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July 23, 1991

W. G. Hairston, III
Senior Vice President
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The Southern Electric System

ELV-02975
1050

Docket No. 50-425


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
LCO 3.0.3 ENTRY DUE TO MOMENTARY CLOSURE OF
CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company hereby submits the enclosed report related to an event which occurred on June 25, 1991.

Sincerely,


W. G. Hairston, III

WGH, III/NJS/gmb

Enclosure: LER 50-425/1991-008

xc: Georgia Power Company
Mr. C. K. McCoy
Mr. W. B. Shipman
Mr. P. D. Rushton
Mr. M. Sheibani
NORMS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. S. D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator
Mr. D. S. Hood, Licensing Project Manager, NRR
Mr. B. R. Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000425				PAGE (3) 1 OF 4	
TITLE (4) LOO 3.0.3 ENTRY DUE TO MOMENTARY CLOSURE OF CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE															
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)					
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)		
									VEGP-UNIT 1				05000424		
06	25	91	91	008	00	07	23	91					05000		
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (11)															
OPERATING MODE (9)		1		20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)			
POWER LEVEL		100		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)			
				20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below)			
				20.405(a)(1)(iii)		X 50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
				20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
				20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)							
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)															
NAME										TELEPHONE NUMBER					
MEHDI SHEIBANI, NUCLEAR SAFETY AND COMPLIANCE										AREA CODE		826-3209			
404															
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)															
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORT TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORT TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORT TO NPRDS	
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO					

AES/RNC. (16)

On 6-25-91 at 0143 CDT, the Train B safety injection pump (SIP) was tagged out for maintenance. At 0218 CDT, a quarterly inservice test was initiated for the Train B centrifugal charging pump (CCP). In accordance with the test procedure, the discharge valve for the Train A CCP was closed. Upon observing the closure of the Train A valve, the Shift Supervisor realized that the operability of both emergency core cooling system (ECCS) subsystems was impacted by the B Train test. Since an inoperable condition for both ECCS subsystems is not addressed by the action requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2, TS 3.0.3 was momentarily entered while action was taken to reopen the Train A valve. A subsequent review of historical records found that, on at least one other occasion, performance of the test procedure had similarly resulted in an inoperable condition for both ECCS subsystems.

The cause of these events was procedure inadequacy. With a few exceptions, test procedures are written so that performance of the procedure on one train will not affect the operability of the redundant train. While this test procedure contained a step which made it an exception, no specific caution was provided to ensure operator awareness of the effect of the step. Also, additional review has determined that the test methodology can be changed so that the test will not affect the operability of the opposite train.

Corrective action will be taken to change the test procedure methodology.

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TEXT

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i) because a condition not provided for in the action requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 existed.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

At the time of this event on 6-25-91, Unit 2 was operating in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100% of rated thermal power. Other than that described herein, there was no inoperable equipment which contributed to the occurrence or consequences of this event.

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On 6-25-91 at 0143 CDT, the action requirements of TS 3.5.2 were entered when the Train B safety injection pump (SIP) was tagged out for maintenance. Technical Specification 3.5.2 requires two independent emergency core cooling system (ECCS) subsystems to be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3, with each subsystem comprised of:

- a. One operable centrifugal charging pump,
- b. One operable safety injection pump,
- c. One operable residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger,
- d. One operable RHR pump, and
- e. An operable flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a safety injection signal and semiautomatically transferring suction to the containment emergency sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, the action requirements of TS 3.5.2 require the inoperable subsystem to be restored to operable status within 72 hours or else the Unit must be in at least Hot Standby (Mode 3) within the next 6 hours and in Hot Shutdown (Mode 4) within the following 6 hours.

