

3150-0011
EXPIRES 4-30-82

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

REPORT DATE: 12/21/21

PHONE: 704-373-2844

DUKE POWER COMPANY

P.O. BOX 33189
CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242

HAL B. TUCKER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE
(704) 373-4531

January 9, 1984


Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-287/83-13 Revision 1. My letter of December 22, 1983 noted that the report was submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.a.(9). This report, however, should have been submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b.(2) which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public. This submittal is also being provided to revise, and thus clarify, statements made in NRC Form 366 of this report which may have been misinterpreted.

Very truly yours,



Hal B. Tucker

PFG/php

Attachment

cc: Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

Mr. J. C. Bryant
NRC Resident Inspector
Oconee Nuclear Station

Mr. John F. Suermann
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

OFFICIAL COPY

JLZC

||

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Report Number: RO-287/83-13 Revision 1

Report Date: January 9, 1984

Occurrence Date: November 24, 1983

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence:

Containment Isolation Valve 3CS-5 was declared inoperable due to leakage past the seat.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Oconee 3 100% Full Power

Description of Occurrence:

At 0230 hours on November 24, 1983 an Engineered Safeguards (ES) valve 3CS-5 was discovered to be leaking past the seat while attempting to isolate and drain the portion of the line between 3CS-5 and 3CS-6 to repair 3CS-25. Therefore, valve 3CS-5 was declared inoperable. The valve was cycled to see if it would properly reseat. After several attempts, the valve resealed and no leakage was observed. For several days the valve was observed for leakage. On December 2, 1983, it was hypothesized that the cycling had corrected the problem, thus the valve was declared operable. However, on December 3, 1983, the valve was again discovered to be leaking past the seat, therefore, the valve was declared inoperable.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The cause of this occurrence was determined to be a component failure. Initially, it was hypothesized that foreign material was lodged in the valve seat and was subsequently flushed away when the valve was being cycled. The December 3, 1983, failure of the valve to properly reseat cannot be determined at this time. A supplemental report on the apparent cause of the valve failure to properly reseat will be submitted when information is available.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The inoperability of valve 3CS-5 meant that one of the two containment isolation valves for penetration number 29 was not performing its intended function. The redundant valve in the quench tank drain line, (valve 3CS-6), was fully operable during unit operation. By deactivating and administratively locking it closed within four hours of declaring 3CS-5 inoperable, continued containment isolation was assured and the limits of 10 CFR 100 would not have been exceeded should the maximum hypothetical accident occurred. Therefore, the health and safety of the public was not endangered.

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Corrective Action:

Within four hours of declaring 3CS-5 inoperable, the redundant valve 3CS-6 was deactivated and administratively locked. This action was performed both times 3CS-5 was declared inoperable, November 24 and December 3, 1983. The failure and eventual repair of valve 3CS-5 will be completed at the next available outage. The results of this investigation will be submitted as a supplemental report.