance with Browns Ferry unit 1 Technical  
Specification 6.7.2.b(2).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

  
J. A. Coffey  
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Document Control Desk  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
Suite 1500  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway  
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, Browns Ferry

OFFICIAL COPY

1622

11