At 0218 CDT, the Unit 2 Shift Supervisor authorized the performance of a quarterly inservice test (IST) for the Train B centrifugal charging pump (CCP). This test is performed in accordance with the instructions of procedure 14808-2, "Centrifugal Charging Pump and Check Valve Inservice Test." In addition to providing a method for verifying the operability of the CCP, procedure 14808-2 also contains steps for demonstrating the operability of the CCP discharge check valve. One of the steps for demonstrating operability of the CCP discharge check valve requires the Train A CCP discharge valve (2HV-8485A) to be closed if the Train A CCP is running. Since the Train A CCP was operating to supply charging flow to the reactor coolant system (RCS), this step was applicable to the test. Therefore, at 0304 CDT (when the operating crew reached this step in the

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procedure), the Reactor Operator proceeded to close the Train A CCP discharge valve. Note that the Train B CCP was running and its discharge valve was open, in accordance with the instructions of the test procedure, at the time that the Train A CCP discharge valve was closed.

Upon observing the closure of the Train A valve, the Shift Supervisor immediately realized that both ECCS subsystems were inoperable since the Train B SIP was tagged out. Since this represented a condition not provided for in the action requirements of TS 3.5.2, TS 3.0.3 was momentarily entered while operator action was taken to reopen the Train A CCP discharge valve. Subsequently, the action requirements of TS 3.5.2 were exited at 2046 CDT on 6-25-91 after completion of the maintenance on the Train B SIP.

Due to a concern that prior performance of procedure 14808-2 (or Unit 1 procedure 14808-1) may have similarly resulted in an inoperable condition for both ECCS subsystems, a review of historical records was conducted on 7-11-91. One previous similar event was identified. On 11-15-90, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 operation, procedure 14808-1 was performed for the Unit 1 Train B CCP. The Unit 1 Train B CCP, the Train B SIP, and the Train B RHR pump had been tagged out of service on 11-14-90 due to a planned outage of the Train B nuclear service cooling water system. The quarterly inservice test for the Train B CCP was due to be performed and since some minor maintenance had been completed for the Train B CCP, performance of procedure 14808-1 was also intended as a functional test for restoring the Train B CCP to service. Since the Train B SIP and the Train B RHR pump were still tagged out, performance of the step requiring closure of the Train A CCP discharge valve therefore resulted in a momentary, unrecognized, inoperable condition for both ECCS subsystems on 11-15-90. No additional previous similar events were identified.

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The root cause of these events was procedure inadequacy. With a few exceptions, test and surveillance procedures are written so that performance of the procedure on one train will not impact the operability of the redundant train. While procedures 14808-1 and -2 were such exceptions, since they contain the step for closing the redundant train CCP discharge valve, no specific caution was provided in these procedures to ensure operator awareness of the effect of this step. Additionally, further review has determined that the test methodology of procedures 14808-1 and -2 can be changed so that it is not necessary to close the redundant train discharge valve. The same result can be achieved by stopping the redundant train pump. Stopping the redundant train CCP, if it is operating, will not impact its operability.

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The Train A CCP discharge valve was closed only momentarily (approximately 1 minute) before compensatory operator action was taken to reopen the valve. Had the error of closing the valve not been recognized, the valve would

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still have been closed only momentarily before being reopened per the guidance of procedure 14808-2. Additionally, per the guidance of procedure 14808-2, the Train B CCP was available and running at the time the Train A CCP discharge valve was closed. Based on these considerations, there was no adverse effect on plant safety or on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. Procedures 14808-1 and -2 will be revised by 8-15-91 to change the test methodology as noted above.
2. A broadness review has been initiated to positively identify any additional test or surveillance procedures containing steps which could similarly render equipment inoperable in the train redundant to the train being tested. As appropriate, a revision to the procedures identified will be completed by 9-10-91 to avoid occurrence of similar events.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Failed Components Identification:

None.

2. Previous Similar Events:

None.

3. Energy Industry Identification System Codes

Residual Heat Removal/Low Pressure Safety Injection System (PWR) - BP

High Pressure Safety Injection System (PWR) - BQ