

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401  
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

BLRD-50-438/82-71  
BLRD-50-439/82-65

81 JAN 19 412:35  
January 16, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - UNDERDESIGNED SNUBBER ON MAIN  
FEEDWATER PIPING IN VALVE ROOM B - BLRD-50-438/82-71, BLRD-50-439/82-65 -  
FOURTH INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector  
K. Landis on October 13, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as  
NCR BLN CEB 8214. This was followed by our interim reports dated  
November 10, 1982 and February 16 and May 25, 1983. Enclosed is our fourth  
interim report. We expect to submit our next report by April 19, 1985.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at  
FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

*L. M. Mills*

L. M. Mills, Manager  
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500  
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2  
UNDERDESIGNED SNUBBER ON MAIN FEEDWATER PIPING IN VALVE ROOM B  
BLRD-50-438/82-71, BLRD-50-439/82-65  
NCR BLN CEB 8214  
10 CFR 50.55(e)  
FOURTH INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

A snubber on the main feedwater piping in valve room B, shown on isometric drawing 1AW0501-CF-B1 at node 5, is underdesigned. The calculated loads (analysis problems N4-1CF-B and N4-2CF-B) at node 5 are low because a snubber was placed on a valve operator at node 25 which apparently added restraint to the piping. The snubber at node 25 if required, should not provide significant restraint to the piping.

Interim Progress

While reviewing the rigorous analysis problems, TVA examined CEB report 75-28, "Dynamic Earthquake Analysis of the Main Steam Valve Room B and Response Spectra for Attached Equipment," which presents the spectra curves in 2 components (translational and torsional). It was found that the piping analyses of the attached piping did not consider the torsional components and effects into the floor response spectra. The analysis problems affected are:

N4-1(2) CF-C, -B, -H  
N4-1(2) CR-D, -G  
N4-1(2) SM-R, -S, -C, and -B  
N4-1(2) SV-A, -I, -S, -K, -L, -M, and -Q

TVA has scheduled the reanalysis for the problems affected and will provide more information upon completion of the work.