

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/1/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT
/0/1/ REPORT /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/8/ (7) /1/2/2/0/8/3/ (8) /0/1/1/1/8/4/ (9)
SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On December 20, 1983, with Unit 1 at 100 percent rated thermal power Containment /
/0/3/ / Pressure Channel IV was observed to be drifting and causing intermittent alarms. /
/0/4/ / The channel was placed in the tripped condition within one hour as required by /
/0/5/ / the Action Statement of T.S. 3.3.2.1. Since the redundant channels remained /
/0/6/ / available to initiate a High, Intermediate High-High and High High Containment /
/0/7/ / Pressure signals if required, the health and safety of the public were not /
/0/8/ / affected. This event is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. /

SYSTEM	CAUSE	CAUSE	COMP.	VALVE
CODE	CODE	SUBCODE	SUBCODE	SUBCODE

/0/9/	/I/B/ (11)	/E/ (12)	/E/ (13)	/I/N/S/T/R/U/ (14)	/T/ (15)	/Z/ (16)	
	LER/RO	EVENT	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL	OCCURRENCE	REPORT	REVISION
	REPORT			REPORT NO.	CODE	TYPE	NO.

(17)	NUMBER	/8/3/	/-/	/0/8/5/	/	/0/3/	/L/	/-/	/0/
------	--------	-------	-----	---------	---	-------	-----	-----	-----

ACTION	FUTURE	EFFECT	SHUTDOWN	ATTACHMENT	NPRD-4	PRIME COMP.	COMPONENT	
TAKEN	ACTION	ON PLANT	METHOD	HOURS	SUBMITTED	FORM SUB.	SUPPLIER	MANUFACTURER

/B/ (18) /Z/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /Y/ (24) /N/ (25) /F/1/8/0/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / The cause of the channel behavior could not be determined, however it is suspect-/
/1/1/ / ed that dirt in the feedback coil of the pressure transmitter resulted in the /
/1/2/ / failure. The transmitter was inspected, cleaned and the channel was returned to /
/1/3/ / service following a satisfactory calibration. /
/1/4/ /

FACILITY	STATUS	%POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF	DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/	/E/ (28)	/1/0/0/ (29)	/ NA /	(30)	/A/ (31)	/ Operator Observation /

ACTIVITY	CONTENT	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
/1/6/	/Z/ (33) /Z/ (34)	/ NA /	/ NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES	DESCRIPTION (39)
NUMBER TYPE	
/1/7/	/0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES	DESCRIPTION (41)
NUMBER	
/1/8/	/0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY	DESCRIPTION (43)
TYPE	
/1/9/	/Z/ (42) / NA /

PUBLICITY	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
	/N/ (44)	/ NA /	/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/2/0/			

NAME OF PREPARER E. Wayne Harrell

PHONE (703) 894-5151

8401230021 840111
PDR ADOCK 05000338
S PDR

Description of Event

On December 20, 1983, with Unit 1 at 100 percent rated thermal power, Containment Pressure Channel IV began drifting erratically causing intermittent containment high to high-high pressure alarms. The channel was observed to drift almost full scale resulting in the alarms. The channel was placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour as required by the Action Statement of T.S. 3.3.2.1. This event is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The consequences of this event were limited since Containment Pressure Channels II and III remained available to initiate a Containment High Pressure Signal (Safety Injection and Phase A Isolation) or a Containment Intermediate High-High Pressure Signal (Main Steam Line Isolation) if required. In addition Channels I, II, and III remained available to initiate a Containment High-High Pressure Signal (Containment Depressurization Actuation) if required. Consequently, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Cause of Event

An investigation of the instrument loop isolated the fault to be in the pressure transmitter (Foxboro Model EllAH Absolute Pressure Transmitter). It is suspected that the event was caused by dirt in the feedback coil of the transmitter which would have resulted in the observed channel response.

Immediate Corrective Action

The pressure transmitter was cleaned and calibrated satisfactorily and the channel was returned to service.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No further corrective action is required.

Action Taken To Prevent Recurrence

No further action is required.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications associated with this event.



VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

P. O. BOX 402

MINERAL, VIRGINIA 23117

January 11, 1984

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. N-83-177
NO/JRR: 11
Docket No. 50-338
License No. NPF-4

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to North Anna Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following License Event Report applicable to North Anna Unit No. 1.

Report No.


Applicable Technical Specifications

LER 83-085/03L-0

T.S. 6.9.1.9.b

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to Safety Evaluation and Control for their review.

Very Truly Yours,



E. Wayne Harrell
Station Manager

Enclosures (3 copies)

cc: Document Control Desk (1 copy)
016 Phillips Bldg.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

OFFICIAL COPY

It 22

11